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The image shows the front cover of an antique book. The cover is decorated with a traditional marbled paper pattern, featuring large, irregular, cell-like shapes in shades of ochre, mustard yellow, and deep blue, set against a dark reddish-brown background. The pattern has a swirling, organic quality. The spine of the book, visible on the left, is made of a dark brown, worn leather. A small, rectangular, cream-colored paper label with a decorative scalloped border is affixed to the bottom left corner of the marbled cover. The label contains the handwritten text "1057 e. 18" in dark ink. The overall appearance is that of a well-used, historical volume.

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DEFENSE OF AN ESSAY

ON THE

PROPER RENDERING OF THE WORDS

ELOHIM AND GEOS

INTO THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.

BY

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**MISSIONARY BISHOP OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
OF THE UNITED STATES TO CHINA.**

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DEFENCE OF AN ESSAY

ON THE PROPER RENDERING OF THE WORDS

ELOHIM AND THEOS

INTO THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.

It is now two years and a half since my Essay, advocating the use of the word *shin* 神 to render *Elohim* and *Theos* into the Chinese language, was written. Soon after its publication, Dr. Medhurst replied to it in a pamphlet of 107 pages, taking up, as he tells us, every successive paragraph that seemed to call for remark.

In England, the "Inquiry" of Dr. Medhurst, and my Essay, drew from Sir George Staunton a small volume, in which he urges the propriety of using *Shángti* 上帝 to render *Elohim* and *Theos*, when these words are used *proprie*, and opposes the use of *shin* for this purpose. This volume is written in so very kind and courteous a tone, that we feel much indebted to its accomplished author for his contribution to our discussion. We are also indebted to Dr. Bowring, H. B. M. Consul at Canton, for a spirited article "On the manner of expressing the word for God in the Chinese language," which appeared in the Chinese Repository for 1849, Vol. XVIII., page 600.

On the 30th January last, Dr. Medhurst and five of his friends addressed a letter of 21 pages "To the Protestant Missionaries laboring at Hongkong and the Five Ports of China," in which they give up the native terms for which they had hitherto contended, and advocate as the rendering of *Elohim* and *Theos* in our Chinese version the transfer of the Hebrew word *Eloah* by the three Chinese characters 阿羅訶 *Aloho*.

More recently, a writer who signs himself "an American Missionary in China," and the Rev. Dr. Legge, have published pamphlets on this controversy, and have commented on my Essay.

That the first-mentioned of these publications has been left so long without an answer, has not arisen from a conviction that no defence of my Essay was needed, but from several causes, the principal of which has been the state of my health, which has rendered writing very irksome to me. Instead of encountering the labor of preparing another pamphlet, I have hitherto preferred keeping the Bible societies acquainted with my views by correspondence; and I confess it is with extreme reluctance that I now set myself to the task of writing another pamphlet for publication; I would so much prefer spending the little strength I have in other work. The question however, which is under debate, is one of such vital importance to the progress of the Gospel in China, that I can not excuse myself from the task, however unpleasant, and I fear that should I refrain longer from printing, it might prove disadvantageous to what I regard as the truth, as many who feel a lively interest in the controversy may have no access to the papers of the Bible Societies, and few who have such access, like to encounter a heavy mass of manuscript. It is due, too, to my missionary brethren in China that I should make them acquainted with what I have to say in defence of an Essay, in the views of which so many of them have concurred. I will therefore, without further preliminaries, address myself to the task which is before me.

In this defence, I shall not endeavor to follow the above-mentioned writers through their several treatises, but shall endeavor to present, as fairly and as fully as I can, all the objections to the arguments offered in my Essay that are of weight, and discuss these objections in that order, which will serve best to set forth clearly the whole matter in dispute.

The positions taken in my Essay may be expressed briefly as follows: The Chinese are polytheists, not monotheists; they do not know the true God, or any being who may truly and properly be called God; therefore the highest being known to them is to be regarded only as the chief god of a pantheon, and not as the Being we call God. *Under these circumstances*, we can only choose, I contended, between 'the name of the chief god of the Chinese, and the name by which the whole class of gods is known in their language.' It is derogatory to Jehovah to call him by the proper name or distinctive title of any false god; we cannot therefore, use the name of the chief god of the Chinese to render *Elohim* and *Theos*, and must, according to the alternative above presented, use the generic name of the Chinese gods. We must embrace this alternative, because the use of this generic is necessary to the correct rendering of the First Commandment, and

many other passages of Scripture; its use is absolutely necessary to forbid the reigning polytheism. This generic name is *Shin*; therefore we must use this word *Shin*, *malgré* all objections, to render *Elohim* and *Theos* into Chinese.

On looking at the above abstract of my argument, it will be seen that the conclusion, "We must use *shin* to render *Elohim* and *Theos*," rests on the following propositions:

1st. The Chinese do not know any being who may truly and properly be called God; they have therefore no name for such a being, no word in their language answering to our word God.

2d. That, this being the state of things, we must seek the general name of their gods, and content ourselves with the use of the word in Chinese that answers to our words a *god*, *gods*, as the best that can be done under the circumstances.

3d. That *shin* is the general or generic name of the Chinese gods; and therefore it follows, That this word should be used to render *Elohim* and *Theos* into Chinese.

From the nature and connection of the above propositions, it will also be seen, that, to invalidate this conclusion, one of the five following propositions must be sustained.

(a.) The Chinese do know a being, who is truly and properly God; or in other words, the highest being known to them is not a false god, but is the very Being whom we call God, whose name is therefore the proper word by which to render *Elohim* and *Theos* in all cases; or,

(b.) Admitting that the Chinese do not know the true God, contend that we should use a relative, not an absolute or generic term to render *Elohim* and *Theos*, because these words are relative, and not absolute terms; or,

(c.) Admitting that the highest being known to the Chinese is not truly and properly God, yet affirm that his name or title, and not the generic name of the Chinese gods, should be used to render *Elohim* and *Theos* in all cases: or,

(d.) Admitting the facts to be as stated in Prop. (b.), affirm that, we should render *Elohim* and *Theos* only when these words are used *proprie*, by the name or title of this highest Being, i. e. *Shangti*; and when used *improprie*, they should be rendered by *Shin*, or *Shin-ming*; or, lastly,

(e.) Admitting that under the above-mentioned circumstances, the generic name of the Chinese gods should be used, if such can be found; deny that *Shin* is this generic name, and affirm, on the contrary, that as the Chinese have neither a name for any being who is truly

and properly God, nor any generic name of their gods, and the words *Elohim* and *Theos* must be rendered by a generic term, we have no resource but that of transferring the original word.

All the objections that have been urged against the use of *Skin*, will come naturally under one or other of these heads; and it will promote, we think, a clear understanding of the questions that have been raised, and of all points at issue, to discuss them in this order.

Previous however to the discussion of these heads, I will recur to a point, on which much stress was laid at the commencement of my Essay. I refer to the importance of determining, definitely, at the very outset, "*what* we should seek for, before our minds become engaged in the examination of the multifarious evidence that may be submitted." The settlement of this point, as a preliminary, is the more important from the fact that all parties admit that there is no word in the Chinese language that answers to the Hebrew *Eloah*, *Elohim*, the Greek *Theos*, *Theoi*, and the English *God*, *god*, *gods*.

On this subject Dr. Medhurst thus expresses his opinion on p. 4. of his "Inquiry:" "Having discussed the meanings of *Elohim*, and *Theos*, as these words were understood by both Hebrew and Greek writers, to indicate the Supreme, as well as inferior deities, we now come to consider what term in Chinese is *most nearly equivalent* to them. And here it may be premised, that, after most studious research, we have not been able to find any one term that fully answers to the words as employed in the Old and New Testaments." Dr. Legge, after quoting this, adds his own opinion in the following words: "The conclusion to which my researches, equally studious probably, though not so extensive, have brought me, is substantially the same." We shall see presently that Sir George Staunton, Dr. Bowring, and the "American Missionary," all concur in this opinion.

Of the word *God*, the several parties writing on this question, take widely different views in many respects; but it seems to me there is one error which has chiefly misled Dr. Medhurst, Sir George Staunton, Dr. Bowring and Dr. Legge, and which we must be careful not to fall into, if we would keep the real point of search clearly before us. The error, to which I allude, is that of regarding the word *God* as the "symbol of an idea," to use Sir George Staunton's expression, instead of regarding it, as it really is, as the name of a *bond fide* Being, of whom, after we have exhausted all the *idees* of which we are capable, we can form but very inadequate conceptions.

Dr. Medhurst commences his Inquiry with these words: "In discussing the proper mode of rendering a word out of one language into

another, we should first ascertain, from lexicographers and standard writers, the meaning of the word which is to be translated; and then, by means of the same process, the meaning of the word or words proposed as the representative of *the idea*, in the language into which we are translating." He afterwards appears to feel conscious that many ideas must concur to make up our conception of what is included in the word *God*; the next stage is therefore to content himself with the leading idea, and this leading or principal *idea* he decides is *power* or authority.

Dr. Bowring writes (see Chinese Repository, Vol. XVIII, page 600): "How indeed should they (i. e. the parties who have written on both sides of this controversy) have succeeded? They have been struggling through incompetent means for an unattainable end; they have been seeking in the Chinese mind, and in the Chinese language for what was never there. In order that an *idea* should exhibit itself by some external *symbol*, some expression, some formula—the *idea* itself must have a previous existence," &c. He then proposes to treat *God* as he would an unknown quantity in algebra, i. e. represent this unknown quantity by a symbol, viz: Θ . When I read this, the thought occurred to me, Could Dr. Bowring kneel down and seriously pray to Θ , "O, Θ ! have mercy upon me!" I surely could not.

Sir George Staunton writes, "In the Chinese language there neither is, nor could there be expected to be, any word which fully and correctly conveys the *idea*, which we Christians attach to the word *God*. Words are but the symbols of ideas, and we have not yet implanted the *idea* itself in the Chinese mind." How much clearer to say,— "We cannot expect to find any name in Chinese for the *Being* whom we Christians call *God*, as we have not yet taught the Chinese to know this *Being*, *God*."

To show how fatally this regarding the word *God* as the symbol of an *idea*, will mislead us, we quote from Sir George's "Inquiry" his method of meeting this difficulty. Having stated that the Chinese have no word answering to our word *God*, he proceeds to say, "I think I have shown that the term *Shángti* has from time immemorial been employed in Chinese in a sense more nearly approaching to that which we attach to the word *God* than any other which at present exists in the language of the country." What is this but saying that, the *Being* whom the Chinese call *Shángti* comes nearer to the *Being* whom we Christians call *God*, than any other *Being* the Chinese know. But this is a case surely in which the rule *nullum simile est idem* applies. To come short of the Infinite *Being* whom

we Christians call *God*, is to come infinitely short : to come only near to, and not to be quite one and the same with Him, is to be wholly another Being, a false god.

To clear this matter, we must remember that the word *God* is always the name, not of an *idea*, but of a being ; that, when used (1st) *proprie*, by monotheists, it is the name of the self-existent, spiritual Being, who created the heavens and the earth, and all things visible; and invisible : that when used (2d) *improprie*, by polytheists, or by monotheists in accommodation to the views of polytheists, it is still, in every instance, the name not of an *idea*, but of a *Being* or *Beings*, (imaginary Beings it is true, yet still beings, not abstract ideas) to whom their ignorant worshipers betake themselves for aid in trouble, look up to for protection, and endeavor to propitiate with religious worship.

The importance of keeping this distinction in our minds arises from the difference there is between those nouns which are the names of beings and abstract nouns, in the facility with which we can use abstract nouns that are very similar in meaning for each other, which interchange can not be made in the case of such concrete nouns as those mentioned above. E. g. the use of the word that comes nearest to expressing the idea we desire to convey, if this word is the name of an abstract idea—of a mere mental conception—is unobjectionable, and is often the best expedient we can adopt in conveying our thoughts to another. But in the use of concrete nouns we can not do this. Suppose that I were telling another of a duty or service he owed to a given Being, and I should from forgetfulness of the name of this Being, direct him to render the service or duty to the Being; whose name came nearest to his in sound or signification, or who most nearly resembled him in person or character; the *resemblance* in any of these respects is not of the slightest importance: on the contrary, being only *resemblance*, and not *sameness*, it proves him to be *another Being* than the one designed, and therefore that by using his name I have defrauded "the Being," to whom the service of duty was due.

If we desire to ascertain whether the Chinese know God, we should not inquire, what the leading or principal *idea* conveyed by the word God is, that we may see if the Chinese have any word that conveys this principal idea; but rather ask, do they know any Being, who, from what they predicate of him, can be known to be the same Being we Christians call God; then the next question is, by what name do they call this Being, and if we can find, in answer to this query, the absolute term, which in the Chinese language designates this being, we shall have found the word in Chinese, that answers to our much sought

word God, when it is used *proprie*. The first point, however, is to decide, Is the being the *same*? it will be time enough, after this point is settled, to inquire for the name. If the being be not the same, no matter what the principal idea suggested to us by his name may be, this name will be but the name of a false god, and nothing more.

The principal idea suggested by the word *God*, (if what this idea is, could ever be decided) takes in only a very small part of the ideas, which go to make up our conception of the Being we call God; and a being, the meaning of whose name conveyed this principal idea, might want those physical attributes, *e. g.* self-existence, omniscience, &c.; or might fail to sustain those relations of Creator, Upholder, Sustainer of the universe, &c., or want those moral attributes, without which a being can not be truly and properly God.

If I am correct in what I have said above, then the first question for us to consider is, do the Chinese know any being, whom we can regard as the same with "the Being" we call God? That they know no such being was taken for granted, and not discussed in my Essay, because, as I there said, I understood this was admitted by all the Protestant missionaries in China. The discussion of this point has become necessary from the fact of its having been distinctly affirmed by Dr. Legge, and from the indefinite manner in which other parties have expressed their opinions about it.

To the position, taken by me, that, "under these circumstances," *i. e.* the Chinese not knowing the true God, "we can only choose between the name of the chief god, and the name by which the whole class of gods in their language is known," I understand Dr. Legge to reply in substance as follows. "There may be no middle course between the alternatives, allowing the case to be as you state it; but I deny the correctness of the statement: the Chinese do know the true God. I rejoice to acknowledge in the *Shángti* of the Chinese Classics, and the *Shángti* of the Chinese people, Him who is God over all, blessed for ever p. 32. But even should we admit that the Chinese do not know the true God, 'there is a real *tertium quid*,' a course altogether different. God is not a generic, but a relative term; and relative terms are defined to be "words which imply a relation, or a thing considered as compared to another. They include a kind of opposition between them; yet so, as that the *one cannot be without the other*. Such are father and son, husband and wife, king and subjects, &c. To these instances I have no hesitation in adding that of *God and creatures*," p. 5. "God does not indicate the *essence*, or express *anything* about the *being* of Jehovah," p. 24. "Should the Chinese therefore have no word

that answers to God, in having been actually used as one of the many names of the Supreme Being (i. e. the true God)," we should not under these circumstances seek for an absolute generic, but a relative term to render Elohim and *Theos*, because these words are relative and not absolute."

The first point made by Dr. Legge's argument, as expressed above, coincides with the proposition marked *a*; the other points come under propositions *b*. and *c*. We shall postpone the discussion of them until we take up those propositions.

Dr. Medhurst, in his "Inquiry," expresses himself very indefinitely on the point whether the Chinese know the true God or not. We have seen above that he acknowledges, at the outset, that he has been unable "to find any one term that fully answers to the words" *Elohim* and *Theos* "as employed in the Old and New Testaments." He then proceeds to mention the important particulars in which "the Chinese ideas of God fall short of the truth." These are, that the "creation of heaven and earth are not ascribed to any being," the highest being known to them, variously designated *T'ien* 天, *Ti* 帝, or *Shángti* 上帝, is never said to be self-existent, nor described as existing from eternity." He then, after mentioning several attributes of the being styled *Ti*, proceeds to say, "There can be no doubt that, the Chinese use the word *Ti* in the same way in which western writers use the word *God*; that they ascribe to *Ti* such attributes, as were usually ascribed to the Divine Being by the Pagans of Greece and Rome." "We therefore conclude that, by *Ti*, the Chinese mean the Supreme God, so far as they are acquainted with him. They also use the word *Ti* when speaking of inferior spiritual beings, who have some superintendence over different parts of the universe, and who, in the estimation of the Confucianists, were entitled to religious worship; while the word was applied by both Táuist and Buddhist writers to beings, whom they considered as gods. The inference therefore is that *Ti* is descriptive of a class of beings, beginning with the highest and passing down to inferior divinities, and is therefore generic for God in Chinese." See "Inquiry" pp. 5,6.

Dr. Medhurst here clearly advocates the use of the word *Ti* to render Elohim and *Theos* on the ground that it is the "generic for God in Chinese." It is not so clear, however, what he means by the sentence, "We therefore conclude that by *Ti* the Chinese mean the Supreme God, as far as they are acquainted with him." This last seems a very unsatisfactory and indefinite phrase, and it is much to be regretted that Dr. Medhurst did not express his opinion more clearly.

In his "Reply to the Essay of Dr. Boone," on page 2d, he expresses the opinion that the Chinese may be regarded as Cudworth regards the Greeks, viz. as both monotheists and polytheists at the same time; that is, understanding the word *Theos* combined in the two terms in different senses; in the first, as conveying what he calls the natural idea of God, viz. an all-perfect Being, the Ruler of the universe; and the other, as alluding to certain supposed invisible intelligences, who were the objects of religious worship, but subordinate to one Supreme." On the next page he gives his opinion on what should be the object of search, as follows: Dr. Boone says that it is necessary to determine what we shall seek; and thinks that seeing the Chinese do not know the true God, we must either seek for the name of the chief god of the Chinese, or the name by which the whole class of gods is known in their language. To this we reply, that as *the true God was as little known among the Greeks as among the Chinese*, it is certainly necessary, in order to express *the idea of God* to determine what we shall seek; for Dr. B. thinks we must seek for one or other of the two things specified by him, viz. the name of the chief god, or the generic name for god. In our estimation we should seek for a name which will convey to the mind of the Chinese the *same idea* which was conveyed to a Greek by the use of the word *Theos*; if the same be likewise that by which the whole class of worshiped beings is known in the language, so much the better. Now it so happens, that the name used for the chief object of worship, or God by way of eminence, and the whole class of worshiped beings, was one and the same term among the Greeks: among the Chinese these *two ideas* are represented by different terms, which constitutes the difficulty."

If I understand his meaning, the view here expressed seems to be, that the Being called by the Chinese *Shángtí*, answers to the monadic *Theos* of the Greeks, but that neither the one nor the other of these beings is the Being the Christians call *God*, i. e. the true God. As the argument in my Essay was based wholly upon the assumption that the Chinese do not know the true God, observing the indefinite manner in which Dr. M. spoke in his "Inquiry," where he seems to imply that the Chinese *Shángtí* is to be regarded as truly and properly God, to draw out a full discussion on this point, I under the signature of "A Brother Missionary," addressed "A few plain questions to those missionaries who in preaching or writing teach the Chinese to worship *Shángtí*." This paper was written previous to the appearance of Dr. M.'s "Reply," and was published in the Chinese Repository Vol. XVII., page 357. It gave great offence, I am sorry to say, to Dr. Med-

hurst and his friends; they called upon me, and insisted upon my retracting the position taken in that paper, viz. that those who exhort the Chinese to worship *Shángtí*, violate the first Commandment. I took great pains to assure them that I did not suppose they intended to violate the first Commandment, but contended that, as the phrase *Shángtí* designates a single individual, and the Chinese who heard them understood by this phrase another being than Jehovah, I must maintain that the Commandment was broken. To inform all who read the Repository that I have no intention of intimating that any of my Brother Missionaries designedly broke the first Commandment, and to divest the matter of every shade of personality, which unhappily, from want of sufficient care on my part, attached to the communication of a "Brother Missionary," I addressed a letter, under my own signature to the Editor of the Chinese Repository (see Vol. XVIII., page 97), to which I beg leave to refer the Reader. This paper I sent to Dr. Medhurst and his friends, as my answer to their demand for an apology, that they might see it before it left Shanghai for the printer's hands. From his note addressed to me on the receipt of this letter, it will appear that instead of maintaining that *Shángtí* is the true God, Dr. Medhurst's habit and that of Messrs. Stronach and Milne was carefully so to explain their use of the phrase to the Chinese, as to prevent them from understanding it, as even *alluding* to any being with whom they were acquainted. His note is as follows:—

"Shanghai, January 13th, 1849.

"My dear Sir,

"Your letter has been read by Messrs Stronach, Milne and myself. We all think it unsatisfactory; principally with respect to the omission of any statement, that it was quite probable that the missionaries using *Shángtí* for God would accompany it with such explanations as would in their estimation, prevent the Chinese from understanding the term as alluding to any being with whom they had been previously acquainted, but to one whose being and attributes are revealed in the S. S.

"Such statement was distinctly required by us, and we fully expected that it would accompany your explanation.

"I am, Dear Sir,

Yours truly

(Signed) W. H. Medhurst."

In the letter of 30th January 1850, Dr. Medhurst and his friends give up all the native terms as untenable, and propose to use the transferréd term *Aloah*, as the rendering of *Elohim* and *Theos* in all cases. They

give us an account, in this letter, of the steps by which they were led to the adoption of the transferred term. They tell us p. 3, that on the reception of Mr. Weller's letter of the 20th Oct. 1849, "both parties took up carefully, "first the consideration of the proposition thrown out by Mr Weller, to employ one term for false gods, and another or the same term modified for the true God," and in the next place considered "the employment of the transferred word Eloah, to be employed in every instance in which the true God was intended, and *Shin* for false gods." These propositions were rejected "as unphilosophical." "For," they add, "in the First Commandment, in John X. 35, 1. Cor. VIII. 5, together with 1 Kings XV. 21, 27., it was felt that the same term ought to be used for God whether true or false, because the force of the passages mainly depends on the employment of the same term: this objection would apply to *Sháng-shin* also, if used for the true God, and *Shin* for false gods; and as there were many other passages of Scripture in which different terms could not be used, it was agreed that it would be better to use the same term throughout. pp. 4, 5."

After this they tell us, that, on a suggestion having been made, to put on the title page of the N. T. an explanation of the sense in which *Shin* was used in said book, it occurred to them "that if *shin* could be used with a definition, so could *Ti*." Accordingly this proposition was submitted to their Chinese teachers, and upon being disapproved of by these teachers, the use of *ti* was abandoned by them, pp. 6, 7. When urging the use of the transferred term, they tell us, "those Chinese who have become most familiar with our Scriptures and views of Theology, being at the same time intelligent men and independent thinkers, frankly confess that they have not a term so generic, and capable of so wide an extension as the one we are seeking for," while the same Chinese "conceive that when foreigners have to introduce *new ideas* they must expect to bring with them new terms." p. 8. They make the proposal to transfer Eloah, therefore, not merely on the ground that the Chinese have no word answering to our word God, as maintained by Dr. Bowring, but on the ground also that they have no generic term for *god* in their language. I will however give the statement in their own words. "To the general strain of Dr. Bowring's remarks, there can be little or no objection. One idea not touched upon by him is that the Chinese language not only wants a proper term whereby to represent the perfections of the true God, but it wants also a generic, which, while it is capable of being *used* for the highest being of which they have any conception, includes all worshiped beings,

and goes no farther. As they have, therefore, no appellative for God, in the Scriptural usage of the term, we must introduce one, and the one we propose is *Aloah*, accompanied by the following translation, "Whenever *Aloah* is used, it refers to the beings whom men sacrifice to and worship. They do not know however that the most honorable and without compare is only one Jehovah, besides whom no other ought to be worshiped. Jehovah is the proper name of *Aloah*."

In direct opposition to the ground taken by Dr. Legge, the six signers of this letter regard their transferred word as a generic term, "as the generic for all worshiped beings." They say, p. 12, "It will be proper to remark here that we intend to use the transferred word *generically*, as the representative of *El*, *Eloah*, *Elohim*, *Theos* and *Theoi*, whenever they occur, whether for the false gods or the true. Should any object that we are calling the contemptible divinities of the heathen by the same appellative, which we use for the true God; we can only say that we feel safe in following Scriptural example. The Apostles had the option of calling the true God *Theos*, and the false gods *daimones*, in every instance, if they chose; but they did not choose; and in alluding to the heathen deity Remphan, they have called him *Theos* with the article before it. So in recording the false views entertained by the Lycaonians in regard to Paul and Barnabas, whom they supposed to be Jupiter and Mercury, the term *hoi Theoi* is used with reference to those beings." On p. 13 they say, "We by no means admit however, that, we cannot as effectually oppose polytheism by a transferred word, as by using a native term. We call our God *Eloah*, we use *Eloah* as the *generic* for worshiped beings, and we tell them that they are not to worship any other being that may be called *Eloah*, but the one who made heaven and earth."

From the above it will be seen that Dr. Medhurst and his friends agree with me in opposition to the two main propositions of Dr. Legge, viz. that the Chinese *Shángti* is *not* the true God, and that the word God is *generic* and must be rendered by a generic term. The only issue they make with me is that stated in proposition *c*; i. e. they admit that under the above mentioned circumstances, the generic name of the Chinese gods should be used, if such can be found, but deny that *Shin* is this generic name; and affirm, on the contrary, that, as the Chinese have neither a name for any being who is truly and properly God, nor any generic name of their gods, and the words *Elohim* and *Theos* must be rendered by a generic term, we have no alternative, and must transfer the original term.

Sir George Staunton, as we have seen above, admits that the Chi-

nese language has no word which fully and correctly conveys the idea which we Christians attach to the word *God*." He advocates the use of *Shángtí*, on the ground that "it has from time immemorial been employed in China in a sense *more nearly approaching* to that which we attach to the word *God* than any other, which at present exists in the language of the country." I am very sorry that, from the oversight of friends in England, I have never received a copy of Sir George's pamphlet. I only had the loan of the copy I read for two or three hours; I am afraid therefore to attempt to sketch the draft of his argument lest I may unintentionally misrepresent him. From a quotation in Dr. Legge's pamphlet, p. 35, I learn however that he only contends for the use of *Shángtí* to render *Elohim* and *T'heos* when these words are used *proprie*. His words are, "It is always to be borne in mind that it is only when the true God is intended to be signified, that *Shángtí* is contended to be the most appropriate term. Whenever the *false gods* of the heathen *generally*, or any *specific false god* by name is in question, the word *Shin* is not only *proper* but *necessary*. On the one hand, the word *Shin* is too low and too wide in its acceptance to be applicable to the True God; and on the other, the phrase *Shángtí* is too high and too exclusive in its meaning to be applicable to any purpose less exalted." From these extracts, I conceive Sir George maintains the views expressed in the proposition marked *d* above.

The "American Missionary in China" advocates the use of *Ti* 帝 with an adjunct, as either 上帝 *Sháng Ti* or 天帝 *T'ien Ti*. He does this on the ground that *Shángtí* (see p. 3) especially in moral character *resembles* far more the true God than does any of the *Theoi* of the Greeks. He is a being, to whom no beginning is attributed, a being of perfect moral rectitude, and is represented as rewarding the upright and punishing the wicked; a being too of universal sovereignty and providence. The distinguishing *title*, by which this being and all other entities supposed to resemble him are known among the Chinese, is 上帝 *Sháng Ti*. This too is a *title* used by way of eminence to distinguish Deity, long before the Chinese were led by their pride either to assume or apply it to mortal man. This was likewise at a time when it is clear, from their ancient books, the Chinese possessed a purer theology and more correct notions of the Divine Being and character than they do now." This writer, it will be seen, only contends here for *resemblance* to the true God. On p. 27 he says, "That it is extremely doubtful whether any being worshipped by the Chinese is by them regarded as *divine*. At most there is

but one, the *Sháng-tí* of antiquity, and he worshiped only by the Emperor." From which he concludes that, "the Chinese mythology, in which there is only one, recognised at all as divine, does not contain, and can not furnish, a proper generic term for Deity. Not having the idea of such a *class* of beings, the language assuredly will not afford a generic term for such a class."

It is very much to be regretted that this writer does not manifest more care in his use of terms, and that he does not define the sense in which he uses the words upon which his whole argument turns: e. g. he answers the question "Is *Sháng-tí* used as a generic term for Deity by the Chinese?" by another question, viz. "Is it appellative for a class of beings regarded *divine*, and not the name merely of an individual?" Upon this we would remark, that the word *Deity* without an article is abstract, and that of all the words he could have chosen, that have any connexion with the point under debate, the adjective "divine" seems to me the most indefinite. We are all familiar with "the divine Homer sometimes sleeps," and I have even seen "the divine Fanny Elssler," &c. Throughout his pamphlet the "American Missionary", appears to me to confound polytheism with what has been styled di- or tri-theism; i. e. a belief in the existence of more gods than one, using the word *proprie* in the sense of self-existent, almighty, &c., &c.

In the result he arrives at, the proposal to render Elohím and *Theos* by *Sháng-tí* and *Shín-ming*, and in the admission he makes that *Sháng-tí* only resembles the true God, and the doubt he expresses whether the Chinese really regard him as divine, his views approach nearer to Sir George Staunton's than to any other: they will be most suitably discussed under proposition *d*.

Having thus indicated, in general terms, the positions maintained by those, whose pamphlets I propose to answer, I shall now proceed to discuss the issues made between these several writers and my Essay in the order above set forth.

The first question for our consideration is that involved in proposition *a*, Do the Chinese know the true God, or any Being who may truly and properly be called God? To this question Dr. Legge answers, "They do: *Sháng-tí* is God over all, blessed for ever."

To put this opinion in the most advantageous way for Dr. Legge, it may be thus expressed: "The Chinese do know the Being we Christians call God, they really know him, though only in an imperfect manner. The *Being* is the very *same*, the difference is in the clearness with which he is known." We agree with Dr. Legge that if this point can be made good, viz., the Chinese know the Being we

call *God*, we ought to take the Chinese name of this Being to render Elohim and *Theos* in all cases, though we should find that the Chinese have never used this word, as the general name of their objects of worship. We should only differ from him, in contending that we must seek for, and use, the absolute name of this Being, and not content ourselves with one of his titles, such as *Shángtí*, which is a mere relative term. I should agree to this; for if the Chinese really know the Being we call *God*, and have in their language a name for Him I do not see how we could be justified in neglecting this name; or using any other word to render Elohim and *Theos*. We should be bound, I think, if these were the circumstances in which we found the Chinese, to tell them that Jehovah—the revealed God—was the same Being they had all along worshiped under this Chinese name, and that we now merely proposed, by the light derived from the Sacred Scriptures, to make Him more fully and perfectly known unto them. This I never would have denied; but when my “Essay” was written, I supposed that this was not contended for by any missionary in China; therefore my argument is conducted, from the beginning to the end, upon the supposition that the Chinese know no being who can truly and properly be called God.

Dr. Legge being the affirmant in this case the *onus probandi* is with him; this however he is so far from perceiving, that he very amusingly sets us the task of finding an instance in which *Shángtí* can not be rendered *God* (*proprie*), when in my “Essay,” which was before him, I had already denied the Chinese had any word in their language which could be so rendered, which made it clearly Dr. Legge's duty to furnish us with the grounds which would justify him, in so translating *Shángtí*, in a single instance. This was the more incumbent on Dr. Legge, as Dr. Medhurst, in his “Inquiry,” admitted, as we have shown, that *Shángtí* is never said to have created the heavens and the earth, or to be self-existent; and in his “Reply,” that the Chinese were ignorant of the true God; and as Dr. Bowring, who also wrote previously to Dr. Legge, so unhesitatingly affirms that the Chinese do not know God. Instead of giving some good and approved definition of the sense, in which the word *God* is to be understood when used *proprie*, (which is the only sense in which the word *God* is ever used as he contends, and in which sense *Shángtí* corresponds to it) and using this as a test to prove that *Shángtí* is properly God, he contents himself with the following *petitio principii*.

“The proof of this assertion is to be sought by making the largest possible collection of examples, in which the expression is used, and

trying whether God will be an appropriate, or rather *the* appropriate rendering of it. The absurdity, of saying that 神 means God, was demonstrated by a process of this kind. Instances were adduced, which made it plain that to say that 神 has such a signification, only affords matter for astonishment. Will Dr Booné, or any other opponent of 上帝 descend into this arena? Let them bring us forward passages, in which it is inadmissible to translate *Shángti* by God. Till they do this, I must tell them, that they only hover about the field of conflict, and are surprisingly averse to "the tug" of the battle. Here is an *experimentum crucis*. I have taken their metal, and put it into the *crucible*—may I be pardoned the play on the words—and it has turned out to be base substance. Let them take this metal and subject it to the same test. If the two words 上帝 do not mean *God*, those who contend that they do are merely setting up a "man of straw." It is not asking too much of Dr. Boone and his friends, to walk up to such an object and handle it. Let them give it a push, and it will fall down at once. The slightest application will prove that it has no life in it. Why have they not done this, and adduced some specific examples in which *Shángti*, can not be translated God? The fair and just way of accounting for their not having yet done so, doubtless is, that such a course has not occurred to them. Having thus suggested it to them, and shown them by what an easy process they may achieve a victory—if it can be achieved—some of them will surely act on the maxim, *Fas est ab hoste doceri*."—pp. 26, 27.

On the above, we shall only observe, that Dr. Legge wastes his labor, when he endeavors to prove it absurd to say that *shin* means God, as we have never contended that, by the *usus loquendi* of Chinese writers, it had any such meaning, much less that the word has this meaning in *all cases*, which is the only point that could be proved absurd by such a test. We contended that *shin* meant a *god, gods*; we furnished our definition of the sense, in which these words are understood, by heathen nations, from authors of high standing, and endeavored to prove by the tests thus furnished, that *shin* was the generic name of the Chinese gods: would that Dr. Legge could be induced to proceed in this orderly method in making out his proof that the Chinese *Shángti* is the being we call *God*, or that he is truly and properly God. If he will prove that the being called *Shángti*, in any one of the quotations he gives us, is truly and properly *God*, we will admit that the *Shángti* mentioned in all the other passages is God too, as we have no doubt that they all refer to the same being. This is *the point* that Dr. Legge should have proved, and it is so clearly his

duty, that we might content ourselves with this answer until Dr. Legge furnishes us with his proofs; but, as the object, which we all have in view, is to develop fully the facts of this case, and to have it correctly and speedily decided,—to contend for truth, not “victory” —I shall gather the best definitions of God from the books within my reach, and then from these definitions and the cosmogony of the Chinese, exhibit the reasons why I dissent from Dr. Legge’s proposition, “The *Shángtí* of the Chinese people is God over all, blessed for ever.”

1. “I shall inquire what kind of *idea*, or notion, scripture and Christian antiquity give us of one that is *really*, and *truly* God. If we trace this matter through the Old Testament, we shall find that the *scripture notion* of a person that is *truly* God, and should be received as such, includes in it *power* and *might* irresistible; perfect *knowledge* and consummate *wisdom*, *eternity*, immutability, and omnipresence; *creative powers*; supremacy, *independence*, and *necessary existence*. These are the distinguishing characteristics, under which God was pleased to make himself known, and it is upon these accounts that he, in opposition to all other gods, claims to be received and honored as God. These therefore are what make up the *scripture idea* of a person who is *truly, really, and strictly God*.” Waterland’s works, Vol. 2 p. 37.

2. Knapp says, “But the best definition of God,—the one in which all the others are comprehended, is the following; *God is the most perfect being, and is the cause of all other being*.” Knapp’s Theol., Vol. I. p. 156.

3. Cudworth says, “The true and genuine idea of God in general is this! A perfect, conscious, understanding being (or mind) existing of itself from eternity and the cause of all other things.” See Intel. System, Vol. I. p. 297.

If Dr. Legge will take Waterland’s representation “of one that is really and truly God,” he must prove that the *Shángtí* of the Chinese people has “power and might irresistible; perfect knowledge and consummate wisdom, eternity, immutability and omnipresence; creative powers; supremacy, independence and necessary existence.” Or if he likes Knapp’s short definition better, prove that he is “a perfect being” i. e. a being possessed of all physical and moral perfections, and that he is “the cause of all other beings,” the creator of the world i. e. of every thing extrinsic to himself.

But to this it might be replied, these are definitions of God given by Christian men, who had in view all the perfections of Jehovah, the revealed God, and it is not necessary to prove that every thing we know of him is predicated in the Chinese books of *Shángtí*, in order that we should admit that he is the same Being as he whom we call *God*. As was said above, the being might be the same, the difference only arises from the clearness with which he is known. It may be maintained by some that the monadic *Theos* of the Greek philosophers, is entitled to be regarded as truly and properly God, notwithstanding all of them conceived of matter as eternal. The consequences that follow, from allowing a being, who is not the absolute creator of all

things, to be truly and properly God, are such that few, we believe, will be found to contend for it. Even Cudworth in his great zeal to bring in the heathen philosophers of Greece as good theists, is obliged to rank those among his imperfect theists, who do not hold that God "is the cause of all things," as stated in his definition above given.

Of what he calls imperfect theism he thus speaks; "and though in a strict and *proper* sense, they only be theists who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the *cause of matter*, as of any thing else, yet it seems reasonable that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who assert one intellectual principle *self-existent from eternity*, the framer and governor of the *whole world*, though not the creator of the matter."

"The American Missionary" and others also, build much on the traditionary knowledge of God, which the Chinese possessed in high antiquity. Let it be shown then from the Yih King, or the Shú King or the Shí King, that *Shángtí* is God, according to this definition of even imperfect theism; i. e. that he is *asserted* in a single passage, to be self-existent from eternity, or that *he* out of preëxisting matter made the heavens and the earth and all things that exist. That those unacquainted with the Chinese classics may be able to form some judgment on this matter, we shall give the cosmogony of the Yih King from the pen of M. Visdelou.

"This book (i. e. the Yih King) informs us what they consider the first principle to be. *T'ai Kih*, 太極 (1) generated the two figures; these two figures generated the four forms, and these four forms generated the eight diagrams. This statement is very enigmatical, and therefore it is necessary to explain it. *T'ai-kih* signifies the *great summit* (*grand comble*), a metaphorical expression derived from the roof of a house, of which the transverse part, which is at the top, is called *kih*, because it is the highest part of the roof. Now, as all the rafters are supported on the top of the roof, so also are all things supported on this first principle. We must here carefully observe that this first principle is said to generate (*engendrer*), and *not* to make (*faire*)."

"The Chinese explain alegorically the two figures *yáng* and *yin* by the two kinds of matter, or the universal matter divided into two

(1.) *T'ai kih* is the primary air, which by motion and rest, from which result heat and cold, moisture and drought &c., generated the five elements, which compose all things."

(2); but properly they signify Heaven and Earth. The four forms denote the perfect matter, which is divided into solid and fluid, and the imperfect matter, which is also divided into solid and fluid. Thus by the help of this twofold distinction of perfect and imperfect (3), the two kinds of matter produce four. The eight diagrams of Fuh-hi denote everything in the universe; e. g. the heavens, the earth, fire, water, mountains, thunder, and still two others, under which all the rest are comprehended."

"But the philosophers explain this axiom more clearly. The following is the account of what they, without any allegory say, viz. The *great summit*, (*T'ai kih*) generated the five elements, and the five elements generated all things. This axiom is the abyss, into which those philosophers, called the *Atheo-political*, have plunged themselves; for they pretend that this *great summit* is the primitive Reason (i. e. *T'au*), which, although without understanding or will, is absolutely the first principle of all things. They consider that this Reason, although destitute of understanding and will, nevertheless governs all things, and that the more infallibly, because it acts necessarily. Finally, they pretend that all things emanate from it as the term generate (*engendrer*) seems to indicate. These philosophers also do not hesitate to give to this reason the title of the ruling power; and as Confucius in the canonical book of changes [the *Yih King*] has, more than once, made mention of *Shángti*, that is to say, the supreme emperor, and of *Ti*, that is, the emperor, and yet we do not see in any part of this book, nor in any other, that *Shángti* generated the matter, that is Heaven and earth, the philosophers conclude from this, that the title *Shángti* is not applicable to the primitive Reason, except when it acts merely in the government of the world. Hence it is that many among them acknowledge besides the primitive Reason, a celestial Genius (*Genie-celeste—shin*, no doubt) that belongs to heaven; at least the Interpreters of the emperor *K'áng-hi*, when explaining the diagram of the dispersion, where mention is made of sacrificing to *Shángti*, searching into the cause why, after the troubles of the empire were appeased, they sacrificed to *Shángti*, render the following reason, viz. that during the times of the dispersion, when the sacrifices to *Shángti* were often neglected, the spirits of *Shángti* had been scattered, and it was necessary therefore to re-collect them by sacrifices.

"(2.) The perfect *yáng* and the imperfect *yin*, the subtle and the gross, the celestial and the terrestrial, light and darkness, heat and cold, dryness and moisture, and all the other qualities of matter."

"(3.) Strength and weakness, or extension and contraction."

If M. Visdelou here gives us a correct account of what is said in the most ancient of the Confucian classics of the "first cause," how hopeless is the attempt to make out Dr Legge's point, that the *Shángti* of the classics is "God over all, blessed for ever." So far from regarding him, as a necessary, self-existent, independent being, the learned men of K'ánghí's reign fancied, from what they read of him in the *Yih King* that the spirits of *Shángti* had been dispersed because of their neglect to offer sacrifices to him during the troubles of the empire, and that they must be re-collected by sacrifices!!!

We beg Dr. Legge also to observe that M. Visdelou distinctly says, that Confucius never affirms in this book or in any other, that "*Shángti*, i. e. the supreme Emperor, ever generated the Heavens and the earth," and either, reconcile this with his position that *Shángti* is God (*propriè*) or, show that M. Visdelou is mistaken.

Of the famous diagrams which are used in divination he gives the following account :—"It is time to pass on to the production of the diagrams. The (primary) matter divided itself into two, the two divided into four, the four into eight, the eight into sixteen, the sixteen into thirty-two, the thirty-two into sixty-four ; here it stopped, for there are only sixty-four diagrams. This is in fact, a geometrical progression, which may be continued ad infinitum. But what is there solid in all this? what is this generation of elements? And what are the five elements which generate and compose all things? Notwithstanding two of them, wood and metal, certainly neither of them ever enter into the composition of all things, still they believe that they do enter, and that so thoroughly, that they even impress some of their qualities upon the human soul. For, this is a dogma, received from all the Interpreters, and even from the Ancients, that the five virtues, viz. benevolence, rectitude, propriety, wisdom and fidelity, spring from the five elements ; e. g. benevolence from wood ; rectitude from metal ; and so of the others. How much is there in all this, which only serves to estrange the mind from the knowledge of the true God, and of the first cause ! The eight diagrams of Fuh-hi merely present to the mind eight things ; viz, heaven, earth, fire, water of two kinds, mountains, and other things of like nature ; but there is not *one word* about God, or the first principle of all things."

Of the immediate principle of all things he says ;—"The Chinese philosophers lay it down as an incontestable fact that the *five elements*, viz, wood, fire, earth, metal and water, are the immediate principles of all things, and that the five genii (*shin*), who govern them, extend their dominion over the dynasties, which ought in turn to possess the

empire of China; they likewise preside over the *five portions* which form the entire heavens, and the five seasons of which the year is composed." These Genii are the five *shin*, who preside over the five elements who are styled, Azure Ruler, Vermilion Ruler, Yellow Ruler, White Ruler, and Black Ruler.

While quoting the opinions of others on this subject, I will cite again a few passages from Dr. Medhurst's "China, its State and prospects" that were quoted in my Essay;—"There are in the works of the Philosopher (Confucius) some allusions to heaven as the presiding power of nature, and to fate (*天理*) as the determiner of all things, but he does not appear to attribute *originality to the one, or rationality to the other*; and thus his system remains destitute of the main truth which lies at the basis of all truth, viz, the being of a self-existent, eternal, all-wise God." Again; "From these expressions about "Heaven", the "Supreme Ruler", and the "principle of order", we might infer that the Chinese *had some knowledge of the Ruler of the universe*, and honored him as such, were we not baffled by the very incoherent manner in which they express themselves, and shocked at the propensity to materialism which they constantly exhibit." Again; "No first cause" characterises all the sects, and the supreme self-existent God, is scarcely traceable through the entire range of their metaphysics; and yet the Chinese manage to combine the apparently irreconcilable principles of atheism and polytheism. 'Gods many and lords many' are adopted by every sect, and it is more easy to find a god than a man in China. Though they account *no divinity* to be eternal, yet they discover a god in every thing."

I quote these words as furnishing important testimony on the point now under discussion, and also to afford me an opportunity of commenting on Dr. Medhurst's observations on my quoting from the "State and Prospects" in my Essay. Dr. Medhurst had been a student of the Chinese language for twenty years, and was justly considered an excellent Chinese scholar at the time that work was written. There could be surely therefore no impropriety in quoting from such a work. The fact that it was written as Dr. M. alledges, in a popular style, has nothing to do with the object for which it was quoted, which was, to show that the Chinese were polytheists and that they did not know any being who is truly and properly God. These are *facts*, which one narrates according to the best of his knowledge and belief, whether he writes in a philosophical, or easy flowing popular style. Had I quoted this work, on any nice point of Chinese criticism, some complaint might have been made, but as it is, we think

Dr. M's complaint wholly gratuitous. My quoting all Dr. Medhurst's Dictionaries against him has been thought by some, I have been told, an unjustifiable *ad hominem* method of arguing; the reason for doing so I have distinctly stated in my Essay. Dr. Medhurst has a great peculiarity for a controversial writer, in not referring to his past writings, however much he may contradict what he has written before on the same subject. Of this he has given many instances since this controversy commenced. His Dictionaries, as I showed in my Essay, all render *shin*, a god. In a communication addressed to the editor of the Chinese Repository, dated Shanghai Sept. 14th 1846. (Vol. XVI, p. 34) he writes, "You may say — 個神, but that means a god, not the one God. *Shin* means without doubt the gods, or the beings of the invisible world, and not God, the only living and true Jehovah, who made all things." In his "Theology of the Chinese", written immediately afterwards, he renders *shin* always spirit,—not god, denies that it means god, and yet does not refer to either his Dictionaries or this letter, or inform his readers in any way, that he had formerly, yea, so very recently held the opinion he was opposing; nor does he condescend to mention a single reason for his change of views. This was the reason, to inform those who had to study this controversy, of this important fact, why I thought it incumbent on me to quote his dictionaries and other writings. If Dr. Medhurst had made his readers acquainted with these facts, I should have been very glad to have been spared the task of doing so; the facts I thought then, and still think, too important to the interests of truth, to be unknown. Dr. Medhurst, I fancy, both thought and wrote much more dispassionately on this subject fifteen years ago, than when penning his "Theology of the Chinese," and his "Inquiry." He was then shocked with the Chinese materialism, and found the Confucianists, and all the other sects, without a first cause, and counting no divinity eternal. In his "Theology of the Chinese" at p. 82 et seq., because he finds the primordial substance which dividing itself into its purer and grosser parts produced heaven and earth, called "the 太一, supreme one, and the great extreme, which including three, consists of one," i. e. Heaven, earth and man, which make one universe, he rejoices "that the Divine Being has not left himself without a witness in this dark land? thinks the Chinese must have derived these ideas by traditional knowledge from the sons of Noah, and remarks that the phrase "including three consists of one" seems to bear some allusion to the mysterious Doctrine of the Trinity, which may have been derived by tradition from the Patriarchal age" He afterwards doubts the cor-

rectness of this hypothesis, but could not bring himself to blot out what he had written. The extreme improbability, that the Patriarchs were acquainted with the mysterious mode of subsistence of the Divine Being, we should suppose would have deterred any one from regarding such a supposition; but Dr. Medhurst was at that time carried away with the idea of proving that *Shángtí* was the true God. Most persons will, I think, agree with me, that if the Chinese in their high antiquity really derived a knowledge of the doctrine of the Trinity by tradition from the Patriarchs, they must have had a much better and fuller tradition of what the faith of the Patriarchs was than we have in the Bible, for certainly no man can deduce the doctrine of the Trinity from the Pentateuch, or shew from it that the Patriarchs held this doctrine. We think this a striking instance to show the importance of our being acquainted with the mood in which Dr. Medhurst is, and the point he is proposing to prove at the time he is writing, to enable us to form a just estimate of the value of any opinion advanced by him. We have in this instance a clear statement of the very materialism which shocked Dr. Medhurst when he wrote his "State and Prospects of China." In the passage quoted by Dr. M. from the *Lí Kí*, or Book of Rites, the *k'í* 氣, primordial substance, is considered as the great extreme, or first principle, instead of *Lí* 理, which is frequently, perhaps most frequently, so regarded; and yet Dr. Medhurst rejoices at the knowledge of God there displayed.

The difficulties in the way of regarding the Chinese *Shángtí* as entitled to be called God (*proprié*) are, to my mind insuperable.

1st. I have never seen any *assertion*, produced from any Chinese writer, that states his self-existence from eternity. Dr. Medhurst admits in his "Inquiry" p. 5, that he has never found such a passage, but seeks to do away with the effects of this fatal admission on *Shángtí's* claim to be regarded as truly and properly God, by adding that "we nowhere meet with a single passage which speaks of his origin." But this surely is not enough. Self-existence from eternity is not such a matter-of-course appendage to a Ruler, that it must, if writers only keep silence about it, be inferred. This is an inadmissible escape from the proof manifestly demanded of a point essential to the support of the cause of *Shángtí*. It amounts to this, nobody has predicated this of *Shángtí*, *therefore* we will infer it; or in other words, as the point is essential to us, we will beg the question. But to this we can not consent. The Chinese may never have conceived of, or spoken of any being or thing as existing from eternity, in which case the inference would be against the supposition that they regarded *Shángtí*

as self-existent from eternity. Or, they may have conceived of, and spoken of, eternally existing principles, and not mentioned *Shángtí* among them; in which case the inference against *Shángtí*'s self-existence from eternity would be ten-fold stronger. This last is the fact; the Chinese have speculated about eternally-existing first principles, but *Shángtí* is not mentioned among them. These principles are *táu* 道 and *lí* 理, which are the same, i. e. the primitive Reason, destiny, fate, "which neither wills nor wishes, plans nor makes," and *K'í* 氣, the primordial substance, which "can settle and collect together, make and do."

2d. In regard to the making of the heavens and the earth, Chinese writers are not silent. They do not regard heaven and earth as eternal; they are made, and made in time; but *Shángtí* had nothing to do with the making of them. Take as an instance the account given in the 49th section of *Chúfútsz's* Entire Works, of the making of heaven and earth. The eternally-existing principles are *Lí* 理 and *K'í* 氣. He sometimes calls *Lí* the *T'ái kih*, Great Extreme, and sometimes *K'í*.

"*Lí* neither wishes nor plans nor does, 理却無情意無計度無造作; "it is without form or trace, it can not make or do any thing"; 無形迹他却不會造作; but *K'í* 氣 he affirms, as I said above, "Can settle and collect together, make and do." "*K'í* can ferment and settle and generate things." 氣則能醞釀凝聚生物也. The *K'í* or primordial substance he views under the two aspects of *Yin* and *Yáng*, i. e. as passive or active. Of the *Yin k'í*, or primordial substance, which has *vis inertiae*, *Kwei* 鬼 is the *ling* 靈 spirit, or *p'eh* 魄 anima: and of the *Yáng k'í* or primordial substance which moves, or is active, *Shin* 神 is the *ling* 靈 spirit, or *hwan* 魂 soul, animus.

From these materials how are heaven and earth made? This primordial substance, so informed by *Shin* and *Kwei*, commenced revolving: but I will give the account of the actual making of the heavens and the earth in *Chúfútsz's* own words, closely rendered. 天地初間只是陰陽之氣這一箇氣運行磨來磨去磨得急了便糲許多渣滓裏面無處出便結成箇地在中央氣之清者便爲天爲日月爲星辰只在外常周環運轉地便在中央不動不是在下. "In the beginning of heaven and earth there only was the *Yin-ed* and *Yáng-ed K'í* (i. e. the primordial substance).

of which we predicate *yin* and *yáng*, or passivity and activity). This one primordial substance (*k'i*) revolved, grinding round and round. When the grinding became rapid, there was pressed together much sediment: in the inside, there being no place for it to get out, it was collected together, and became the earth in the centre. The finer part of the primordial substance then became the heavens, and the sun, moon and stars, which externally around (i. e. the earth) constantly revolved. The earth is in the middle at rest; it is not below."

This scheme of the generation of all things is by no means peculiar to Ch'ü-fútsz'; he derives it from the *Yih King*, the source from which all the literati derive their views on this subject, and who do not therefore differ much from Ch'ü-fútsz' in their interpretation. To show the concurrence of other distinguished Chinese writers in his views of cosmogony, I will quote a few paragraphs from a paper by Mr. Gutzlaff, in the *Chinese Repository*, Vol. III., p. 55.

"The account given by the Chinese of the mythological era is less extravagant than that given by any other nation, though comprising according to some writers a period of many thousands of years, like the Indian kulpas. In assigning a cause of the existence of the world they are greatly at a loss! Ignorant as they are of the true God, they are carried away by their imaginations, and speak of a cause capable of moving inert matter by which the male and female principles, *Yáng* and *Yin*, were called into being, whose continual revolutions produced heaven and earth. For this they are 'without excuse,' though they never read that, 'in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;' but if, after hearing of his wondrous works, they deny the Author of their being, the Creator of the universe, they will be found still more guilty at his bar. The Roman Catholics have repeatedly given them an account of the creation of the world, but they have rejected this reasonable doctrine with disdain, and continue to believe in the absurd *panteism* of the *Yáng* and *Yin*. In geography and astronomy, they have condescended to be instructed by foreigners, but to the science of all sciences, the knowledge of the Divine Being, they as a nation, have never given their attention.

"Hwai Nán-tsz', a celebrated Chinese author, discoursing upon cosmogony says, Heaven was formless, an utter chaos, and the whole mass was nothing but confusion; order was first produced in the pure ether; out of the pure ether, the universe came forth; the universe produced the air; the air the milky way. When the pure male principle, *Yáng*, had been diluted, it formed the heavens. The heavy and thick part coagulated and formed the earth. The refined particles united very soon, but the union of those that were thick and heavy went on very slowly; therefore the heavens came into existence first, and the earth afterwards. From the subtle essence of heaven and earth, the dual principles, *Yáng* and *Yin* were formed. The joint operation of *Yáng* and *Yin* produced the four seasons; and the four seasons putting forth their generative power, gave birth to all the products of the earth. The warm air of the *Yáng*, being condensed, produced fire; and the finest parts of fire formed the sun. The cold air of the *Yin*, being likewise condensed produced water, and the finest parts of the watery substance formed the moon. By the seminal influence of the sun and moon, the stars were formed. Heaven was adorned with sun moon and stars; the earth has received rain, rivers, and dust."

"This is perhaps," says Mr. Gutzlaff, "the most rational theory of cosmogony the sages of China have been able to furnish. *The orthodox creed taken from the Yih King, teaches nothing but absurd materialism.* Heaven operates, Earth produces, and all things come into existence, &c. Sz'z' tell us that 'all that has shape, heaven and earth included, was produced by something shapeless, and that the visible world was produced by successive revolutions.' The *Wu-yun Lih-nien ki* is still more curious in its theory. 'When the primeval vapors and ether germinated, there was a commencement of things; heaven and earth were separated; the male and female principles came into existence; the Yang scattered the primeval ether, the Yin conceived, and man was produced by their union. The first born was Pwánkú. At the approach of death, his body was transformed: his breath was changed into winds and clouds; his voice into thunder; his left eye into the sun, and his right into the moon; his limbs became the four regions (poles); his blood and serum rivers; his sinews and arteries, the earth's surface; his flesh fields; his beard, the stars; his skin and hair, herbs and trees; his teeth and bones, metals and rocks; his fine marrow, pearls and precious stones; his dropping sweat, rain; and the insects which stuck to his body became people.'

These several schemes will be found to vary considerably from each other in details; but they, and all the schemes of cosmogony I have ever seen from the pen of Chinese writers, agree in being entirely godless. No "conscious mind, itself self-existent," creating the primary matter, or even out of chaotic matter, producing order by the formation of the heavens and the earth. The following short expression of the doctrine of the Yih King is that in which probably all the literati would agree. It is from the 49th section of Chū-fútsz's entire works.

"All things, the four seasons and the five elements, come only from the Great Extreme (*t'ai kih*). The Great Extreme is the primordial substance (*k'i*) which, moving along, divided and made two *k'i*; that which in itself has motion is the Yang, and that which had rest, or *vis inertiae*, is the Yin. It (the *k'i*) divided and made the five elements. It also further divided and made all things."

萬物四時五行只是從那太極中來太極只是一箇氣迤邐分做兩個氣裏面動底是陽靜底是陰又分做五氣又散爲萬物。

This is the same scheme of making all things, as that referred to in the *Li Ki*, quoted by Dr Medhurst and commented on just above. If this be the doctrine of "the learned" on this subject, they must be ignorant of the true God, for if *Shángti* stood quietly by and permitted the Yin and Yang to grind on until heaven and earth and all things were made, we can not regard him as God (*proprie*): and if he did not exist at that time as an idle spectator, he is not self-existent from eternity; and this is equally fatal to his claim to be regarded as truly and

properly God. If the Chinese were entirely silent about the making of heaven and earth, and clearly asserted *Shángti's* self-existence from eternity, it might with some more show of propriety be inferred that he who rules over all things, must have made all things—heaven and earth included in these 'all things'—but it would have been a mere inference carrying no conviction along with it; but as the case is, there is no room left for such an inference: *Shángti* is not mentioned among the eternally-existing principles that are spoken of, and the making of the heavens and the earth is assigned to the *Yin Yáng chí k'i* 陰陽之氣 the primordial substance of which *Yin* and *Yáng* are predicated.

If it be asked, why does not the cosmogony of Confucius in the *Yih King*, that of *Chú-fútsz*, and of all the Confucianists ascribe the making of heaven and earth to *Shángti*, I answer, the reason is, I fancy, that they so identify heaven and earth with *Shángti*, in their minds, that it would be to them like making a being the cause of itself; and as they never regarded heaven as eternally existent, and looked upon *Shángti* and Heaven as the same being, they never conceived of *Shángti* as self-existent. Whether this be the reason or not, it seems certain that none of them ascribe the making of the heavens and the earth to *Shángti*. I can not believe in the existence of a traditional knowledge of God among a people, who had forgotten this fundamental fact, that God was their Creator—at least their Maker, and that of the world they live in. If *Shángti* is neither self-existent, nor eternal, nor the maker of the heavens and the earth, what then, it will be asked, is asserted of him, on which his claim to be considered as truly and properly God is founded?

The first sentence quoted by Dr. Legge is, "The majestic God (*Shángti*) conferred the just medium of perfect virtue on the lower people." In this whole investigation nothing is more puzzling than the predicating words which indicate intellectual and moral qualities of things which we regard as devoid of both: from our habits of thought and modes of expression, we can scarcely avoid regarding the names of the things which have such qualities predicated of them metaphorically, while the Chinese on the contrary feel no difficulty at all, and use them in their strict and appropriate sense. Take, for instance, the words just quoted, "the just medium of perfect virtue:" this, in Chinese, is called the *wú cháng* 五常, five cardinal virtues, which are given as follows: *jin*, *i*, *li*, *chi*, *sin*, 仁義禮智信 viz., benevolence, rectitude, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity. From these five cardinal virtues, both men and things, *jin wuh*, 人物

obtain at their generation *sang* 生, and these constitute their *sing* 性, nature, and this *sing* 性 is explained to be *li* 理, which is one of the two eternally-existent principles, out of which heaven, earth, men, and all things were made. We have seen from M. Visdelou above, that these five cardinal virtues are derived from the five elements, viz, wood, metal, &c. What a strange mixture have we here! Things (*wuh*) have by nature, benevolence, rectitude, propriety, wisdom and fidelity, and these moral qualities are derived from wood, metal, &c.

In the *Yih King* the matter is thus stated: "One *Yin* and one *Yang* is called *t'au* 道; the connection of these two constitutes goodness; the perfection of them constitutes *sing* 性, nature."

Of these terms, the commentators give the following explanation: "The ceaseless revolutions of the *Yin* and *Yang* refer to the *k'i*," the primary air of M. Visdelou, and what we have rendered above, *primordial substance*.

The (*li*) order in which these revolve, or fate which determines their revolutions—is called *Tau*, the primitive Reason of M. Visdelou. Another writer says, "*T'au* has no voice nor form, and is invisible; that by which men act is *T'au*, Reason. One *Yin* and one *Yang* are the *T'au* of heaven and earth; things (*wuh*) are by this generated, (*sang* 生 (and perfected)."

"The word "goodness" in the phrase, "the connection of these constitutes goodness," is explained to be the work of transforming and nourishing things, "which is the business of the *Yang*, the moving or active primordial substance."

The word *sing* 性 nature, is thus explained: 性謂物之所受。言物生則有性。而各具是道也。陰之事也。 "Nature means that which things (men included) receive. It means that when things are 生 *sang*, generated, they have *sing*, nature, and that each thing is so arranged, is owing to *T'au*, and is the business of the *Yin*, the non-moving, or passive primordial substance." This *sing*, nature, is also explained by the character 理 *li*. Put all together, and it amounts to this: men and things obtain 氣 *k'i*, and thus they have 形 *hing*, form; they obtain *li*, and thus they have 性 *sing*, nature.

The great question is, what sets this primary substance, *k'i*, in motion? If you answer *T'ái k'ih*, then what is *T'ái k'ih*? *T'ái k'ih* is *Li*, *T'ái k'ih* is *T'au*, *T'ái k'ih* is *K'i*: A most vicious circle, from which there is no escape.

If you say, "Heaven confers this nature," the 天命, the celestial decree is merely *li* or *táu*. If you say, *Shángti* confers this nature, *Shángti* is Heaven, and so you run round the circle again. No wonder that Dr. Medhurst found himself "baffled by the very incoherent manner in which they express themselves, and shocked at the propensity to materialism which they constantly exhibit."*

* I shall throw together in a note here the proofs of all I have advanced in the text, and give the Chinese characters along with the translation. These extracts are all from the 49th section of Chü-futsz's works, the whole of which section is devoted to the consideration of *Lí* and *Kí*.

1. "This Great Extreme is merely *Lí*, the principle of order." 太極只是一箇理字。

2. "This character *táu* 道 is the Great Extreme of the Yih King, or Book of Diagrams. One is the odd number, and belongs to the active primordial substance (*yáng*); two is the even number, and belongs to the passive primordial substance (*yin*); three is the odd number and even, added together. When it is said two produced (*sang* 生) three, it means that two and one make three. If we merely consider *one* as the Great Extreme, there is no need to say further that Reason (*Táu*) produced one." This puts an extinguisher upon the idea of a first Cause in the Yih King. 此道字即易之太極。一乃陽數奇。二乃陰數之偶。三乃奇偶之積。其曰二生三者。猶所謂二與一爲三也。若直以一爲太極。則不容復言道生一矣。

3. "All things, the four seasons, the five elements, only from the Great Extreme come. The Great Extreme is merely a *Kí*, a primordial substance." 萬物四時五行。則是從那太極中來。太極只是一箇氣。

4. "The Great Extreme is *Lí*—the principle of order; it is the active-passive primordial substance viz., *k'í*." 太極理也動靜氣也。

5. "The Great Extreme is not a separate individual thing; if we speak of it with respect to the Yin-yáng—active-passive primordial substance, then it is in the Yin-yáng; if with respect to the five elements, it is in the five elements; if with respect to all things, then it is in all things; it is merely a *Lí* principle of order (i. e. inherent in all things.) Because it goes to the extreme (of everything of which it is predicated), it is called *Tai kí*, the Great Extreme." This excludes all idea of its being a first cause distinct from *Lí* and *Kí*. 太極非是別爲一物。即陰陽而在陰陽。即五行而在五行。即萬物而在萬物。只是一箇理而已。因其極至。故名曰太極。

From the inability to produce any proof that *T'ien*, or *Shàngti*, produced the heavens and the earth, recourse is had to passages where heaven is said to generate all things, and "all things are said to come from *Shàngti*, as men from their parents." But the Chinese phrase here used, 萬物 *wàn wuh*, never includes, according to the

6. "Should any one ask an explanation of the assertion that the principle of order (*li*) exists first, and the primordial substance (*ki*) afterwards; I answer there is no need to speak thus: but now that we know they are united, whether the *Li* was first, and afterwards the *Ki*, or the *Li* afterwards, and *Ki* first, all this is a matter into which we can not search; but should we endeavor to form some idea of it, then we may suppose that (*ki*) the primordial substance relies upon (*li*) the principle of order, when it acts, so that whenever the primordial substance is collected, there (*li*) the principle of order is present: for the primordial substance (*ki*) can coagulate and collect, act and make, but the principle of order (*li*) neither wishes, nor plans, nor does; but where the primordial substance (*ki*) coagulates and collects, the (*li*) principle of order is in it. Just as between heaven and earth (i. e. in the world), men and things, grass, trees, birds, and beasts, in their generation (生 *sang*) all of them require a seed, and certainly there can not without a seed (*omnia ex ovo*?) from nothing be generated a single thing; this is (illustrates) the primordial substance (*ki*), i. e. the *ki* performs the part of the seed. "With respect to the principle of order (*li*), it is a pure, empty, wide world, without form or trace, it can not make or do any thing; but the primordial substance can ferment and settle and generate things."

問先有理後有氣之說。曰。不消如此說。而今知得他合下是先有理。後有氣耶。後有理。先有氣耶。皆不可得而推究。然以意度之。則疑此氣是依傍這理行。及此氣之聚。則理亦在焉。蓋氣則能凝結造作。理却無情意。無計度。無造作。只此氣凝聚處。理便在其中。且如天地間人物草木禽獸。其生也莫不有種。定不會無種了。白地生出一箇物事。這箇都是氣。若理。則只是個潔淨空濶底世界。無形迹。他却不會造作。氣則能醞釀凝聚生物也。

7. "With respect to the constitution of man, his *li* (i. e. the principle, or law of order which determines his form, constitution, &c.), is the principle of order (*li*) of heaven and earth; and his *ki* (i. e. the primordial substance of which his body, soul and anima—the whole man is made), is the primordial substance (*ki*) of which heaven and earth are made. The *li* (inherent principle of order) has no trace and is invisible; we must therefore look for it in the *ki*—primordial substance. In the world we have both the principle (law) of order (*li*), and the primordial and substance (*ki*). The principle of order (*li*) is the [primitive] Reason (*t'au*) which is inherent in material bodies, and is the root of

usus loquendi of Chinese writers, the heavens and the earth; and this 1st, because 天地萬物 *t'ien ti wán wuh* is used as a periphrasis for the universe, but 2d, and still more conclusively, because the generation of all things, 生萬物 *sung wán wuh* is throughout the *Yih King* and all the Confucian classics, constantly referred to 天地

their generation (or the principle from which they emanate). The primordial substance (*kt*) is the material—the substance out of which things are generated. Hence, when men and things are generated, they must receive this *kt* (emanation from the primitive Reason), and then they have 性 *sing*, nature; they must receive this *kt* (primordial substance), then they have 形 *hing* form."

人之所以爲人。其理則天地之理。其氣則天地之氣。理無迹不可見。故於氣觀之。天地之間。有理有氣。理也者。形而上之道也。生物之本也。氣也者。形而下之器也。生物之具也。是以人物之生。必稟此理。然後有性。必稟此氣。然後有形。

8. "That which is called the Great Extreme is only in the Yin-yáng. And what is called the Yin-yáng—active-passive primordial substance—is only in the Great Extreme. What people at present say, about there being, above the Yin-yáng, a separate, incorporeal, shadowless thing, which is the Great Extreme, is incorrect."

所謂太極者。便只在陰陽裏。所謂陰陽者。便只在太極裏。今人說是陰陽上。別有一箇無形無影裏。是太極非也。

9. "The meaning of the Great Extreme just is, the extreme point of the principle (law) of order (*kt*); having *Lí* you have this thing, i. e. the Yin-yáng; priority or posteriority of order can not be predicated of them (viz. of *Lí*, and the Yin-ed-Yang-ed *Kí*, active-passive primordial substance); therefore we say, that when in the *Yih King* (or Book of Diagrams) we read of the Great Extreme, it means that the Great Extreme is in the midst of the active-passive primordial substance (Yin-yáng); and that it is not exterior to, or separate from the Yin-yáng. Now if we explain it (the Great Extreme) as the Great Centre, or regard it as having existed before heaven and earth, prior to the division of the great expanse, I fear it is not safe. That which is inherent in material bodies we call *t'au*—primitive Reason; the substance out of which things are formed we call *Kí* 器, the material; now to speak of the Great Extreme as Divine (*shin* 神)—or as a Divine thing, or to speak of it as existing before the division of the heaven and the earth, when the primordial substance was all united in one mass; these propositions we also fear have no basis."

太極之義。正謂理之極致耳。有是理即有是物。無先後次序之可言。故曰易有太極。則是太極。乃

t'ien ti, heaven and earth; e. g. in the *Yih King* we read, under the 乾 *kiên* diagram, 大哉乾元萬物資始 "how great is the originating virtue of heaven; all things receive their commencement from it!" And again, under the 坤 diagram, 至哉坤元萬物資生 "how great is the originating virtue of earth; all things receive their birth (or consummation) from it!" On these two sentences, M. Visdelou thus remarks: "Hence it is that Heaven is called by the Chinese the Father of all things, who gives the commencement to all;

在陰陽之中。而非在陰陽之外也。今以大中訓之。又以乾坤未判。大衍未分之時論之。恐未安也。形而上者謂之道。形而下者謂之器。今論太極。而曰其物謂之神。又以天地未分。元氣合而爲一者言之。亦恐未安也。

10. "If it be inquired what is meant when we read in the Book of Records, such sentences as the following, viz, that *Shangti confers the virtuous nature on the people*;' that 'Heaven is about to impose great duties on man;' that, 'Heaven to protect the people makes for them princes;' that, 'Heaven having produced things treats them according to their capacity;' that, 'upon those who do good it sends down a hundred felicities, and upon those who do ill it sends down a hundred calamities;' that, 'when Heaven is about to send down some uncommon calamity, it first produces an uncommon man to determine it:' in expressions of this kind, is it meant that above the azure heavens, there really is a Ruler who acts thus? or is it that Heaven has no mind? (i. e. no controlling mind so that things happen by chance?) or is it merely, if we seek the origin (or cause) that according to the principle (law) of order (*li*) it is thus? I answer, these *three points* have but one meaning, viz., according to the principle of order (*li*) i. e. the eternal fitness of things—destiny, fate—it is thus. In the revolutions of the primordial substance hitherto, fulness has always been succeeded by decline, and after a period of decline there has been one of fulness, just as if things were caused to go round in a circle. There never has been a period of decline that was not followed by one of fulness."

問上帝降衷於民。天將降大任於人。天祐民。作之君。天生物因其材而篤。作善降之百祥。作不善降之百殃。天將降非常之禍於此世。必預出非常之人以擬之。凡此等類。是蒼蒼在上者。真有主宰如是耶。抑夫無心。只是推原其理如此。曰此三段。只一意。這箇也只是理如此。氣運從來一盛了又一衰。一衰了又一盛。只管恁地循環去。無有衰而不盛者。

and that the earth is named the Mother; who nourishes, nurses, perfects and consummates all things. However they can not be either the one or the other, the *alone*, or the first principle of all things; and besides, as we have already said, the absolute first principle is the grand summit, *t'ai-kih*, which generated the heavens and the earth. In the table of *Fah-ki*, there is no mention in any part of it of a first principle of all things; nevertheless, many interpreters formerly took heaven for the grand summit, *t'ai kih*, and especially its virtue *kien* 乾; no doubt, because heaven is the most grand, most elevated of all bodies, and because in it the power and splendor of the first principle most shines forth."

"Heaven and earth unite, and 萬物 *wán wuh*, all things are produced." "Heaven and earth nourish 養 *yáng*, all things 萬物 *wán wuh*." "Heaven and earth exert their influences, and all things 萬物 *wán wuh*, are generated." "First, you have heaven and earth, and then all things are generated, 萬物生 *wán wuh sang*." "Heaven and earth are the Father and Mother of all things 天地 萬物之父母." We must not suppose that heaven and earth are here used merely by metonymy for the producing power, because each does its part. We read 天一生水 *t'ien yih sang shui* "heaven is one, and generated water; earth is two 地二生火 and generated fire. We also meet with the phrase 天地以生物爲心 "the heart (wish or disposition) of heaven and earth is to generate things." This is one of the instances in which we are quite thrown out by what I mentioned above—the predicating intellectual and moral qualities of material, physical objects. The first thought on reading this sentence is, that the words *heaven* and *earth* must be understood metaphorically; but if we will take the trouble to look up the native comment, we shall find that the expression is resolved into the famous word *li* 理: e. g. *Chü-fútsz'* gives the following explanation of the 天地之心, the heart of heaven and earth. 問天地之心。天地之理。理是道理。心是主宰。底意否。曰。心固是主宰。底意然。所謂主宰者。即是理也。不是心外別有個理。理外別有個心。 "Should any one ask whether in the phrases, the 'heart of heaven and earth,' and 'the (*li*) principle of order of heaven and earth,' if the character *li* does not mean *táu li*, principle, and *sin*, heart, mean Ruler; I answer, heart certainly has the meaning of Ruler, but what we call

Ruler, is just this *li*, i. e. the principle of order; it is not, that besides the heart there is this *li*; principle of order, or besides this *li*, principle of order, there is a heart."

And so in the *Yih King*, when we read that 夫大人者與天地合其德, "the great man with heaven and earth unites his virtue," we fancy heaven and earth must be used metaphorically, but the word "t'ien 天 heaven," in the phrase "heaven and earth" refers, the commentator expressly tells us, "to its form and substance." He also says, the virtue in which heaven and earth and the great man unite, is *Yü*.

The generation of all things is also ascribed to the *yin* and *yáng*, to the 二氣 *erh k'í*, the two primordial substances, which are the same as the *yin* and *yáng*, and to the 五行 *wú hing*, the five elements. While the generation of all things is thus ascribed to so many different agents, the generating of the heavens and the earth is never ascribed to *Shángti*. This generation however is ascribed to *Yin Yáng chi k'í*; as for instance in the following 天地但陰陽之物.依舊是陰陽之氣所生也. "Heaven and earth are only a thing or creature of the *Yin* and *Yáng*; they are what the *Yin*-ed and *Yáng*-ed *k'í*, (i. e. the primordial substance of which we predicate *Yin* and *Yáng*, activity and passivity) generated of old."

To pursue this argument from the Chinese cosmogony any farther, we think useless. What Cudworth maintains is necessary to constitute imperfect theism, is certainly the minimum that we could consent, should be used as a test to prove whether *Shángti* is truly and properly God or not. That he can meet the requirements of this test is not pretended on *Shángti*'s behalf by Dr. Medhurst, as we have seen, and I am persuaded can not be shown from the Chinese classics by any one. So far from proving *Shángti* to be God (*proprie*) he can not, judging from all that is predicated of him, (as far as I am informed,) be shown to be even a Demiurge. And to this assertion I beg to call Dr. Legge's attention particularly.

If Dr. Legge gives up the point of *Shángti*'s self-existence from eternity, he can not abandon that of his having made the heavens and the earth, and still maintain that he is "God over all, blessed for ever," without the greatest inconsistency. This last point he must prove, for, if he fails to make it good, we must regard *Shángti* as one of those gods, whose doom was long ago announced by the prophet: "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens." Jer. x. 11.

Before taking our leave of this point, I can not refrain from quoting some excellent advice which M. Visdelou gives to those who maintain that the Chinese are worshipers of the true God. He says:—

"The Chinese are certainly in advance of other nations in the care and accuracy with which they have written their histories. Besides what we call history in general, they write also particular historical accounts of all things, amongst which religion holds the chief place.

"Each dynasty possesses a history of its religion. Thus it will not be difficult, instead of vainly disputing about their canonical books and about detached portions of passages, to gather from history, a decided opinion concerning the religion of each dynasty, and finally to decide if the religion of the Chinese be the religion of the true God."

If we act on this suggestion of M. Visdelou, and test *Shángti's* claim to be regarded as the true God by the historical account of the religious worship of each dynasty, the conviction produced on our minds that "*the Shángti of the Chinese people*" is not the Being we call God, is as decided as that derived from a consideration of their cosmogony. For an account of the objects worshiped in the *Chau* dynasty B. C. 1100, I must beg leave to refer the reader to my "Essay," pp. 14, 15, 32, 33, 34.

In his "Inquiry," p. 44, Dr. Medhurst gives the following account of the worship of the present dynasty: "At the great sacrifice by the rulers of the present dynasty, at the period of the winter solstice, an altar is elevated at the southern side of the Capital, of a round form, three stories high, the top of which, or the principal place of honor, is intended for the shrine of *Shángti* or *Ti*; having the shrines of the Imperial Ancestors arranged on the right and left hand; while those of the attendant *shin*, such as the spirits presiding over the sun, moon and stars, clouds, wind and rain, are placed on the second story, and are honored with medium sacrifices. When the sacrifice is to take place, the shrine of *Shángti* is escorted to the high altar; and while the fumes of incense are ascending, the emperor greets the approach of the *shin* or spirit of *Ti*; after which he ascends the steps, and in the presence of *Shángti* and of the imperial ancestors, offers incense with three kneelings and nine prostrations: this done, he goes towards the shrine of the imperial ancestors, arranged on each side of the high altar, and offers incense with three kneelings and nine prostrations. The same ceremonies are gone through with regard to the offerings, which are first presented before the shrine of *Shángti*, and then before those dedicated to the Imperial Ancestors. When the service is completed, the spirit of *Ti* is escorted on its departure by music, and the shrine conducted to the temple, where it is deposited as before."

It will be observed here, that the respect shown to the imperial ancestors is as great as that shown to *Shàngti*, nothing but precedence being given to him. They are elevated to the same height, and they, as well as *Shàngti*, have incense offered to them, and are saluted with "three kneelings and nine prostrations." If the emperor had any, even the slightest, knowledge of the self-existent Being who is "God over all," could he thus elevate his deceased ancestors, the mere creatures of this Being, to equal rank and honors with him?

To illustrate further the Chinese worship, we refer also to a paper on "the State Religion of China" from the pen of Dr. Morrison. This paper was communicated by him to the Chinese Repository in 1834, after he had enjoyed intimate intercourse with the Chinese people and the officers of government for twenty-six or seven years.

"The Chinese have no generic name for religion. The word *kiau*, which means to teach, or the things taught, doctrine or instruction, is indeed applied by them to the religious sects of Táu and Budha, as well as to the ethical sect of Confucius. But they do not apply it to the *State Religion*; for that does not consist of doctrines which are to be taught, learned and believed, but of rites and ceremonies. It is entirely a bodily service, which, however, tacitly implies the belief of some opinions; though to have correct opinions according to some prescribed rule or articles of faith, forms no part of the system. The state religion, as practiced by the Court of Peking and by the Provincial governments is contained in the code of laws called *Tá-tsing Houi-tien* and in the *Tá-tsing Liuh-li* under the head *li*, rules of propriety and decorum, or rites and ceremonies, and in the subordinate division *tsi-sz*, sacrifices and offerings. From these two works we shall briefly specify; 1st, the persons or things to whom these sacrifices are presented, or the objects of governmental worship; 2d, the ministers or priests who offer these sacrifices; and the preparation required of them for the performance of this religious service; 3d, the sacrifices and offerings, the times of presenting them and the ceremonies accompanying them; and 4th, the penalties for informality, or defective performance of the state religion."

"First, we are to speak concerning the objects of worship, or things to which sacrifices are offered. These are chiefly things, although persons are also included. The state sacrifices are divided into three classes; first, the *tá sz*, or great sacrifices; second, the *chung sz*, or medium sacrifices; and third, the *siáu sz*, or little sacrifices. These last are also denominated *kiau sz*, the crowd or herd of sacrifices; the word *kiau*, a flock of sheep, being used as a noun of multitude. In the following list, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th, are the objects or classes of objects to which the great sacrifices are offered; from the 5th to the 13th are those to which the medium sacrifices are offered; those of the 14th and onward, have right only to the little sacrifices.

1. *T'ien*, the heavens or sky. This object of worship is otherwise called the azure heavens; and *hüing k'ung yü*, 'the imperial concave expanse.'

2. *Ti*, the earth. This, like the heavens, is dignified with the epithet imperial.

3. *T'ai miâu* 'the great temple' of ancestors. This title is used to include all the tablets contained therein dedicated to the manes, or shades of the deceased emperors of the present dynasty. This triad of titles, *t'ien*, *ti*, *t'ai miâu*, always placed together on a level in respect of dignity at the

grand sacrifices, are also worshiped apart. The lines or columns of Chinese characters being read from top to bottom, dignity is always denoted by the height of the title, which corresponds in some degree to our use of capital letters. Inferiority of rank or dignity is marked by the title being placed one or more characters lower. Heaven, earth and ancestors, as objects of worship of equal dignity, are placed on a level, and one or more characters higher than other objects, as the sun, moon, stars, &c. An idea of this may be conveyed to the reader by the position of the words in lines, thus;—

Heaven, Earth, Ancestors,

Sun, moon, stars, &c.

4. *Shié tshih*, the gods of the land and grain; these are the special patrons of each existing dynasty, and generally located in the fourth place.

5. *Jih*, the sun, called also *tá ming*, the great light.

6. *Yueh*, the moon, called also *yé ming*, the night light.

7. *Tsien tái tí wáng*, the manes of the emperors and kings of former ages.

8. *Sien sz' K'ung-tsz'*, the ancient master, Confucius, &c., &c.

"From this specimen it is apparent that in the Chinese state religion, the material universe, as a whole, and in detail, is worshiped; and that subordinate thereto, they have gods celestial and terrestrial, and ghosts infernal; that they worship the work of their own hands, not only as images of persons or things divine, but human workmanship for earthly purposes, as in flags and banners, and destructive cannon. That the material universe is the object of worship, appears not only from the names of those several parts which have been given above, but also from other circumstances. Thus, the imperial high priest, when he worships heaven, wears robes of azure color, in allusion to the sky. When he worships the earth, his robes are yellow to represent the clay of this earthly clod. When the sun is the object, his dress is red, and for the moon, he wears a pale white. The kings, nobles, and centenary of official hierophants, wear their court dresses. The altar on which to sacrifice to heaven is round, to represent heaven; this is expressly said. The altar on which the sacrifices to the earth are laid, is square; whether for the same wise reason or not, is not affirmed. The "prayer boards," *chuk pin*, are of various colors, for the same reason as the emperor's robes. In the worship of the heavens, an azure ground with vermilion letters is used; in the worship of earth, a yellow ground is used with black characters; for the worship of ancestors, a white ground is required with black characters; for the sun, a carnation, with vermilion characters; and for the moon, a white ground with black characters," &c., &c.

"The times of sacrifice are specified as follows: Those to heaven are offered on the day of the winter solstice; those to earth on the day of the summer solstice; and the others at regular appointed times which it is not important to detail in this sketch."

"The ceremonies of this grand worship of nature, this natural religion, consist in bowing, kneeling and knocking the head against the ground, or in Chinese *pai* 拜, *kwei* 跪, *k'au* 叩. In those sacrifices in which the emperor officiates in *propria persona*, he never knocks his head against the ground. What he requires of the greatest monarch on earth, he will not give to the greatest, 'supremest' thing that he worships. The three kneelings and nine knockings of the head against the ground, he turns into three kneelings and nine bows. The *k'au* or the *pai*, i. e. the knocking or the bowing, seems to make a material, or rather a feeling difference in the estimation of his Majesty." See *Chinese Repository*, Vol. III, p. 49.


To show that the view expressed by Dr. Morrison is not peculiar to him, we shall quote, again from M. Visdelou. "The Chinese philosophers," he says, "speak of revering Heaven, but they understand by

Heaven, Reason; not that which belongs to man, and which is but the effect of that, but the primitive, which is the first principle and the necessary cause of all things. To respect this Reason, is to follow it; just as we respect fate (*le destin*), not by prayers and honors, but by submitting ourselves to its laws. Fate (*sc. 天理*) say they, is marked out by Heaven; i. e. by the primitive Reason (*sc. 天道*), which is the first principle of all things. In truth it (Reason) acts blindly; but the same necessity which renders it blind, renders it also infallible. It is *it* which is fate, inasmuch as *it* acts necessarily. 'This is the doctrine which the Missionaries (of the Church of Rome) have called the atheo-political.' In his account of the state religion, he specifies the objects of worship as follows:—

"It is well here to observe, that the religion of the philosophical sect of China (i. e. the Confucian, or state religion) does not exclude sacrifices, which on the contrary are quite numerous. To speak here only of the principal or Imperial sacrifices, there is one for Heaven (*le Ciel*), for the Earth, and the ancestors of the emperors; for the tutelary spirit (*Shin*) or Genius of arable lands, and for the tutelary Genius (*Shin*) of the grains of the empire; these are sacrificed to at the same time. There are also sacrifices for the five principal mountains of the empire; for the five tutelary mountains, for the four seas, and the four rivers. They sacrifice at the sepulchres of the illustrious emperors of past dynasties, and at the temple dedicated to Confucius in the place of his birth, and to other sages and heroes. All these sacrifices are made by the emperor himself, or by his orders. Moreover when the emperor is about to march himself on any military expedition, he sacrifices to the spirit (*shin*) of the standards, and they stain the standards and drums with the blood of the victims."

No one, from this account of the state religion of China, as given by Dr. Morrison and M. Visdelou, can make out that the Chinese are worshipers of the true God; nor, we should think, after reading it, could resist the impression, that his imperial Majesty and those who join with him in this worship, are wholly ignorant of the being we Christians call God.

But, it is said, in high antiquity, the Chinese had much more knowledge of God than they have at present. Of this assertion I have never seen any proof produced from the ancient books that have come down to us. We have already seen what is to be found in the Yih King, which treats of physics and metaphysics, on this subject. Its uniform doctrine is, that heaven and earth generated all things; I say 'uniform doctrine,' for in the sentence, quoted from

the 5th chapter of the 4th section of the Book of Diagrams, "The  [Supreme] Ruler [causes things to] issue forth under the Chia Diagram (See Dr. Medhurst's "Theology of the Chinese," p. 234), the words "Supreme" and "causes things to" are added by the translator. The text should be translated, "The Ruler issues forth under the Chia diagram," which answers to the commencement of spring. Some interpreters understand the word *Ti* of *Shángti*; but the ancient interpreters, M. Visdelou tells us, understood by it the Emperor Fuh-M.

If recourse is had to the *Shú King* 書經, the Historical Classic, for proof of the assertion that, in high antiquity, the Chinese had a purer knowledge of God than they have at present, we shall find the account of what took place on the occasion, when the first religious worship was offered in China, in the Canon of Shun, which is the second book of the *Shú King*. It reads as follows: "Shun then offered the sacrifice called *lui*, to *Shángti*; he presented a pure offering to the six venerable Ones, he looked with devotion towards the hills and rivers, and glanced around at the host of *Shin*." See Medhurst's *Shoo King*; p. 17.

What is this sacrifice called *lui*? The word means, to correspond to, and the explanation given of the name is this: "The *kiáu* sacrifice (see my Essay, pages 18 to 26 incl.) was the sacrifice constantly presented to the *expansive heavens*, at the border of the country; but this not being one of the seasons for the regular sacrifice, and there being occasion for a sacrifice to announce to heaven, (Shun's association with Yau on the throne) the ceremonies used were like those of the *kiáu* or border sacrifice; therefore it is called *lui*, a corresponding sacrifice."

Here it will be seen, the Supreme Ruler worshiped is "the expansive heavens," the accustomed sacrifice to which was offered at the winter solstice; which sacrifice, called *kiáu*, is imitated on the occasion of this worship to *Shángti*, who is evidently, merely "the expansive heavens" worshiped under the title of Supreme Ruler. Of this ancient sacrifice called *kiáu*, it may be asked, Was it so set apart to the worship of "the expansive heavens," "the Supreme Ruler," that no other being or thing was ever permitted to share it with him? The answer is, that the expansive heavens, the Supreme Ruler, has never enjoyed among the Chinese from the earliest times, of which their histories inform us, any such *preëminent* distinction. Following out the view presented in the *Yih King* of Earth's participating with Heaven in generating all things, so that they together became "the

Father and Mother of all things," this highest sacrifice was always offered to Earth as well as to Heaven, the only distinction between them being, that this sacrifice was offered to Earth at the summer solstice and at the northern border of the country, whereas it was offered to Heaven at the winter solstice and southern border of the country. Some greater deference to Heaven is no doubt designed in these slight distinguishing circumstances, but not greater than the Chinese would accord to the father over the mother.

I hope that those who find in the Chinese classics proof that the ancient Chinese knew and worshiped the true God, will produce it. I do not think tradition could have done much for Shun, when he thus worshiped "the expansive heavens," under the title of the Supreme Ruler, and added to this the worship of the six venerable Ones, *i. e.* 1. the four Seasons; 2. Heat and cold; 3. the Sun; 4. the Moon; 5. the Stars; and 6. Drought; and not content with all this Sabianism, descended to earth and worshiped the hills and rivers, and hosts of deceased worthies.

The *onus probandi* is with Dr. Legge, and the nature of the case is such that we are constrained, "for conscience sake," to call upon him to give us the clearest proof, before we can go with him. A mistake here is most fatal. While we have a single doubt that "the *Shángtí* of the Chinese people" is God, truly and properly God,—the very identical Being we are taught in the Sacred Scriptures to worship—we dare not teach others to worship him. Where love and affiance are due, we must be cautious and jealous; for God is jealous. The wife must have no doubt that "her man" is her husband: if she have the shadow of a doubt, and yet lives with him, she commits adultery. God uses this very relationship to illustrate his own jealousy: we therefore say, "our God," the God we worship, must be Jehovah. If there is a single doubt that "the *Shángtí* of the Chinese people" is Jehovah—the very same identical Being, and not merely the most like Jehovah of any of the Chinese gods—and we proceed, notwithstanding this doubt, to worship him, we are guilty of spiritual adultery.

We can not but think that Dr. Legge has a very difficult task before him, whether he appeals to the Chinese cosmogony, or the Chinese ritual, to prove that "the *Shángtí* of the Chinese classics and the *Shángtí* of the Chinese people is God over all blessed for ever." But if Dr. Legge should succeed in proving to our satisfaction that the being whom the Chinese designate by the phrase *Shángtí* is to be regarded as truly and properly God, I would still object to the use of this phrase to render Elohí and Theos.

1st. Because *T'ien* 天, not *Shángti*, is the absolute term by which the Chinese designate this Being, "as a whole and without reference to anything of which it is a part;" while *Shángti* is merely one of the titles of *T'ien*, which expresses only one single, definite relation that *T'ien* bears to men and all things. This title is therefore unsuitable for rendering *Elohim* and *Theos*, because we must use the word by which they are rendered, to speak of Jehovah as he exists in and of himself—*e. g.* when it is used to speak of his nature, his existence from eternity before there were any creatures to stand in any relation to him, or to express the doctrine of the Trinity; and also, because the Being we call God sustains not one merely, but many relations to us, and therefore the word by which we render *Elohim* should be an absolute term—the name of the Being viewed as a whole—and not a relative term, which can suggest only one relationship.

2d. Because *Shángti* is a compound term, consisting of an adjective "Supreme," and a noun "Ruler," and we want a simple, uncompounded word—*God*. These points will be best discussed under propositions *b.* and *c.*

The issue made with us by Dr. Legge on this point was thus expressed in proposition *b.* :—

"Admitting that the Chinese do not know the true God, (Dr Legge) contends that we should use a relative, not an absolute generic term to render *Elohim* and Θεός, because these words are relative, not absolute terms."

On this point Dr. Legge writes: "First of all, I deny that God is a generic term. If I can substantiate this, then there is no room for 'the single question,' to which Dr. Boone 'narrows' the controversy, viz., 'What is the generic name for *god* in the Chinese language?' If it were intended in speaking of the 'generic name for God' merely to say that God is a term that may be applied (right or wrong) to more than one object of thought, I should let the use of the word pass without animadversion. I profess myself as much opposed as any man can be to the trifling of logomachies. But it has been employed according to its true application, which is not in questions of grammar and logic, but in the representations of natural history. Much has been said of the 'genus of gods,' as if there really were in nature many gods, while at the same time and on the same page, it is stated that 'there is in truth but one God,' and that 'there is no other being in the universe but Jehovah entitled to this name.' We are told that 'the existence of a generic name for God is owing entirely to polytheism.'" page 4.

Though this seems to puzzle Dr. Legge very much, there is to my mind no difficulty about the matter as it was stated in my Essay. The question was asked at the outset, if the Chinese knew the true God, if they were mono-theists or poly-theists? To this question the answer was given "they are polytheists, they do not know the true God;" in which answer, as I understood, all then discussing this question agreed. Not knowing the Being we call God, they could have, I contended, no name for Him—no word answering to our word *God*, when used *proprie*. Under these circumstances, it was inquired, What is a translator to do? If he takes the name of the chief god, by the admission above made, this would be only the name of a false god, which it would be derogatory to Jehovah to use as his appellation; the name of any other particular deity inferior to the chief god, would be still more objectionable: it was therefore contended that, among polytheists, where the true God is unknown, the only course to be pursued is to use the generic name of their gods to render Elohim and Θεός; and to prevent mistake, this phrase was defined to be "the name of the highest genus, or *class of beings*, to whom the Chinese offer religious worship." Still further to guard against misapprehension, I wrote: "There being in truth but one God, the existence of a generic name for God is owing entirely to polytheism. If none other than the true religion had ever prevailed, there could have been no such genus as this conceived of. The gods of a polytheistic people are merely imaginary beings, who have no real existence. The true God claims the right to displace the whole class; and this is the reason that, in translating the Scriptures into the language of such a people, the generic term for god must be used: Jehovah claims the right—not to be recognized in the place of the chief god of such a system, but—to take the place of the whole class of gods. He will not consent to propose Himself to polytheists, as their Jupiter or Neptune, their *T'ien* 天 or their *Fuh* 佛 Budha. He claims to be 'the all and in all.'..... We must therefore take for Jehovah the name of the whole class, and affirm that it *properly* belongs to Him alone; that there is no other being in the universe *entitled to this name*; that those whom the heathen have, in the days of their polytheistic ignorance, called gods, are mere imaginary beings who have no existence except in the minds of their blinded votaries.

"The generic name for God, when thus claimed for Jehovah, undergoes a change by Christian usage; according to this usage, it is employed in a *proper sense*, to designate Jehovah alone; and, but

for the fact that it must still be used to combat polytheism, its generic character would wholly cease. But as polytheism gave rise to so *improper* a *genus*, so the necessity there exists of forbidding men to have a plurality of gods, causes the word to retain so much of its generic character, as to make it available to prohibit sternly the recognition and worship of all the imaginary beings, who are by polytheists *strictly* and *properly* included in its meaning." *Essay*, page 6.

With all this before him, Dr Legge writes: "Much has been said of the 'genus of gods,' as if there really *were in nature* many gods, while at the same time and on the same page, it is stated that 'there is in truth but one God.'" It is very surprising to me Dr Legge did not see that I contended there was *in nature* but one God, and that the *plurality* exists only in the *imagination* of polytheists; that the word *God*, when "employed in a *proper* sense," designates Jehovah alone, and that "the genus" is an "improper" one, whose existence is entirely owing to the false views of polytheists. But whether the beings designated be real or imaginary, can not, I conceive, alter the *character* of the word, which is the common name of the class. This word, if it be a name common to several *beings*, must be a common name, an appellative noun, a generic term. Whether Elohim is actually used as the name of only one being, or as a name common to a number of beings, is a question of fact, to be determined, not by inquiring what is the first idea that comes into our minds, when they "rise rapidly and vigorously to the idea of God," but by an appeal to the *usus loquendi* of the writers of the O. T.: 'The inspired writers do not suppose that there exist many gods—a class of gods—nor do we, but polytheists do; and accordingly we find that *they*, in all the languages with which we are acquainted (the languages in which the Sacred Scriptures were written included), have a general name by which this class of beings is called; and that *monotheists*, whether inspired men or not, have never scrupled to use this word when speaking of these imaginary beings; it is idle therefore to say that the word so used is not the name of a class of beings—that it is not a generic term. In Hebrew, Eloah and Elohim, and in Greek Θεός, Θεοί, are used as the name of this class of beings, and in Chinese, we contend that Shin is so used:

With respect to the fact that Elohim is used as a name common to Jehovah and all the false gods of the polytheists mentioned in the O. T., there can, of course, be no controversy between Dr. Legge and myself, nor with respect to the fact whether Elohim is, or is not, the *appellative name* of this whole class; the only point of difference is

with respect to the *character* of this appellative ; is it absolute or is it relative ? This also is a question of *fact*, to be determined by an appeal to the *usus loquendi* of the word. If Dr. Legge understands generic as absolute appellative, and desires to deny that the word Elohim is generic in this sense, he makes the very issue which I desired to make in my Essay, when I defined *shin* to be the *name* of a class of *beings*, and called "*ti* a mere *relative term*, denoting *office*, and not an appellative noun." Dr. Legge's strictures on my use of the word "appellative noun" in this last sentence, are just ; I wanted the opposite of "relative," and the proper term "absolute" did not occur to me. I am glad that Dr. Legge has called attention to my mistake, and brought up the question more clearly for discussion, by pointing out the proper terms to be used, viz., *absolute* and *relative*. I agree with him that the point is a fundamental one, and regret that I did not, in that part of my Essay, express my meaning more accurately. That Dr. Legge intends to maintain, in sober earnest, that God is a relative term, and not absolute, appears not only from his use of these words, but from his carefully defining the sense in which he uses the word *relative*, and from his assuring us that, "God does not indicate the *essence*, nor express anything about *the being* of Jehovah." This last statement is only a just consequence of the preceding one, "that God is a relative term;" but I should have thought the mere writing out the proposition in this form would have awakened Dr. Legge to a sense of its incorrectness, and caused him to blot out all he had written on the subject. Dr Legge tells us very correctly, from Rees' Cyclopædia, that relative words "include a kind of opposition between them ; yet so as that *one* can not be without the *other*."

Will Dr. Legge tell us then, what *that* is without which Jehovah could not be God ? He answers on p. 5 its correlative is "creatures." "As soon as the first man was called into existence, Jehovah stood to him in the *relation* of God." Is the eternity of God one of the articles of Dr. Legge's creed ? If so, to be consistent with the view above expressed, he must maintain the eternity of the creation also. On p. 11, Dr. Legge quotes the principle of the Grecian philosophers, "*ex nihilo nihil fit*." However true this doctrine may be when applied to every "material cause," does Dr. Legge regard it as true when applied to the efficient cause—to God ? Does he deny a creation from nothing *ἐξ οὐκ οὐκ*, so that there never was a time when God existed alone, before He had created anything ? If Dr Legge answers, as we have no doubt he will, that he believes in the eternal existence of the Being, and that this Being, when existing absolutely alone,

without anything extrinsic to Himself, out of nothing made the heavens and the earth; then he only differs from us in maintaining that this Being could not properly be called God when viewed thus absolutely; and the question is reduced to one of the *usus loquendi* of the word; which happily is so uniform that it is easily settled.

The Psalmist says, "O LORD, *before* the mountains were brought forth, or *ever* thou hadst formed the earth and the world; even *from* everlasting *to* everlasting, thou art God." Ps. xc. 2.—"I said, O my God, take me not away in the midst of my days: thy years are throughout all generations; of old thou hast laid the foundation of the earth" &c., &c. Ps. cii. 24. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." When the Evangelist tells us here that the Word "was God," does Dr. Legge understand him to say that the Word merely sustains a relationship to God the Father or to men? When stating the doctrine of the Trinity, does not Dr. L. say, "there are three Persons and one God?" Is the word *God* here used as a relative term? Dr. Legge says the correlative of God is *creature*; from which we infer the word *God* means Creator: can he adhere to this explanation of the word, and point out to us what relationship is affirmed to exist between the three Persons of the blessed Trinity when we say "there are three Persons and one God?" We also speak of "our Savior Christ" as "both God and man." Do we by the words "God" and "man" express our belief in the existence of two *natures*, the Divine and human, in one Christ; or merely mean thereby, that Christ sustained two diverse *relations*, i. e. creator and creature, to other beings? If Dr. Legge can be induced to forget for a moment his thesis, "God is a relative term, not absolute," which, to sustain the cause of *Shángtí*, "Supreme Ruler," he has incautiously undertaken to defend, he will I have no doubt acknowledge, with the orthodox of all ages of the Church, that by the word *God* when so used, we affirm that the three Persons are of one divine essence or nature—of one substance. This is undoubtedly the meaning the word *God* bears, and has borne in the Christian Church from the beginning, as can be shown from its *usus loquendi*.

I open a work on Systematic Theology, which lies before me, that of Knapp, and turn to the heading; "General names applied to Deity, without distinction of true or false." The first given is *Eloah*, *Elohim*. I turn to the next article; it is headed, "Of the *nature* and *attributes* of God." The writer tells us, "the *nature* of God is the sum of the divine perfections, the *attributes* of God are the particular distinct *perfections* or *realities*, which are *predicable* of the divine *nature*."

These attributes are then considered in the following order, "The Spirituality of God;" "the Eternity and Immutability of God;" &c., &c. Are not these *essential* attributes? If Dr. Legge, when he predicates these attributes of Jehovah, does not call Him *God*, will he inform us what word he uses as the name of this Being, when discoursing of His attributes?

But this work is a recent one, and Dr. Legge fortifies his position with the great name of Newton; we shall therefore exhibit at some length the *usus loquendi* of the word. We do this not merely for the interests of this controversy, but for the cause of truth in general, for if Dr. Legge's position be correct, our formulas, which teach us the orthodox faith on the doctrine of the Trinity, are worth nothing, and our systems of divinity, which use the word *God*, when affirming the eternity of Jehovah, affirm also the eternal existence of its correlative the *creature*.

The first quotation we shall cite to show the *usus loquendi* of the word, is from Tertullian. He distinguishes the words *God* and *Lord* as follows:—

"Dei nomen dicimus semper fuisse apud semetipsum et in semetipso Dominum vero non semper. Diversa enim utriusque conditio. *Deus* substantiæ ipsius nomen, id est, divinitatis; *Dominus* vero non substantiæ, sed potestatis, substantiam semper fuisse cum suo nomine, quod est *Deus*; postea *Dominus*, accedentis scilicet rei mentio. Nam ex quo esse cœperunt in quæ potestas Domini ageret, ex illo, per accessionem potestatis, et factus et dictus est Dominus. *Tertull. contra Hermog. cap. 3, quoted in Waterland's Works.*

Council of Nice. *Προσέκομεν εἰς ἓνα Θεόν, κατέφα κανονικάτωρα καὶ εἰς ἓνα κυρίον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ λόγον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς . . . ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί, &c.*

The Athanasian Creed. "We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the *substance*. For the right faith is that we believe and confess; that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and man: God of the *substance* of the Father, and Man of the *substance* of his mother: who although he be God and man, yet he is not two but one Christ; one altogether; not by confusion of *substance*, but by unity of person."

The Protestant churches at the Reformation, without a single exception, I believe, define the word *God* in their standards as an absolute, not as a relative term; and in direct opposition to Dr. Legge affirm that the word *God* does "indicate essence, and express *something* about the *being* of Jehovah."

1. The Confession of England thus speaks on this subject: "We believe that there is one certain *nature* and Divine power, which we call God, and that the same one God hath created heaven and earth, and all things contained under heaven." See *Harmony of Prot. Confessions*; *Conf. of England*, p. 30.

2. "We believe and teach that God is one in *essence* or *nature*, subsisting by himself, all-sufficient in himself, invisible, without a body, infinite, eternal, the Creator of all things both visible and invisible," &c. See *ibid.* *The Latter Conf. of Helvetia*, p. 18.

3. "We believe and acknowledge only one God, who is one only and simply *essence*, spiritual, eternal, invisible, immutable, infinite, incomprehensible, unspeakable, almighty, most wise, good, just, and merciful." *Ibid*, *Conf. of France*, p. 29.

4. "We believe in heart, and confess with the mouth, that there is only one and simple spiritual *essence*, which we call God, eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite, who is wholly wise, and a most plentiful well-spring of all good things." *Ibid*, *Conf. of Belgia*, p. 32.

5. "The churches with common consent among us do teach . . . that there is one Divine *essence*, which is called, and is God, eternal, without body, indivisible, of infinite power, wisdom, goodness, the Creator and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible," &c. *Ibid*, *Conf. of Augsburg*, p. 36.

These documents all speak one language, and that directly the reverse of the main proposition on which Dr. Legge's argument is founded. But the point is of such great importance, that I trust the reader will pardon my presenting him some additional quotations from a few eminent theological writers.

Bishop Pearson, commenting on the words of the first Article of the Creed, "I believe in God;" after saying that the name *God* is attributed unto many, tells us that the excellency which makes it *proper* to Him "is grounded upon the Divine *nature* or *essence*, which all other who are called gods have not, and therefore are not by *nature* gods. 'Then when ye knew not God (saith St. Paul); ye did service to them; who by nature are not gods.' (Gal. iv. 8) There is then a God by nature; and others, which are called gods, but by *nature* are not so; for either they have no power at all, because no being, but only in the false opinions of deceived men, as the gods of the heathen, or if they have any real power or authority, from whence some are called gods in Scripture, yet they have it not from themselves, or of their own nature, but from Him who 'only hath immortality,' and consequently,

only Divinity, and therefore is 'the only true God.' . . . So that the notion of a Deity doth at last expressly signify a *being* or *nature* of infinite perfection; and the infinite perfection of a nature or being consisteth in this, that it be absolutely and essentially necessary, an actual being of itself; and potential or causative of all beings beside itself, independent from any other, upon which all things else depend, and by which all things else are governed." *Exp of the Creed*, p. 25.

Archbishop Usher says, "We describe God by these properties, a spirit eternal. Or more fully, God is a spiritual substance, having his being of himself, infinitely great and good, and hence we learn to acknowledge both our being and well-being from him, and from him alone; and when we say that God is a substance, we mean that he is such a thing, as hath a being in himself, of himself, and which giveth a being to all other things." *Body of Divinity*, p. 41.

Waterland, having expressed his views of what is included in the Scripture notion of one that is truly and properly God, as given above at page 19, in our quotation from his Works, says: "And if Scripture has thus informed us what *properties, attributes, and perfections* (observe, not what relations) must be supposed to meet in one that is truly and properly God, our own reason must tell us that these attributes, &c., must have a subject, and this subject we call substance; and therefore the *Scripture notion* of God, is that of an eternal, immutable, omnipresent, omniscient, almighty substance." *Waterland's Works*, Vol. II. p. 37.

Dr. Clarke, Waterland's great opponent, contended as Dr. Legge does, that the word God was a relative term, implying dominion; and to sustain this view quoted from Hippolytus a sentence that Waterland comments on as follows. "The words you chiefly value are *καὶ ὅρα ὅτι ὁ Χριστὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς κατεστάθη ὡς ὁ Θεός*, 'Christ was constituted Ruler over all by the Father.' On occasion whereof, let me observe a thing to you, which you are not aware of; that though the ancients scrupled not to say, that Christ was *constituted* by the Father: *Ruler or Lord*, or even *Creator*, (according to Prov. viii.) or anything coming under the notion of *office*, (the Father ever being looked upon as the *first* in order, and in virtue thereof, the fountain of every office, according to his own voluntary appointment,) yet you will never find it said by the ancients, that the Father *constituted* Christ a *God*, or appointed him to be *God*, which observation is highly deserving your special notice; as it may discover to you a fundamental flaw in your *hypothesis*, and may show you that you have taken a great deal of pains with the ancients upon a

very wrong view; and (give me leave to add) to very little purpose. Had you found ever an ancient testimony, declaring that Christ was constituted *God over all*, you would have done something; the rest are impertinent, and come not up to your point. The word *God* was never looked upon as a word of *office* or *dominion*, but of *nature* and *substance*; and hence it is that the ancients never speak of Christ's being constituted God." Waterland's Works, Vol. II, p. 415.

"The truth is, *God* denotes *all perfection*, and *Father* denotes a *relation* of order, and a particular *manner of existing*, all which you confusedly blend together, as if signified by the one word *God*." *Ibid*, p. 510.

Bishop Stillingfleet says, "We do not say that three persons are but one person, or that one nature is three natures; but that there are three persons in one nature. If, therefore one individual nature be communicable to three persons, there is no appearance of absurdity in this doctrine. And on the other side, it is impossible that there should be three Gods, where there is one and the same individual nature; for three Gods must have three several divine natures, *since it is the divine essence which makes a God*." *Enchiridion Theologicum*, Vol. I, p. 427.

Quotations on this point might be extended *ad libitum*, but those given above are enough to show that the word *God*, by the use of orthodox writers of the Christian Church in all ages, is an absolute, not a relative term, and that it *does indicate the essence of Jehovah*.

Dr. Legge endeavors to sustain his proposition that "God is not a generic, but a relative term," by what he calls a grammatical or syntactical proof, which proof he fortifies with two considerations, and the great name of Newton. The grammatical proof is that the English word *God* may be used, either with or without the English articles. The first consideration, which fortifies the view derived from the grammatical uses of the word, is that "it (supposing the word *God* to be a relative term) meets and explains all the facts of the case;" second, "that the manner in which the name is vindicated to Jehovah in the Old Testament is inexplicable excepting on this view." We shall take up these severally in the order in which they are above stated.

The grammatical proof is thus stated by Dr. Legge. "Grammatical propriety is not violated by any of the forms of expression:—God made the world, a God made the world, the God made the world, Gods made the world. Let us take any generic term of the animal kingdom, and try to use it in the same way, and we shall find it imprac-

ticable." The fact here brought forward by Dr. Legge is that the word *God* may in English be used either with or without the article, and the inference he draws from it is, that it is an appellative noun of the class called relative, and not of the class called absolute. I state the matter in this way to avoid logomachy, for Dr. L. says in his Essay, "it is universally conceded that *God* is not a proper name;" and "Grammarians divide all nouns into two classes, which are now generally denominated *proper* and *common*; formerly, common nouns were called appellatives, and they include all nouns which are not proper;" and that "a relative term may be as much an appellative as a generic term." He can therefore, only mean to affirm, that the individuals who have this common name are classed together under this appellative, because they sustain, or are supposed to sustain, a relationship towards men, which is common to them all, and not because of their possessing a being supposed to possess certain attributes or natural qualities, which are common to them all. What is there, then, in the known rules with respect to the use of the English article, that makes its use or non-use, a proper test for deciding such a question as this? "Proper nouns designate beings in a definite manner, so that there is no need of any sign to point out the particular individuals, to which they are applied. Relative nouns" (relative or absolute) "on the contrary, being common to all the individuals of the same species, when we wish to apply them to a single individual, or a certain number of individuals of this species, or lastly to the whole species, it is of use to employ particular signs to indicate these various applications." "The words, which serve to determine the extension of appellative nouns, are denominated Articles."

Hence Dr. Legge, from his first example, "*God* made the world," might infer that as the word *God* here designates a given being so definitely, "that there is no need of any sign to point out the particular individual to whom it is applied," it must be a proper name; but he admits "it is universally conceded that *God* is not a proper name;" and this conclusion would be shown to be incorrect by his 2d, 3d and 4th examples of the use of the word. These last examples prove, beyond a doubt, that the word is used as an appellative, but give not the slightest hint, as to whether the beings comprehended under this common appellation, were so called because of their sustaining *relationships*, or possessing *attributes* common to them all. Dr. Legge admits that the word *man*, as well as the word *God*, may be used in these four constructions; e. g. "*man* built the house, a *man* built the house, the *man* built the house, *men* built the house;" but this does

not cause the slightest distrust of the value of his test, for he doubts if "man be rightly called a generic term"!!! He says, "it does not belong to our subject to explain how *man*, if it be rightly called a generic term, differs from other similar terms in this grammatical use." With all deference to Dr. L., it seems to me this is the very thing his subject did require him to explain, if he wished his readers to have any confidence in the value of his proposed test, to ascertain whether a noun be appellative relative, or appellative absolute, i. e. generic. If *man* be a generic term, and Dr. L. will explain to us why it differs from other generic terms, "in this grammatical use," we may perhaps see, by the light of this explanation how *God* may be a generic term and agree with the word *man* "in this grammatical use" of the articles.

If *man* be not "a generic term" (as Dr. L. hints), it is so commonly supposed to be one, that he might have taken it for granted his readers would have been of this opinion, and should therefore have paused to explain, how this error had become so common, by either showing that the word *man* is not a name common to the race called in Latin, the *genus homo*—or that the name of such a race is properly called a generic term, in which last case, he should have defined the sense in which he uses the phrase "generic term," as it must be one peculiar to himself. Dr. Legge may conclude, if he please, that the words, *God* and *man*, are quite anomalous in their method of both using and rejecting the article, though he furnishes us with a list of words (which list might very easily be greatly extended) that admit of the same construction; but nothing can be more fanciful than his use of this test, to ascertain whether a word be relative or absolute—whether it may be used to render *Elohim* and *Θεός* or not.

Dr. Legge does not appear to have settled in his own mind definitely, what the relation designated by the word *God* is. On p. 5, he tells us the correlatives stand thus, "God and creatures;" on p. 8, it "has regard to servants, and implies dominion;" on pp. 36, 37, "Supreme Ruler." He says he has gone over the collection of passages in *Crudden's Concordance* "with the view of testing whether *Shāngti* (Supreme Ruler) will serve as a translation of *God*, and the result was that Supreme Ruler tallies with every one of them." He laughs at the distinction made in my Essay of the two senses in which the word is used (i. e. proper and improper), and declares on p. 21, "I only know of one meaning or sense belonging to it."—"To speak of *God* in the sense of heathen nations is absurd."*

* Dr. Legge's words are, "But to speak of *God* in the sense of heathen nations is absurd. Heathen writers never use it without an article,—i. e. in the

"All this (the saying that the phrase "Supreme Ruler" always tallies with the word *God*) is nothing more than saying at great length what might have been said in four words, *God just means God*. Men may play fantastic tricks in the application of terms, but the meaning or significance of the terms as terms remains the same." What inherent vitality words must have in them, one is ready to exclaim, to stand out so stiffly against men's perverse *usus loquendi*! Ernesti says, "§ 16. *The meaning of words conventional*. Words, considered simply as sound, have no meaning; for they are not natural and necessary signs of things, but conventional ones. Usage or custom has constituted a connection between words and ideas."

"The first of all the laws of interpretation is certainly this:—to endeavor to investigate the sense of a writing or passage which is to be interpreted, according to the signification which the *general usage of the language*, or also the well known particular *usage* of the writer, connects with the words which he employs. The rule, in one word, amounts to this: we should seek in the first place the literal sense of every passage to be interpreted, as it must be afforded either by the *general usage*, or by one which is peculiar to the writer. This no one has doubted, and no one can doubt who is possessed of a sound understanding." *Planck's Introd. to Sacred Philology and Interpretation*. Translated by Dr. Turner, p. 128.

These writers only declare in other words, what Horace said long before them, that words are the mere creatures of usage.

sense in which it is employed in English without an article—excepting when they do so in its true application, and convey by it its real meaning." I have several remarks to make on these two sentences. What is the meaning of the last? Heathen writers never use the word *God* without an article in the sense in which it is used without an article in English, excepting when they convey by it its real meaning: in other words, the word *God* in the English language, when used without an article, is used in the sense we call *propiè*, and heathen writers never use the word in this sense except when they convey by it its true meaning. This is a truism Dr. L. might have spared us. Does he mean to lay down a general proposition that heathen writers universally, in their respective languages, never, &c? This would be saying something towards the support of his "grammatical test;" but unhappily for this supposition, many heathen languages, e. g. the Latin and Chinese, have no article; the Hebrew and Greek have. Will Dr. L. venture the assertion that wherever *Elohim* and *Theos* are used without the article, these words always designate the Being whom we in English designate by the word *God*, when it is used without the article? My words were, "We only maintain that it (*ekhia*) means *god* in the sense of heathen nations." Dr. L. changes this word "god" into "God," and asserts that the phrase "God in the sense of heathen nations" is absurd. What is the difference between the phrase *I used* and that of Cudworth, "the pagan notion of the word, god or gods?" Will Dr. L. as dogmatically assert the absurdity of the phrase used by "that great scholar?"

"Si volet *usus*,
Quem penes arbitrium, et jus et norma loquendi."

Dr. Legge regards this common-sense view of the matter, we may suppose, almost in the same light as he does a heresy. His doctrine is: "Does Dr. Boone doubt that we shall remodel the *literature* of the Chinese? Whatever there is in the *literature* of this great country that is vicious and of error, will be driven away by the advance of truth, like the chaff before the wind. Nothing that *man's intellect has wrought* in the vanity of its imaginations, will abide the sifting of science, and the presence of God's book. . . . But we can not remodel the *language* of the country. The *literature* is the work of man; the *language* is the work of God. As surely as the corn that grows from the bosom of the earth is from God, so also is language that grows up out of the mind of man." p. 20. He speaks of ideas "inhering" in words, and remarks, that on a comparison of the meanings given of *God*, *Theos*, and *Elohim* in Johnson's, Robinson's and Gesenius' Lexicons, "there is *felt* (the italics are his own) the truth of the remark that *Elohim* and *Theos* are correctly rendered in English by God." If Dr. L.'s theory be true, with what reverence should we regard all the divinely inspired words of this heathen language! How impious of us to attempt to change the meaning of any word by *usus loquendi*, (e. g. of any appellative noun, sc. the general name of their objects of worship,) as this would imply an impression on our part, that the Chinese had false conceptions of the objects, when they classed them together under a common appellative, and that "the language" was the work of their own fallible minds, not "the work of God," thus wronging men a work of God, and robbing him of his due!* This peculiar view of the nature of language exercises a most unhappy influence upon Dr. L. as a philosophical inquirer. This we shall see as we proceed.

But to return to the point in hand: if the non-use of the article affords a reliable test of the suitableness of a word to render *Elohim* and *Θεός*, we wonder Dr. Legge did not put the words he

* It is very strange to me that Dr. Legge did not perceive how completely these views of his are at variance with those of Bacon, quoted by him, with approbation, on the 39th page of his "Argument." "The error [of calling the Chinese *shin* gods] supplies us with a fine specimen, of what Bacon calls the *idola fori*. 'These,' he says, 'are the most troublesome of all causes of error. They arise out of the commerce or intercourse of society, and especially from language. Words are commonly given to things according to vulgar apprehension, and distinguish things by differences apprehensible to a common understanding; and when an intellect more acute, and more diligent observation, would distinguish things better, the words cry out against the endeavor.'"

proposes to use, "Supreme Ruler," to this test. Can he say "Supreme Ruler made the world?"* But it is time I should go on to "the considerations" which Dr. Legge adduces to fortify his inference.

The first is, The regarding God as a relative term "meets and explains all the facts of the case." This is a resort to the true inductive method, an appeal to the *usus loquendi*—the facts of the case, and by this appeal we will cheerfully abide. The facts of the case Dr. Legge tells us are, "that men served the true God before they wrongly imagined any other. When they took his *attributes*, and gave them to other beings, real or fictitious, they called them by the name which belonged to him only." This appears to us a correct account of what must have been the case with the first men, those who used the primitive language; but Dr. Legge's proposition, "men served the true God before they wrongly imagined any other," is an indefinite proposition, which is not true if it be taken universally. If he says, Some men, the first men, those who spoke the primitive language, served the true God before they conceived of false gods, and that the word *God* must therefore have been used *by them* *proprie*, before it was ever used *impropiè*, his proposition is no doubt perfectly correct; but it can have no bearing on the English word *God*, or the Chinese words *Shàngti* or *Shin*, unless he is prepared to contend that the English or Chinese was the primitive language. If Dr. Legge will make his proposition universal,—“all men served the true God before they wrongly imagined any other,” its fallacy is at once apparent; it would require all men to have been monotheists before they were polytheists, which is contrary to what we all know to be the fact. The facts of the case, so far as they can affect the present nations of men and their languages, appear to me to be these.

In the 10th chapter of Genesis, we read, "And unto Eber were born two sons; the name of one was Peleg; for in his days was the earth divided." And in the next chapter: "The whole earth was of one language and of one speech. And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east that they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they

* The reason the word *god* in English does not need the article to designate definitely the true God seems to me capable of very easy explanation. The English are monotheists; they hold that there is only one God; this word therefore according to their faith is properly the name of but one being, and "designates this being in a definite manner, so that there is no need of any sign to point out the particular individual to whom it is applied." It is natural that monotheists should fall into such a *usage*, so that the word standing absolutely should designate Jehovah, and that it should require a sign to make it refer to any other being.

dwelt there. And they said one to another, Go to, let us make brick and burn them throughly. And they said, Go to, let us build a city and a tower *whose top may reach to heaven*, and let us make us a name (or a sign) *lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth*. And the Lord said, Go to, let us go down and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth." From this we may infer that when Peleg was born, men received a Divine command to divide themselves into separate groups, and go into different quarters of the earth, that the whole might be inhabited. Against this Divine command they determined to rebel, and as a rallying point to prevent their being "scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth," they commenced building "a tower whose top should reach to heaven," a lofty object that could be seen afar, and would serve to bring them all back to a common centre. For this rebellion God confounded their speech, and by this means enforced obedience to his command, which they were in the act of disobeying. "So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth;" and we hear nothing more of the scattered groups, except those immediately connected with the chosen people, until they come up, hundreds of years afterwards, on the pages of profane history. Whether the men who were building this tower had taken God's attributes and given them to other beings, and called these beings by His name, and thus become polytheists, we can not tell; the account in Genesis is too brief.*

* Dr. Hales (Chronology, Vol. I, page 356) thus speaks of the "ringleader" in this rebellion "The prime author of this rebellion against the divine decree, and grand corrupter of the pure patriarchal religion, by *Sabianism* and *Demonolatry*, was the Cuthite *Nimrod*, "the Rebel," as the name implies, who was afterwards deified himself under the title of *Belus*, and supposed to be translated to the constellation *Orion*, in the heavens. And from the central region of *Babel*, this grand apostacy from the primitive faith, seems to have been transplanted into the four quarters of the world; as proved from the remarkable fact of the general resemblance of the pagan mythology, in these its two leading outlines, in Asia, Africa, Europe and America; and from the conformity between the leading doctrines of the primitive pagan priesthood, the *Magi* in Chaldea, the Brahmins in the East, and the Druids in the West, as circumstantially proved by Faber in his elaborate work."

Faber says, "When the children of Noah left the high land of Armenia they journeyed until they reached the flat country of *Shinar*. During their progress, or possibly before they quitted Mount *Ararat*, the ambitious *Nimrod*, at the head of his enterprising Cuthites, accustomed them to submit to his rule, and laid the foundation of that idolatrous apostacy, which he after completed at *Babylon*. Noah and the three great paternal patriarchs were now dead: and I am strongly inclined to suspect that even before the emigration from Armenia, the worship of the true God on the summit of *Ararat*, was perverted to the worship, or at least to the excessive veneration of the self-triplicating great

But let us suppose that, up to the time of this act of great rebellion, they had not forsaken the true God for any false gods; admitting these to be the circumstances of the case, what is the weight of the inference in favor of the fact that each of these groups of rebels would teach their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren, generation after generation, to worship the true God? They are rebels punished with a great curse for their rebellion. Such men, we know, do not "like to retain God in their knowledge." On what then are we to base the inference that their descendants, after the lapse of several hundred years, would still retain a knowledge of the true God? Look at those nations which, from their proximity to the chosen family, are mentioned in the Scriptures, and what does the narrative tell us of their state? What is the state of the Canaanites, Hivites, &c.; of Sodom and Gomorrah? To keep alive a knowledge of the true God upon the earth, Abraham is thus addressed by God: "Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will show thee." The reason of this command was, that even in this favored family, the true God had been forgotten, and the worship of false gods set up. "And Joshua said unto the people; Thus saith Jehovah, the God of Israel, Your fathers dwelt on the other side of the flood in old time, even Terah, the father of Abraham and the father of Nahor; *and they served other gods.*" Josh. xxiv.

Thus we perceive, where we have history to lead us, and are not left to inference, that by the time of Abraham, polytheism had become so prevalent, that to keep alive a knowledge of the true God, he must be separated from his country and his father's house, for there the plague had commenced. If we look too at the proneness of the chosen people to forsake Jehovah their God for strange gods, even after he had sent down His arm on their behalf, and led them out of Egypt through the Red Sea, we shall be convinced, that, with the

father and the vessel out of which he had been born into the post-diluvian world." *Essays on Pagan Idolatry*, Vol. III, p. 238.

In his first volume, having discussed at length, and with great learning and ability, the common origination of the various systems of paganism, he sums up his opinion in these words: "Thus, so far as I can judge, it indisputably appears, that the idolatry, by which all the various nations of the earth were infatuated, was a system originally invented at Babel under the auspices of Nimrod and his Cushites, and afterwards in the progress of replenishing the world with inhabitants, by the various scattered members of his broken empire, carried off alike to the nearest and to the most remote countries of the globe. Such being the case, though the hypothesis of Mr. Bryant is certainly not affected by this circumstance, all those theories which would deduce the origin of pagan mythology either from Egypt or from Hindustan, or from any other country peopled after the dispersion from Babel, *must, according to the Scriptural account of the matter, fall to the ground.*" *Ibid*, Vol. I., p. 78.

limited attainments in knowledge which the men of that infant age of the race had made, the temptation to polytheism must have been very strong—perfectly overwhelming where there was nothing but a faint tradition through a long line of ungodly men, or the light of nature, to instruct them in the unity of the Godhead. We think from these considerations, that the inference is against our finding, hundreds of years after the dispersion from Babel (when they have become sufficiently civilized to begin recording events, and their history commences), in the language of any of the tribes that were completely separated from the chosen people, a word which answers to *Elohim* when used *proprie*: that is, a word which is used as the name of a self-existent, almighty, spiritual Being, who created the heavens and the earth. At any rate, the circumstances are such that no one is entitled to take it for granted that there must have been such a word in each of the dialects now spoken by men, which was afterwards corrupted by the usage of polytheists. Polytheism may not be older than the word *Elohim*, as the Hebrew may have been the language spoken by Noah; but we know it was much older than the time of Moses, who is the first writer in Hebrew whose writings have reached us. We think it is probably older than either of the words *Θεός*, *Deus*, or *God*, and shall in a subsequent part of this Defense state some of the considerations which have led us to think that in Greece at least, *Θεός* was used *improprie*, long before it was used *proprie*. It is time however, now to return to Dr. Legge's first fortification of the inference derived from his grammatical argument.

If we admit the fact to be, in the case of all existing languages, as Dr. Legge supposes, I can not see how he can derive any inference from it in favor of his supposition that the word must be a relative term. Whether we suppose that the word *god* was first used as the name of the true God, and was afterwards applied to false gods, or that it had been previously applied to a number of beings, and was claimed afterwards as properly applicable only to one, would not at all affect, so far as I can see, the question whether the word was first used as a relative or absolute term. To decide the point we are contending about, we must inquire, Why, in either case, was this name given? 1st, Whether the being or beings, as the case might be, were called by this name because he or they were supposed to possess certain properties or qualities, which constituted them subsisting beings? or 2d, Whether they had this name from their being regarded as merely sustaining a certain relation to some other beings or things? To prove that it must have been from the latter view that the name

was given, Dr. Legge quotes a passage from the first chapter of Romans, which appears to me to show in the plainest manner the incorrectness of his views of the character of the word *God*. I commence the quotation a few lines above those quoted by Dr. Legge. "Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them (*marg. or, to them*); for God hath showed it unto them: (for the invisible things of him from the creation are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead); so that they are without excuse: because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts and creeping things;" and "changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshiped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever, Amen." With the same view, on p. 36 of his Argument, he quotes the words of St. Paul in I. Cor. viii. 5, 6; "For though there be that are called gods whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be gods many and lords many), but to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." On this he remarks; "Nothing can be plainer to my mind, from this passage, than that the apostle dealt with *θεος* as a relative term, having its *proper* signification, and expressing a relation, of which the one party could *only be the Supreme Being*, of whom are all things and we by him, and from whom therefore it could never be diverted, excepting by the depravity of men, and a falsehood imposed upon themselves. *And this is the signification of the term, and thus it is dealt with throughout the Scriptures.* Jehovah says, 'There is no God' i. e. no Supreme Ruler, 'beside me.'"

It would consume too much time to examine closely both of these passages; we shall therefore take the first one quoted by Dr. Legge, merely remarking on the latter, that if the words "God" and "Father," in the sentence "one God, the Father," are both so clearly *relative* terms in Dr. Legge's view, that nothing can be plainer to his mind, we should like to know what construction he can possibly put on what is commonly called the orthodox statement of the doctrine of the Trinity?

In examining the first passage quoted, that from Rom. i. 19, we shall merely give the views of a few eminent commentators, and leave Dr. Legge to answer them if, after reading their views, it still continues

so plain to his mind, that the apostle Paul uses *θεος* as a relative term. The first question to be asked, in determining whether St. Paul uses the word *God* as an absolute or relative term, here, is, what are "the invisible things of him," which "from the creation of the world are clearly seen?" Bloomfield says, *ἀόρατα αἰσθητὰ* mean "his nature and attributes of Godhead, not discernible to mortal eyes." Stuart, *Ἀόρατα* means the attributes or qualities of the Divine Being; of course the expression refers to the attributes belonging to God considered as a spirit." Hodge, "These invisible things are seen, *being understood*, that is, it is a mental vision of which Paul speaks. The eye of sense sees nothing but the exterior, but the mind sees mind, and mind possessed not of human power and perfections, but of eternal power and divinity." But we are not left merely to his commentators; the apostle himself tells us what "that which may be known of God" is—"even his eternal power and Godhead." The power here spoken of is not, to use the words of Tertullian, merely "*accedentis rei mentis*," but an absolute and eternal property of the Being mentioned.

If Dr. Legge's opinion of the way in which St. Paul always uses the word *θεος* is correct, then the word here rendered by our translators "Godhead," should have been rendered "Rulership," or "the state or condition of being Ruler." How then should this word *θεϊότης* be understood? Stuart says, "*Θεϊότης* is distinguished by Tholuck and others from *θεῖος*, for they represent the latter as signifying the *Divinity, or the Divine nature*, while the former is represented as meaning the *complexity of the divine attributes*, the sum or substance of the divine attributes. I can not however, find any good ground for such a distinction. *Θεῖος* is the abstract from *θεος*; and from this latter is formed the concrete or adjective derivative *θεῖος* divine. To *θεω* of course means *divinity*, and from this comes another abstract noun with the same signification. So Passow, *θεϊότης*, divinity, divine nature. He then adds, "In particular, divine greatness, power, excellence, eminence, &c., &c.; i. e. *θεϊότης* designates the divinity with special reference to these qualities—the identical manner in which the word is employed in our text." Bloomfield, "his omnipotence and the other attributes of his Godhead."

The next question is, what is meant by the sentence, "When they knew God, they glorified him not as God?" Does the apostle mean that they did not regard and treat him as a being, standing in such a relationship to them, should have been treated; or that they served him in a manner derogatory to his divine nature?

Bloomfield says, "the glorifying of God as God must consist in the thorough recognition of all his glorious attributes—his eternity, power, wisdom, &c., &c. Tholuck says, "To glorify God as God is to acknowledge him in the integrity of the divine attributes, and then, for the sake of these, to love, invoke, and fear him."

Hodge, "The apostle says, When they knew God they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful. These two expressions include every act of worship. The former refers to the recognition of the *divine perfections*, the latter to the acknowledgement of God as the source of all good. To regard God as possessed of all excellence and as the giver of all good, is true piety."

With one more question we must close our examination of this passage. Did their folly, in making an image of the incorruptible God, arise from a mistake with regard to the relationship indicated by the word *God*, or a mistake with regard to the Divine nature, which is expressed by this word? That it is the last, all the commentators are agreed, and the nature of the case puts it beyond all question. Bloomfield, "They dishonored the glorious nature of the incorruptible God, by representing him under the likeness of corruptible man, and birds, &c." Tholuck, "False conceptions of God gave rise to false representations of him." Hodge, "Their soul lost all right apprehensions of the divine character and perfections, and they were hence able to worship as gods, birds, beasts, and creeping things." Stuart, "They foolishly and inconsiderately indulged evil imaginations, *i. e.* base and degrading views respecting the nature and attributes of God, and the honor due to him."

I can not think that Dr. Legge's "view of the term *God*. . . meets and explains all the facts of the case."

The second consideration, by which Dr. L. endeavors to fortify his view of the word *God* as a relative term, is, that "the manner in which the name God is vindicated to Jehovah in the Old Testament is inexplicable excepting on this view." I wish Dr. L. had mentioned the difficulties which he saw in the way of vindicating the name *God* to Jehovah on the supposition that it is an absolute term, *i. e.* a word "indicating the essence, the being of Jehovah" (to use his own words), for my mind can not conceive any.

We have seen above, that Dr. L. admits "that appellatives include all nouns that are not proper;" whether, therefore, this word is absolute or relative, it is a name that is confessedly common to many individuals, which is vindicated as properly belonging only to one. But what is there, in the meaning of this word, if it be supposed an absolute

name, to render its vindication to Jehovah, in the passages quoted by Dr. L., so inexplicable? These passages from the Old Testament are, "There is no God with me," "I am God, and there is none else," &c. If we suppose the word *God* to be a relative term "implying dominion," if it be supreme dominion, there is nothing inexplicable, I admit, in vindicating such a title as due only to Jehovah. But what is there inexplicable in the vindication of this name to Jehovah, if we suppose the word to imply the possession of attributes, qualities, nature? Are there any beings beside Jehovah who have the same nature with Him, so that if the word be used in this last sense, it can not be claimed as properly belonging to Him alone? The passages quoted by Dr. L. declare that polytheists are wrong, there is only one God; but they do not say whether the word *God* is used as the name of a Being, regarded as standing in a given relationship, or as possessed of a given nature: in which of these two senses the word is used, we must learn from its general *usus loquendi*.

From the passages quoted by Dr. L., which give no intimation in which of the two senses the word is used, I must however except the last, as it is very clearly in this case used not "to imply dominion," but nature. The passage is from Ezekiel xxviii, 2, 9. "Son of man, say unto the prince of Tyrus, Thus saith Jehovah God, Because thy heart is lifted up and thou hast said, I am a God, I sit in the seat of God, in the midst of the seas; yet thou art a man and not God. . . . Wilt thou yet say before him that slayeth thee, I am God? But thou shalt be a man, and no God in the hand of him that slayeth thee." What is the antithesis between "a man and not God," if the word *God* here only "implies dominion"—means "Supreme Ruler" as Dr L. contends it does? Waterland was so far seeing anything inexplicable in regarding the word here as an absolute term, that he quotes this very passage to show that the word implies nature, not dominion. He says, "When the Prince of Tyre pretended to be God, he thought of something more than mere *dominion* to make him so; he thought of strength invincible and power irresistible: and God was pleased to convince him of his folly and vanity, not by telling him how scanty his *dominion* was, or how low his *office*; but how weak, frail and perishing his *nature* was; that he was man only, and "not God," and should surely find so by the event. When the Lycaonians, upon the sight of a miracle wrought by St. Paul (Acts xiv, 11), took him and Barnabas for gods, they did not think so much of *dominion*, as of power and ability beyond human; and when the apostles answered them, they did not tell them that their *dominion* was only human, or that their *office* was not divine, but that they

had not a divine nature; they were weak, frail, and feeble men, of like infirmities with the rest of their species, and therefore no *gods*." Waterland's Works, Vol. I, p. 305.

The two considerations mentioned by Dr. L. do not, it appears to me, in any way "fortify" the inference he derived from his fanciful grammatical test, in favor of God's being a relative term, which raises so very slight a presumption in its favor, that it left, I suspect, on the minds of most of his readers, the whole weight of the proposition to be sustained by these subsequent considerations.

In answer to the simple authority on which he relies—that of Sir Isaac Newton—I will take the liberty to quote a paragraph or two from a very clever and excellent review of the Doctor's "Argument," which was published in the China Mail of the 23d May, 1850. The Reviewer says, "The third fortification is 'the great authority of Newton.' The quotation from the Scholium of the Principia is in point, and seems to agree with the Doctor's view, but can not corroborate it. Newton, beyond the limits of abstract and natural science, becomes as another man. Does not the Doctor feel this in reading his conjecture respecting prophecy, and his tracts on 'Those two noted corruptions of Scripture?' If he adhere to Newton in all these things, from the convictions of reason, will he not bring the great author to the same test here, according to the maxim quoted by himself, *non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta querenda sunt?*

"But is it not this philosopher's sole object to refute the doctrines of the Epicureans, who believed in the existence of inactive deities, and the Stoics and others who held to *anima mundi*? Newton is maintaining, we apprehend, a question of *facts*, and not of the *application of words*. He does not wish to prove that the term *God* is equivalent to the term *Lord*, but that God is the Lord, the universal Ruler over a dominion distinct from himself, which the ancient philosophers denied.

"Again; in the Scholium on his profound contemplations on the works of God, Sir Isaac naturally views the Infinite One as the God of nature, and not as the self-existent, prior to all secondary beings. A plurality of objects is necessary to constitute relation, but when God dwelt alone, He sustained no relations, and the term applied to Him in that state is not a relative. Newton says, 'a being without dominion however perfect, is not the Lord God;' but God he surely was without a creature and without a subject. If Newton had been writing a book of synonyms, he would not have defined the word *God* merely by *Lord*, and made the term relative because another title of the same being necessarily implies relation."

There is one thing to be admired in Dr. Legge's "Argument"—he lays aside so entirely the indefinite style, in which the "advocates of *tí* and its cognates" have conducted their part of the controversy, and speaks his mind out fearlessly and fully. Dr. Medhurst, as we have seen, contented himself with saying that "the Supreme in their estimation is variously designated *T'ien*, *T'í*, or *Shángtí*;" and "by *T'í* the Chinese mean the Supreme God so far as they are acquainted with him." Supreme god here may mean, either the chief god of a polytheistic system, or the God over all, the true God: most readers would perhaps understand it in the last sense. Dr. M. however, in his Reply to Dr. Boone's Essay, says that the Chinese know as little of the true God as the Greeks did, and that they have *never conceived* of a self-existent, almighty Being who made heaven and earth; and in his Letter of the 13th January, 1850, "that when he employs the Chinese phrase *Shángtí* as the name of God, in preaching, he does not use it as even alluding to any being with whom the Chinese are acquainted. Dr. Legge speaks out fully and at once on this subject: he rejoices "to acknowledge in the *Shángtí* of the Chinese classics, and the *Shángtí* of the Chinese people, Him who is God over all, blessed for ever."

What Dr. Medhurst's opinion of the meaning of the phrases *Shángtí* and *T'í* is, I have found it difficult to decide from reading his Inquiry, his Reply, or the Letter of January 30th. Dr. Legge speaks his opinion out fully: "*T'í* means Ruler; it may be the Supreme Ruler, or it may be any other." p. 28. Of the phrase *Shángtí*, he says, "Separate its constituent characters, and we shall translate them 'Supreme Ruler.' "*T'ienti* 天帝" he says, "simply denotes, in itself, the Heavenly ruler, or Heaven's ruler."

Dr. L. on p. 22, defining appellative or general names, says, "If the idea be of a *dignity* or *office* common to many individuals, it is a relative term." The class denominated by the Chinese word *tí*, he here designates by the word *ruler*; they are therefore classed together because of a "common office or dignity;" thus he sustains the view of this word taken in my Essay, pp. 59, 60, 63, in opposition to that of Dr. Medhurst, as expressed on p. 6. of his Inquiry. "The inference therefore is that *tí* is *descriptive* of a class of beings beginning with the highest and passing down to inferior divinities, and is therefore generic for *god* in Chinese."*

* In a paper drawn up by Dr. Medhurst when he was proposing to use *tí* with a definition, as mentioned by him on page 6 of the letter of January 30th, 1850, the definition he proposed to use is as follows:—"In this book (the New

Dr. L. has so fully persuaded himself of the truth of this proposition, and of the fact that he has demonstrated its truth, that he risks, and acknowledges that he risks, his whole cause for *Shángti* upon his correctness in maintaining it and another proposition, viz., that the word *god* is *mis-used*, if applied to any other being than the Supreme Being. He speaks out here in the same decided manner which we have admired before:—"I may be permitted to intreat my readers to consider well the fundamental positions on which I have constructed the argument. If these be sound, solid rock—the presumption is that the building reared on them must stand. For myself, I can say, that if the two propositions (those just mentioned) in which I have summed up the preliminary discussion, can be unsettled, I shall feel at once that I must gird up my loins afresh, and commence anew my inquiries for a term in the Chinese language to correspond to the term *God*."

p. 41. And in a previous part of the "Argument," after telling us in a passage already quoted, that, "as surely as corn that grows from the bosom of the earth is from God, so also is language that grows up out of the mind of man," he thus warmly expresses his sense of the great impropriety of using a generic term to render a relative: "Change that mind, and you will change the nature of language. Depose the old laws that since the creation have governed the association of ideas, and introduce new ones in their room, and we may use terms of classes" (generic absolute-appellative): "for relative terms. In a word let us make the Chinese, and also ourselves, from being men into beings of a new class—then, *and not till then*, can we employ the character *Shin*" (because generic) "to render *Elohim* or *God*." Dr. Legge thus declares an interminable, internecine war between absolute and relative terms. If the general verdict shall be that *God* is an

Test.) wherever *Ti* occurs, it is not used in the sense of human rulers, but in the sense of celestial rulers, and spiritual beings generally worshiped by men. There is however but one *Ti*, the maker of heaven and earth, most honorable and without compare, besides whom no other ought to be worshiped; we therefore call him *Ti*."

In the preamble that precedes this definition, Dr. Medhurst stated, as he and his friends maintain in their letter of the 30th January, that "Messrs. Medhurst, Stronach and Milne contend, as they have always done, that *Ti* is employed in the Chinese classics and other writers, to denote God by way of eminence; while it is used also with reference to other beings worshiped by the Chinese." From this definition, we learn the sense in which they understand the word to be employed; when it denotes "God by way of eminence," viz., "the Ruler by way of eminence," "the celestial Ruler." They say, "Wherever *Ti* occurs" in the New Test.; they use it in the sense of "celestial rulers," not "human rulers;" it is plain therefore that they consider the meaning of the word to be "*ruler*" not *god*, and that "*celestial ruler*" is taken as a general equivalent to the words *God*, *god*, *gods*.

absolute appellative, and not a relative term, the fate of *Shángti*, Dr. L. admits, is decided; indeed he has precluded himself from saying one word in favor of using it as the rendering of *Elohim* (regarded as absolute) unless he hereafter discovers that "*ti*, ruler" is absolute. If then the reader, who does not understand Chinese, wishes to have the issue upon which this question, viz., Whether *Shángti* should or should not be used to render *Elohim*? presented to him in such a way that he needs no knowledge of Chinese to enable him to judge for himself, Dr. L. here brings the matter perfectly within his reach. He admits that *ti* means *ruler*, and that the whole case turns on the decision of the point, Are *God* and *ruler* both relative terms or not? If then the reader should conclude that *God* and *ruler* differ in the one being an absolute term and the other a relative, he may conceive, from the lively picture given us by Dr. L. above, what sad consequences would follow from rendering *Elohim* and *Esoz* by *Shángti*. And if he wishes to realize more fully the sad consequences that would follow from such a rendering, let him read over the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, substituting the words "Supreme Ruler" and "Supreme Rulership," for the words "God" and "Godhead" wherever they occur; and we think he will be as firmly convinced that "Supreme Ruler" and "Supreme Rulership" (*i. e. Shángti*) will never answer as the rendering of the words "God" and "Godhead," as Dr. Legge can be of the correctness of the point on which he "takes his stand."

Dr. Legge confounds the *name* with the *being*. The Being we call *God* sustains numerous relations to us and to other beings, and when we wish to refer to these relations, we call him Creator, Ruler, Father, &c.; but these relations are not implied in the name *God*, as he was *God* before these relations had any existence. And from this fact, that *God* sustains to us not one, but many relations, we derive an additional argument against the use of any relative term to render this word. Relative terms can *strictly* and *properly* be used to designate only a single relationship. Dr. Whately defines them as follows: "When any object is considered as a part of a whole, viewed in reference to the whole or to another part, of a more complex object of thought, the noun expressing this view is called *relative*; and to *relative* noun is opposed *absolute*, as denoting an object considered as a whole: Thus "father" and "son" are relatives; being regarded each as a part of the complex object father-and-son; the same object designated absolutely would be termed a *man*," &c.

This complex object of thought is changed in every new relation, so

that if we have occasion to speak of several relations sustained by the same subject, we must designate the subject of which we would predicate these relations, by its absolute name, the name by which we call "an object when considered as a whole," and not by the name of any of these relations. For instance, we may say, This man is my father, her husband, his uncle, &c., &c.; he is a lawyer, merchant, European, Englishman, &c., &c.; but we could not predicate all these several relationships of this same subject, if we designated him by the name of any one of these relations. We could not say, This father is a husband, uncle, lawyer, Englishman, &c. So here, I contend, we can not, as the rendering of the word *God*, use the name of any one of the relations he sustains to us (*e. g.* Supreme Ruler), because no relative term can be used to express all the various relations that God sustains to us and to his other creatures, as I have illustrated in the case of the word *man*. If Dr. L. should, therefore, succeed in proving to our satisfaction that the Being, whom the Chinese designate by the term *Shángtí*, is to be regarded as truly and properly God, I would still object, as I said above, to the use of this phrase to render *Elohim* and *Θεός*, on the ground that *Shángtí* is a relative term, and not the absolute name of this Being.

Relative terms, Dr. L. tells us, express the idea "of a dignity or office common to many individuals; . . . they do not indicate the essence;" it becomes therefore a question of much interest to inquire, what being it is that the Chinese call "the Supreme Ruler," or "Ruler on high." In my Essay I stated that this being was *Tien*, Heaven, the chief god of the Chinese, and that *Shángtí* was used as one of the titles of this being.

On this point, Dr. L. is very sensitive. Referring to this opinion of mine, he says, "Turning to the 30th page of the Essay, we find that Dr. Boone, to support the idea he is there advocating, quotes and comments as follows: 'In the *Shí King*, *Siáu-yé*, *Ching-yueh* section, p. 21, we are expressly told that *Shángtí* is the God of Heaven, *Shángtí t'ien chí shin yé* 上帝天之神也.' This is wonderful. Heaven is the chief god of the Chinese. Then *Shángtí* is the god of the chief god. 'Vail bonnet,' as Chillingworth says, O chief god, to *your* chief. It does not matter though your chief be only your own title. Thus and thus 'we are expressly told,' and though it seems rather an unreasonable requisition to you, there is no help for it. Ah, chief god! I am afraid you are like some great men upon the earth, vain of their little elevation, and worshipers of their sounding titles!" He then with great naïveté adds, "I really do not know in

what better or more *kindly* way, to expose as truth demands, the erroneousness of such rash statements as that I am now animadverting on."

My statement, which is no obnoxious to Dr. Legge, contains two points; first, that *Shángtí*, "the Supreme Ruler" is *T'ien*, heaven; and 2dly, that this *T'ien* is the chief god of the Chinese. Is the first point correct? If we turn to the Dictionary of Kánghí, we find *Shángtí* thus explained:—*Shángtí t'ien yé*, 上帝天也 the Supreme Ruler is Heaven."

If we turn to Dr. Medhurst's Inquiry, we shall find that he devotes the whole of his second section to the proof of this point, viz., "*Tí*, or *Shángtí* is said to be synonymous with 天 *t'ien*, Heaven....Imperial heaven and *Shángtí* both refer to Heaven, the difference is only in the variation of the expression; the mode of *expression* is different, but the subject matter is the same." p. 23.

That Heaven is the divinity, Dr. Medhurst makes the foundation fact of his argument to prove that *Tí* or *Shángtí* means God. "The word which most readily conveys to the Chinese the idea of Divinity is 天 *T'ien*, Heaven: and yet in defining Heaven, they do not say that it is the Being who is the special object of religious worship; but say that Heaven is the one great One who dwells on high and regulates all below. They call Heaven the great Framer, from whom all things originally come, who disposes of all things according to his own decree; in short, in the words of Morrison, Heaven is the unknown God of Confucius. In illustrating anything as divine, the Chinese do not say that it is an object of religious worship, but that it resembles Heaven; when they wish to say that *Tí* means *God*, they assert that *Tí* is synonymous with Heaven, and is one of the names of Heaven; when they wish to exalt their living monarchs by ascribing the most exalted epithets to them, they call their emperor Heaven, or the Divinity; his throne is Heaven's throne; his presence Heaven's countenance; his envoys, Heaven's messengers; and his troops, Heaven's soldiers, &c. When they intend to pay divine honors to imperial ancestors after death, they 以之配天 associate them with Heaven in sacrifice." Reply, p. 45.

Again: "The most usual method is to speak of this Being, under the simple designation of *T'ien* 天 Heaven; by which they do not intend the visible heavens, but the being who presides over all, or in other words, the Divinity." *Ibid.* p. 28.

"*Tí* is one of the names of Heaven (or the Divinity in the estimation of the Chinese); the reason why Heaven is called *Tí* is because *tí* means to judge; this application of the word signifies that Heaven

is *widely extended over all*, without any private feeling, &c., &c." *Ib.* p. 6. On the next page, explaining the sentence, which is from Káng-hí's Dictionary, he says, "A name is that by which a thing is called, the appellation of the being referred to: *that being* is *T'ien* 天, the Divinity in the estimation of the Chinese, and *Ti* being *one of his names*, it is equivalent to God in western languages." Dr. Medhurst here certainly regards *T'ien* as the proper name of this being, and *ti* as one of his appellative names, which appellative, Dr. Legge contends, is a name of dignity, or office, a relative term.

That "the Supreme Ruler" is, in the opinion of the Chinese, "Heaven," is so universally admitted, that I can not suppose this is the very rash statement that Dr. Legge feels called upon so indignantly to expose. We must then next consider what the Chinese understand by the word *t'ien*. In answer to the question, what is the meaning of the character 天 in the *king* and classics generally (經傳), Ch'í fútsz' replies, "Men must see and distinguish for themselves; sometimes it means the material heavens (蒼蒼); sometimes it means the ruling power (主宰) and sometimes merely destiny, fate 理." In my Essay, I gave the following explanation of the meanings of *t'ien* :—

"From the earliest antiquity to the present times, the two highest objects of veneration in the national rites of China have been called *T'ien* 天 Heaven; and 地 Earth; and to the worship of these two objects, a sacrifice called *kiau* 郊, offered at the winter and summer solstices, has, from time immemorial, been appropriated.

"The question that occurs to every one upon learning this fact is, Do the Chinese understand by these words the visible heavens and earth upon which they tread, or are the words used by metonymy, for the invisible beings who preside over heaven and earth respectively? To this, we answer, it is conceded on all hands, we believe, that the material objects are not the objects of worship; and that the words, when used as the names of objects of worship, are employed metaphorically. What then is the object definitely designated by the word *t'ien* 天 heaven, the highest of the objects worshiped in the national rites?

"To this question two different answers may be given, according as regard is had to one or the other of two opinions held by Chinese of different sects, on this point. During the Sung dynasty (about A.D. 1100) there sprung up a sect of philosophers to whom the Romish missionaries have given the name of *atheo-politique*, and to whose views great prominence has been given in all the editions of the classical works published during the present dynasty. This sect would answer the question, what is meant by *T'ien*? as follows: *T'ien* 天 is *Shángti*, 上帝, the Ruler on high; and *Shángti* is 理, the rule of order, destiny, fate.

"There is another class, however, who we conceive; represent the polytheists of China, and the old views of the state religion, as represented in the *Chau Li* (Ritual of the Chau dynasty, B. C. 1100), who answer as follows: The *T'ien* worshiped at the winter solstice is *T'ien chi shin* 天之神 the God of heaven, and this *T'ien chi shin* 天之神 is *Shángti*, the ruler on high."

"It will be observed that according to both of the opinions above expressed, the word Heaven is used metaphorically, and that 天, the title of *Shángti* 上帝 the Ruler on high, is given by both parties; but the one party so explain their views as to lead to a mere lifeless principle *ti*; what they say 'neither wills nor wishes, acts, nor does,' while the other party leads us to polytheism, and to regard the *T'ien chi chin* 天之神, the *Shin* of heaven, and the *ti chi ki* 地之祇 the *Ki* (*Shin*, as *hè* is also called) of the earth, as the two greatest gods in their pantheon."—page 18.

It will be observed that in the above view I omitted one of the meanings of *T'ien* given by *Chú fútsz'*, viz., that which regards it as the material heavens. I did so, because "it was conceded on all hands," i. e. by all discussing the subject at the time my Essay was written, "that the material objects are not the objects of worship." There are four or five views of this subject, which can all be sustained by competent Chinese authority. 1st. That of Dr. Morrison, that, in the Chinese state religion, the material universe as a whole, and in detail, is worshiped; and that subordinate thereto they have gods, celestial and terrestrial, and ghosts infernal." See above, p. 38; which view, we saw, was also that of M. Visdelou. It can be clearly shown that this is the only sense the word will bear in many parts of the classics, where the production of all things is ascribed to heaven and earth; and that it is the material heavens many writers have in mind, when they speak of heaven as the object worshiped in the *kiáu*. Take, as a proof of this, the names "expansive heaven," "bright heaven." The explanation given of the phrases is material. Thus Ching-shi Ngoh's explanation of the words *háu* and *sháng*: "Because of the immensity of its substance (氣 i. e. amount of primary matter which it has), we call [the ruling power] *Háu T'ien*, Expansive Heaven: because its ruling seat is on high, we call it (the power, above called Expansive Heaven) *Shángti*, i. e. the Ruler on high. See Essay, p. 29.

It is owing to this we suppose, that Dr. Medhurst, as great a stickler as he is for the doctrine that *T'ien* is the Divinity, the Supreme Being in the estimation of the Chinese, yet says, "The idea they (the Chinese) had of God, was of an originating, overshadowing, protecting,

and governing something." Reply, &c. p. 41. And in his Inquiry: "This application of the word *tí*, judge, signifies that Heaven is *widely extended over all*," &c., page 6. And at page 25, (where he maintains that *Shángtí* is not merely the supreme God of the Chinese, their chief god, &c.) he says, "To all this it will be sufficient to answer, that the Chinese represent the being referred to as, with respect to supreme authority and universal dominion, synonymous with Heaven: now Heaven is *not supreme over one nation but all nations; it over-spreads the whole world*, and is looked to with reverence by every one; *therefore we conclude that by Heaven is not meant the chief god of the Chinese, but the supreme ruling power, known and acknowledged in China and everywhere else; the word being used in almost every nation by metonymy for God.*" But I shall not pursue this subject, as my object at present is not to sustain any one of these views; and this view of the subject has been sufficiently presented by Dr. Morrison and M. Visdelou in the quotations made from them as given above.

The second view is that which regard *Tien*, "the Supreme Ruler" as *Táu*, the Primitive Reason, or *k*, destiny, fate. This is the view of the other political school, whose views have also been sufficiently presented above, and are most easy of illustration, as they are made very prominent in all the editions of the classics published during this dynasty.

The third, fourth, and fifth views agree in that they regard "the Supreme Ruler" as *Tien chi Shin* 天之神 "the Shin of Heaven," but differ in the method of understanding the words *heaven* and *shin*. The view taken in the part of my Essay quoted by Dr. Legge is that heaven is here used as the name of a place, and *shin* as the name of the spiritual being, the god, who presides in, or rules over this place; the proper name of which god is *Tien*, Heaven, and his distinctive title *Shángtí*, "the Supreme Ruler," or "the Ruler on high," as this phrase is rendered by some Chinese.

It is clearly shown, I think, in my Essay that this is the opinion held by some of the writers quoted by me, who I suppose, represent the views of the polytheists. This view of *Tien*, as the proper name of *this shin*, and *Shángtí* as *his* distinctive title, is borne out by the case of the *Wú Tí* 五帝 Five Rulers. These, Dr. Medhurst allows, are gods, and that they are the *shin* 'who preside over' the five elements; now these *Shin* are distinguished by proper names, *Ling-wei ngáng*, *Chih-piu-nú*, &c., and by the titles "Azure Ruler, Vermilion Ruler," &c. See Essay, p. 57. This is the view which Dr. Legge endeavors

to render ridiculous in his off-hand way. The view may or may not be correct; and if it has, to the reader's mind, anything ridiculous in it, when correctly presented, I am perfectly willing to encounter his ridicule for holding such a view; but I think I was entitled to have my own view presented by Dr. L., when he wished to show that it was absurd, and not another view substituted instead thereof.*

The fourth view is that of the pantheists. *Tien* is viewed as a compound being, and *Shin* as the informing divinity or spirit. The word *divinity* or *spirit*, may be regarded as either abstract—signifying the divine energies of *Tien*; or concrete—the spirit, soul of this compound being. Dr. Medhurst thus represents these views:—explaining a Chinese sentence, which he thus renders, “*Shángtí* is the same as Heaven; if we were to collect together [in thought] the spiritual energies of Heaven, and speak of it (*i. e.* the collection) we should call it *Shángtí*,” he says, “The way in which the Chinese represent it is something like the following:—*Shángtí* is *Tien*, Heaven, or the Divinity. The *shin* or spiritual energies of Heaven, are diffused throughout all nature; when viewed only as producing wind and rain, such portion of the celestial energies, if personified, would be called 風伯 *Fung Peh* the Manager of the Wind, or 雨師 *Yü Sz*, the Director of Rain; or if viewed as guiding the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the various seasons, would be 六宗 *Luh Tsung*, the Six honored Ones. But supposing all the spiritual energies of heaven collected into one and personified, the name attached to the individual possessing in himself all celestial energies, would be *Shángtí*.† Should it be objected that

* Dr. L.'s misrepresentation of my view was, I have no doubt, unintentional, and arose from not adverting to the explanation given of this matter in the previous part of my Essay. Though he renders the word *shin*, *Spirit*, and I *God*, yet he understands the word *t'ien* just as I do, and adopts substantially the same explanation of the passage that I gave, as we shall see immediately below. I say the same, because I can not suppose that Dr. L. regards the “Spiritual Being” who “possesses this supreme power,” and who is the *Shángtí* (“Supreme Ruler”) whom he believes to be “God over all,” as only the spirit or soul of the compound Being *Tien*. Whether a spiritual Being possessing such power and dominion should be called a *god* or not, let the reader judge. If we are content to take Dr. L.'s opinion, we must regard this *Shin* as “God, over all, blessed for ever.”

† This view seems to agree with that set forth by St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*. Lib. IV. Cap. XI.

The subject of the chapter is “*De multis diis, quos doctores Paganorum unum eundem que Jovem esse defendunt.*” We select only a few sentences. “*Quotquot libet igitur physicis rationibus et disputationibus asserant: modo sit Jupiter corporei hujus mundi animus, qui universam istam molem ex quatuor, vel quot eis placet, elementis constructam atque compactam implet et movet; modo sit æther, ut ætrem Junonem subterfusam de super amplectatur;modo autem (ne sit necesse per cuncta discane) deus unus de quo multi a poeta nobilissimo dictum putant.*”

in this way there would be two divinities, Heaven and Shángtí, we reply in the words of the Chinese writer, that *Shángtí* and *Heaven* are the same." See Reply, p. 35.

The views of another class he gives us at p. 38:—"Dr. Boone then (p. 33) alludes to the prayers used in the national worship, according to the 周禮 Ritual of Chau, and affirms that those prayers were addressed to the *Shin*, *Kwei*, and *Ki*, adding that they were presented at a time when the people sacrificed to heaven, earth, and ancestors. From this we perceive that the objects sacrificed to were the great powers of nature, with deceased progenitors; and that *Shin*, *Kwei*, and *Ki*, were the spirits of those objects, sometimes used elliptically for the objects themselves. The annual prayer for grain was said to be offered to Shángtí, from which we are left to infer that Shángtí is included among the spiritual beings to whom prayers were offered; to all which we have no objection to offer. But from neither statement are we entitled to infer that the spirits of the object sacrificed to were the gods of those objects, or that all spiritual beings are gods, because Shángtí is reckoned among them. It appears from the whole that the Chinese prayed to heaven, earth, and deceased men, for certain blessings;* showing that they considered these capable of conferring the

Deum namque ire per omnes,
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum:

Ipse in æthere sit Jupiter, ipse in aëre Juno, ipse in mari Neptunus in terra Pluto, in terra inferiore Proserpina, in focus domesticis Vesta, in fabrorum fornace Vulcanus, in sideribus *sol et luna, et stellæ*, in div. nantibus Apollo, etc. hi omnes dii demque sit unus Jupiter."

The reader will observe that it is Shángtí and Jupiter, the chief god of each system, who is thus made the universal, impersonal power, recognized under different names, according to the different offices or works performed by this power. The sentence which Dr. Medhurst here explains was translated in my Essay on the supposition that *shin* was here used as a concrete noun; I am now satisfied that Dr. M. took the more correct view in regarding it as abstract. As the management of the heavenly bodies, &c., however, is rather a divine than a spiritual function, I should prefer to render 天之神 "divine energies," and not "spiritual energies" as Dr. M. has done.

* If Dr. Medhurst's view is correct, that the Chinese worshiped, in the times of the Chau dynasty, B.C. 1100, heaven, earth, and deceased men, and conceived of the Heaven and earth so worshiped as material beings possessed of spirits or souls; it is a great confirmation of the opinions of Dr. Hales and Mr. Faber mentioned above. I may mention that, by demonolatry, both those writers mean the worship, not of devils, but dead men. Dr. Medhurst's theory expressed above, that the Chinese addressed their prayers to, and honored by their worship, the material and not the spiritual part of the object worshiped, seems very strange: take the case of the earth, for instance; that they prayed to the mud, and not to the spirit animating this compound being. May we not better suppose that the class of writers, whose views Dr. M. is here stating, conceive of heaven and earth; the sun, moon, stars, &c., in a manner answering to Cudworth's animalish gods, in which case they would regard the whole compound being as their god—the object prayed to and worshiped.

good things they sought. But we may observe that heaven, earth, and ancestors were the *beings* on whom they relied, and their spirits were prayed to *only as connected with those beings*. They would not have prayed to the *kwei*, if those *kwei* had not belonged to their own ancestors. So also they would not have called upon the *shin* and *k'i*, if they had not belonged to heaven and earth; which great powers of nature were the objects of their worship."

Thus we see there are four or five views taken of this subject by different Chinese writers, and there may be as many more for all I know. The holders of these views all agree in calling *T'ien*, *Shàngti*, "the Supreme Ruler," whether they understand by this name *T'ien*, on the one hand the material heavens, or a lifeless, senseless, principle; or on the other, the *shin* of heaven, i. e. a spiritual being, a god, who resides in or rules over heaven; or the informing divinity, spirit, or soul of the compound being called Heaven, or the divine energies of heaven—all agree in calling *T'ien*, in whichever of these ways they understand the word, "the Supreme Ruler." This shows that *Shàngti* is, as Dr. L. contends, a relative term, and does "not indicate the essence, or express anything of the *being*" of the supreme ruling power; and it has been for the purpose of illustrating this important point, much more than to defend myself against the ridicule of Dr. Legge, that I have thus commented at length on his remarks on my views of *Shàngti* and *T'ien*.

From the views of the Chinese writers introduced above, another fact is apparent which is worthy of our especial notice: it is that the *only ray of theism* that breaks in upon us from these various explanations of *T'ien*, is through the word *shin*. From the phrases "Expansive Heaven, the Supreme Ruler" (with its immense *k'i* 氣 substance and ruling seat on high), and *Tau*, Primitive Reason, and *k'i*, destiny, fate, we get no indication that *T'ien*, the Supreme Ru-

When we address a man, we surely do not anatomize him after Dr. M.'s method, and consider whether we are speaking to the material or immaterial part of him. If by the *shin* and *k'i* here referred to, we understand the independent, separate spiritual beings, who preside over heaven and earth, it is as easy to understand why they are considered more honorable and more powerful than any of the other *shin*, as it is to understand why his Imperial Majesty, the Hwangti 皇帝, is considered more honorable and more powerful than any other man. It is not as a mere man, that he is made so much an object of honor, but as the ruler of so great a nation: So here, the *shin* of heaven, who is called *Shàngti* 上帝 is not superior to the other *shin*, on the score merely of being a *shin*; but is regarded as the chief of the *shin*, and the Supreme Ruler over them all, because of his imperium—heaven.

ler is "an understanding being" (to use Cudworth's phrase): it is only when we come to those explanations in which *shin* is used, that the Divinity of *T'ien* becomes possible; and in these explanations, *Shángti* is neither more nor less than *this shin* 上帝天之神也. "*Shángti* is the *shin* of Heaven." If *this shin* be a separate, independent being, ruling over heaven, a god, *Shángti* is *this god*. If *this shin* be the soul of the compound being *T'ien*, *Shángti*, according to our explanation, is *this soul*. If *this shin* be merely the divine or spiritual energies of *T'ien*, *Shángti* is the title by which it pleases pantheists to designate *these energies*. As long as *Shángti* is defined to be "the *shin* of heaven," the phrase "the Supreme Ruler" must stand or fall with the meaning we attach to *shin*. *Ti*, ruler, does not "indicate the essence," nor "express anything of the being."

It is not easy to determine which of the above views of *shin*, Dr. L. adopts. I should suppose however, it is the one I have placed third, and which he has ridiculed me for rendering "god of heaven." He explains the matter thus: "There is indeed some little perplexity in the way in which the Chinese speak of Heaven, which can only be explained by adopting the conclusion of Dr. Medhurst, 'that by Heaven is not meant the chief god of the Chinese, but the supreme ruling power, known and acknowledged in China and everywhere else; the word being also used in every nation by metonymy for God.'" (Inquiry, p. 25.) Dr. L. continues, "*Shángti* is the *T'ien chi Shin*, the spirit that possesses this Supreme Power. The term *Shángti* declare that possession, and express the meaning of God unadulterated, without diminution and without increase. The very nature of the term declares that it is not a proper name. It is relative, and I appeal to my missionary brethren whether the idea which they get from the characters themselves, and which they know the multitude of the Chinese to get, does not terminate in the Spiritual Being (*shin*) so denominated, instead of leading away their minds to the God Heaven, as the "*substans*," or "*ens*," in which the power is to inhere."

On this explanation, I shall offer two or three remarks. 1st. Dr. L. considers the *shin* of heaven to be the spirit that possesses supreme power; with what right therefore can he complain of my calling this *shin* "the god of heaven?" 2d. This *shin* is called *Shángti*, which "terms," he says, "declare that possession, and express the meaning of God unadulterated, without diminution and without increase." If this be so, instead of writing "the god of heaven," which Dr. L. complains of, I should have written "the GOD of Heaven." 3d. Dr. L. feels the need of some "*substans*" or "*ens*" in which "the supreme

power?" indicated by the relative term "Supreme Ruler," "is to inhere in and he finds it in the *shin*, the spiritual being here called, "the Supreme Ruler." If then *god* is an absolute term, the "nomen ipsum substantie," as Tertullian explains it, Dr. L. here makes *shin* the "substance" or "ess" in which this Supreme Ruler inheres, "the god of heaven," and *Shángti*, the mere title of this god.

If it is my calling *shin*, the chief god of the Chinese, instead of calling him, or it, "God over all, blessed for ever," that Dr. L. regards as "the rash statement" he is bound to expose, I can only plead all I have said in the previous part of this paper, on the cosmogony and worship of the Chinese, to show that *Shángti* is not the true God, in extenuation of my offense. Amidst all the various and conflicting opinions advanced by the Chinese, one fact seems to be certain, viz., that *shin* 天 heaven, (and *ti* 地 earth) have been worshiped in the *tiên* sacrifice from the earliest times recorded in their books, and that this is the highest act of worship offered in China. It follows therefore, that these words, whether we are to understand them strictly and properly, or metaphorically, are the names of their two greatest gods. This matter can be put into a nutshell. Unless *shin* is the only God, he must be the chief god, or some or all of the other gods must be his equals, or some other god must be superior to him. Which of these will Dr. L. take? He can not say that *shin* is the only god the Chinese have ever acknowledged or worshiped, and he is welcome to any of the other suppositions he prefers. Dr. Medhurst sets up a claim, in behalf of the Chinese, for a monotheism similar to that which Godworth claims in behalf of the Greek philosophers; but his statement is, I think, very rash, and calculated to mislead those unacquainted with the facts of the case—stating these facts, even as Dr. M. has himself stated them in other parts of his writings. This I shall attempt to show.

Dr. M.'s statement of the Chinese monotheism is as follows: "Godworth thinks that the Greeks were both monotheists and polytheists at the same time; that is, understanding the word *God*, combined in the two terms in different senses (see Vol. I, p. 374): the first, in conveying what he calls the natural idea of God, viz., small perfect being, the ruler of the universe; and the other as alluding to certain supposed invisible intelligences, who were the objects of religious worship, but subordinate to the one Supreme." *What Godworth pleads for in behalf of the Greeks may be allowed to the Chinese, and they may be considered as monotheists, because they believe in one supreme God, the Author and Ruler of all.*" Reply, p. 2.

Cudworth claims for the monadic *Θεός* of the Greeks, as Dr. M. himself shows on pp. 41, 42, that he was an absolutely perfect Being; *αὐτάρκης*; self-existent, the cause of all other beings, and possessing infinite power, &c. Of *Shàngti*, Dr. Medhurst admits that he is nowhere said to have "created the heavens and the earth;" and that we do not find that the Chinese predicate of him self-existence, nor do we remember any place in which they expressly describe him as existing from eternity." Again, on p. 41 of his Reply, he writes, "On p. 35, Dr. Boone says, although we admit that the word *shin* is never used by the Chinese to designate the self-existent, almighty Being who made heaven and earth, still we contend that the highest being they have ever conceived of is included in the class called *shin*. We will admit the first part of the above statement, because the Chinese have no idea of such a being (see Inquiry, p. 5); and there is no need of contending for the latter, as we do not deny it." Knowing these facts, as Dr. M. did, I can not understand how he could write, "What Cudworth pleads for on behalf of the Greeks may be allowed to the Chinese, and they may be considered as monotheists, because they believe in one Supreme God, the Author and Ruler of all." Is *Shàngti* an absolutely perfect Being, is he the Author of all of heaven and earth? The whole statement is calculated to mislead those unacquainted with the facts of the case, and is irreconcilable with Dr. M.'s own acknowledgements given above.

(The comparing the Chinese *T'ien* or *Shàngti* to the Greek *Zeus* or Latin *Jupiter*, does not imply that those who make this comparison suppose there is much similarity in character between the chief gods of these several nations; but what is meant to be affirmed by it is, that they are man-made gods, without holiness, and devoid of those characteristics which distinguish Jehovah, the true God. In some respects the Greek *Zeus* is very superior to the Chinese *T'ien*; they resemble each other in that the one, in *Βασιλεὺς* "king of gods and men," the other is *Shàngti*, Supreme emperor, or emperor on high; if there are many acts of *Zeus* unworthy of him, and such as we do not find predicated of *T'ien*, he has, to balance this, a much nobler character in other respects, and an unimpeachable personality. *T'ien*, on the contrary, is a perfect puzzle; impassible, impersonal, and is guilty of no gallantries, and always faithful to *ti* *thi* earth, with whom he began all things,* yet he is as entirely devoid of all holiness as *Zeus* was, and indifferent who shares with him the honor of religious worship.

* To denote this matrimonial relation, *T'ien* in the Chinese cosmogony, is called the *yáng* (male), and *Ti* is the *yin* (female).

In the next step of our argument we find Dr. Legge differing from those who agree with him in advocating the use of *Shángti*. He contends that *Shángti* should be used to render Elohím and Θεός in all cases, whereas Sir George Staunton and the American Missionary contend for its use "only when the true God is intended to be signified," and respectively propose *shin* and *shin-ming* as the rendering of these words in all other cases. These views were expressed above in propositions *c* and *d*.

Dr. L. contends for the use of *Shángti* in all cases as follows: "I return now from this long digression to the point I was urging, the employment namely of *Shángti* in every case, to render Elohím and Θεός. It was observed that the sacred writers had no option of their own. Similarly, I observe, we have no option of our own. Our simple duty is to follow their example, and to give the name that we use for God, the Supreme, to false gods, in every case where the same thing is done in the Bible. And indeed we could not otherwise be faithful translators: we could not convey to Chinese readers 'the mind of the Spirit.' Granted that it may at first seem strange to them to see the name of 'the Supreme Ruler' so widely given; this is one thing to be taught them—that the people of whom the Scriptures tell us were so foolish as to do so." page 40.

Though I differ so entirely from Dr. Legge with respect to all the points on which his argument in favor of *Shángti* is founded, and in the conclusion at which he has arrived, that *Shángti* should be used to render Elohím and Θεός; yet I must declare my full concurrence in his determination to render Elohím and Θεός always by the same word. The only objection which can be urged to this course, is, that the Chinese have no word, that according to its usage among themselves, answers to Elohím in both the senses in which it is used in the S.S., *i. e.* *proprié*. This objection, instead of being with me an argument against the uniform rendering of the word, seems only to make manifest the necessity there is for our pursuing this course. As Christians, the Chinese will need a word exactly answering to Elohím and Θεός; as heathen polytheists they have no such word; we therefore must by our *usus loquendi* make such a word for them. So far I entirely agree with Dr. Legge; "We have no option of our own; we must select the most suitable word we can find in the Chinese language, and by our use cure all its defects; in short, make it correspond exactly to Elohím and Θεός, as these words are used in the S.S. Here, however, my agreement with Dr. Legge ceases. He fancies that he has found a phrase

in the Chinese language answering to the words Elohim and Θεός when used proprié, and contends that we should take *this phrase*, and make it by our use entirely correspond to those words. If he can prove that Shángtí is the absolute name of *the Being* whom we regard as God, there can, we think, be no doubt of the correctness of his conclusion. But this we are persuaded he can never prove; the first point, absolute name, a point of *vital importance*, he does not even contend for; and as to the second point, that the being designated is the true God, we are constrained to call for much more direct and strict proof than has yet been attempted. The difference between Dr. L. and myself consists in this: he contends that the Chinese have a *phrase* that answers to the words Elohim and Θεός when used proprié; but have nothing answering to these words when used improprié: I, on the contrary, contend, that they have no word answering to Elohim and Θεός when used proprié, and that *shin* exactly answers to these words when used improprié. Dr. L.'s view makes the Chinese agree with those nations who have enjoyed a Divine revelation, or who have derived their views from thence; as the Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, in having a word that corresponds to our word GOD; but differ from Jews, Christians, Mohammedans, and *all other people*, in having no word answering to our words *god, gods*. If Dr. L.'s view be correct, it becomes a question of some interest to account for the fact how *such a people* came to be classed for so long a time among the heathen nations of the earth.

Should however his readers refuse to go with him in the opinion that the Shángtí of the Chinese classics, and the Shángtí of the Chinese people, is "God over all, blessed for ever," Dr. L. maintains they should still stand to *Shángtí* as the rendering of Elohim and Θεός. His words are: "Let me observe that however others may differ from the opinion which I have just unhesitatingly expressed that *Shángtí* is not the chief god merely of the Chinese, but the true God also, such difference of opinion will not justify them in rejecting the term as not being the proper rendering of Elohim and Θεός. It is a relative term which *implies dominion* that *inheres* in a spiritual being. It ought therefore to belong to Jehovah; and granted that to *every being* to whom the Chinese have given it, it has been given wrongly, it is for us now to take and rescue it from such perversion, and give it to Him 'whose right it is.' Jehovah Shángtí will just express in Chinese what Jehovah Elohim does in Hebrew, and Jehovah God in English." If I understand Dr. L., he here contends that the title, "the Supreme Ruler," should be used to render Elohim and Θεός, even if it should

appear that the Chinese have never used this title to designate God *proprié*, but have used it only as the distinctive appellation of one or more of their false gods, because these words are *titles* which have the same meaning as the Chinese phrase *Shángtí*. If we determine that the word *god* is an absolute term, this point of Dr. L.'s argument is wholly set aside by such determination; but even if any one should be induced to regard the words Elohim and θεός as relative terms, he would be very unwary, I think, to follow Dr. Legge in his conclusion that these words must be rendered by the phrase *Shángtí*. And this because *Shángtí*, by both classical and popular usage, when standing alone or absolutely, does not designate indifferently any one of the individuals who may be so called, but is the distinctive title of a definite individual being, and this individual being is a *false god*.*

That *Shángtí* is, according to common usage a singular, not a common term;—that it is a relative, and not an absolute term;—and that being thus *singular* and *relative*, it is the distinctive title, not of the true but of a false god:—these points constitute the very ground on which we enter our solemn protest against the use of this phrase to render Elohim and θεός, when used either *proprié* or *improprié*. We have already discussed two of these points, viz., Whether the Chinese *Shángtí* is the true God, and whether *god* is an absolute or relative term, at sufficient length. We shall therefore here only inquire whether the phrase *Shángtí*, when standing alone, is according to Chinese usage, classical and popular, a common or a singular term.

And first, of the use of this phrase in the Chinese classics. On this point we have the most unqualified testimony from the pen of Dr.

* To this objection it may be answered, that Elohim, when standing alone, designates an individual being as definitely as *Shángtí* does. True, but this individual so definitely designated is *the true God*, the proper object of worship. If it can be proved that the Tien of the classics is the true God, the more definitely *Shángtí*, when *standing absolutely*, designates *this* being, the better; but if the *individual* definitely designated be a false god, the objection seems to me unanswerable and fatal. It was no doubt a feeling of the truth of this, that made Dr. Medhurst, when he maintained that the individual being designated was the true God, testify so strongly (as we shall presently see he does) that *Shángtí* in the classics *always* and *invariably* means the same individual being and "him only." After, however, he had admitted that the Chinese do not know the true God, as he did in his Reply to Dr. Boone, and letter of 13th Jan. 1849, given above, it was as manifestly for the interests of *Shángtí* to deny that it definitely designates a single individual; accordingly Dr. M. in his "Reply to the Few Plain Questions of a Brother Missionary," makes it "a generic term."

Medhurst: "Dear Sir, you ask me if we must not give up the use of *Shángti*. I answer, No, until we can find a better. It is not the name of the chief idol among the Chinese, as your correspondent argues, but (when standing alone without any prefix) *always* and *invariably*, in every Chinese book of note and worth, means the Supreme Being, and him only." Letter to the Editor of the Chinese Repository, Vol. XVI, p. 34. The italics and capitals are Dr. M.'s.

"Mistakes are anticipated and sought to be corrected by the Chinese commentators on the classics, who supposing it possible that *such* misapprehensions may arise, tell us *distinctly* that it is a mistake to imagine that the (*wi-ti*) five rulers, presiding over the elements, are synonymous with (*Shángti*) the Supreme Ruler, that it is *wrong* also to think that the Supreme Ruler is unequal to the Five Rulers, &c. Thus out of 175 instances in which the word *Shángti* is used in the Chinese classics, only *one* refers to human rulers, and *all* the rest to the *Supreme Ruler*." See Theology of Chinese, p. 273.

Dr. Medhurst afterwards in a pamphlet, entitled "Reply to the Few Plain Questions of a Brother Missionary," states the character of the phrase *Shángti*, and the *facts* of the case to be directly the reverse of what he so plainly and unequivocally testifies they were in the quotations above given. In this pamphlet, he says, "The phrase *Shángti*, even according to the Literati, is not the name of an individual being, but a *generic term* at least for the six beings above mentioned"—i. e. Tien, and the *shin* who preside over the five elements, the Five Rulers, who, Dr. M. says in the quotation above, are so carefully distinguished by the classical writers. As in the case of his testimony about the word *Shin*, mentioned in a previous part of this Defense, so here, Dr. M. takes not the slightest notice of the plain, explicit testimony to the contrary of the *statement* he is now making, that he had published only a few months before. To sustain his first *statement* that *Shángti* when standing alone *always* and *invariably* means "the Supreme Being and him only," Dr. M. pledged "*every Chinese book of note and worth*," and in addition gave us the result of a careful concordance of the passages in which the phrase occurs "in the Chinese classics;" from which it appears that the phrase *Shángti* in 174 cases designates the individual being styled "the Supreme Ruler," and only once any other being, a human ruler; which last is ascribed to flattery.

If this be a fair view of the use of the phrase "in the Chinese classics," who can doubt that according to this usage it is a singular term, and that *Shángti* denotes a definite, individual being. Now what does

Dr. M. produce from "the Chinese classics" to set aside this conclusion? A single sentence from the *Hsiáu King* (a very secondary classic) in which the commentators suppose the phrase *Shángti* must refer not to *Tien*, the Supreme Ruler, but to the *Wá Tí*, or Five Rulers. This is the solitary instance Dr. M. can produce to add to the one above given, in which in the classics the title *Shángti*, "the Supreme Ruler" does not designate the god *Tien*. Dr. Medhurst, and all other Europeans who have made translations from the Chinese classics, uniformly render the phrase *Shángti*, when standing alone, "the Supreme Ruler," and never "a Supreme Ruler," or "Supreme Rulers." Dr. Legge, throughout his "Argument" so renders it: I think we may therefore take it for granted, that according to the *usus loquendi* of the Chinese classics, the phrase designates, when standing alone, a definite individual being; and that the literati of the present day, if we exhort them to worship *Shángti*, would understand us to be referring to the definite individual being so called 174 times in their classics; the being whom the ancient emperors *Yáu* and *Shun* worshiped under this title. As a practical question, it is of very little importance to me whether *Shángti* has been used in the classics to designate any other being than *Tien* once, or thrice; the really important practical question is, If I exhort a Confucianist to worship *Shángti*, will he understand by this phrase a definite individual being? And then, is this definite, individual being, the true or a false God? If you answer, he will understand by it the being whom *Yáu* and *Shun* worshiped at the round hillock; and say further that this being is not "the God over all, blessed for ever," but a man-conceived, a false god; how can I, if the matter stand thus, exhort him to go and worship *Shángti*? Would it not be directing him to commit idolatry by the worship of a false god? Is it any answer to this to say with Dr. L., "It is a relative term that implies supreme dominion which ought to belong to Jehovah;" and we must therefore use this title as his appellative name? If *Shángti* meant "a Supreme Ruler," or "a Ruler on high," thus conveying only a general idea, which would be correct as far as it went; though such a phrase would not suit as the rendering of Elohim and *deus*, still there could be no objection to designating Jehovah occasionally by this title, as we say in English, King of kings, &c.; but since the phrase *Shángti* is understood, not in this general way, but as the specific designation of a false god, the case is entirely changed; and if we, knowing a man would understand us to refer to this false god, should notwithstanding exhort him to worship *Shángti*, how can we doubt but that we should be held responsible

for the consequent idolatry that would ensue upon his complying with our exhortation ?

Dr. L. admits that *Shángtí* designates a definite, individual being ; this being he has persuaded himself is the true God ; he therefore can have no scruples in exhorting any one to worship *Shángtí*. In this he is quite consistent ; but if *Shángtí* designates a definite individual being, and this being *be not* the true God, how can Dr. L. tell his brethren who take this view of the case, that “ such difference of opinion will not *justify* them in rejecting the term as not being the proper rendering of Elohim and θεός ? I am constrained to pause here, and ask Dr. Legge if the fact that a phrase is the *distinctive title* of a *false* god, will not justify (!) a Christian missionary in rejecting it as the rendering of Elohim and θεός, what would, in his eyes, serve as a justification for rejecting any phrase ? He justifies his extraordinary adherence to the phrase *Shángtí*, whether it designates the true or a false god, on the ground that it is “ a relative term,” and “ not a proper name ;” and he appeals to his missionary brethren to say whether “ the idea which they get from the characters themselves, and which they know the multitude of the Chinese get, does not terminate (observe, not in a spiritual being, or *one* of the spiritual *beings* so called, but) “ in THE Spiritual Being so denominated.” Here then, Dr. L. agrees with me ; *Shángtí* designates “ the Spiritual Being so denominated :” if THIS “ Spiritual Being” be the true God, it is our duty to exhort the Chinese to worship Him ; if *he* be a false god, we can not, as we fear THE jealous God we serve, either worship *him* ourselves, or exhort others to do so. To show that *the* Spiritual Being, “ denominated” *Shángtí*, is the true God, appears to me essential to Dr. Legge’s success ; even if he prove to the satisfaction of us all that *god* is a relative term. If the phrase *Shángtí*, by its usage in the Chinese classics, designates the definite individual being *Tien* 天, and this being is not the true God, we shall be just as responsible for exhorting men to worship *him*, calling him by his *distinctive title* *Shángtí*, as we would be if we called him by his absolute name *Tien*. I have never contended that *Shángtí* was a *proper name*, but always, on the contrary, that it was a mere title : but a title, which, by Chinese usage, designates so definitely an individual being, that it is *in effect*, and as far as concerns the particular point we are *now* discussing, to *all intents and purposes* a proper name. A being may be as definitely designated by a title of office or dignity—by a relative term—as by an absolute proper name. We have a remarkable instance of this in the fact that Jehovah, the absolute, proper name of the revealed God, is

rendered in the English Bible by the phrase "the Lorn." Common instances occur in such phrases as the following, "the Queen," "the Iron Duke," "the Founder of Rome," &c. In England, these phrases would designate the individuals referred to quite as definitely as the words Jehovah, Queen Victoria, the Duke of Wellington, Romulus, &c. And so too, in Chinese, the phrase *Shángti*, in the classics, designates the chief god quite as definitely as the absolute name *Tien* does. The question *here* turns not upon the *character* of the *phrase*, but of *the being* who is designated by it: if *he* be the true God, it is lawful for us, yea, our duty, to worship him, and to teach others to do so; if *he* be a false god, and any one, upon our exhorting him to worship *Shángti*, should commit an act of idolatry by worshipping *this* false god, of what avail would it be to say that we only designated *him* by his *title*, and not by his *proper name*? If an Englishman, talking to other Englishmen, in England, should tell a number of stories of "the Queen," which though true of the Queen of Spain, were wholly false if referred to her most gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, should we not hold him responsible for any misunderstandings and scandals his stories might give rise to—the phrase "the Queen" being by common usage, at the present time, in England, so distinctive a designation of Victoria? In like manner, we contend that when speaking to Confucianists, the phrase *Shángti* is quite as *distinctive* a designation of the chief god *Tien*, as "the Queen" is at present of Victoria in England; and that therefore if *Tien*, *the being* whom the literati style *Shángti*, the Supreme Ruler, be not *the* true God, we shall be responsible for their worship of a false god, if we teach them to worship *Shángti*, without taking pains to warn them against the false god worshiped under *this title*, at the winter solstice by Yáu and Shun, and *the successive emperors of China to the present time*.

But though it be granted that in the classics the phrase *Shángti* designates a definite individual, the Rationalists and common people also use this phrase, and by it designate other beings than the *Tien* of the classics; therefore, argues Dr. M., it is a generic term.

"It would appear from the line of argument pursued by the writer of the letter, that by the phrase *Shángti*, the Chinese (Dr. M. should have said, the Chinese *literati*) will understand only the supreme *Shángti* (query, supreme Supreme Ruler?) spoken of in the classics. According to a statement made by the late Mr. Lowrie, it seems however, that the Chinese, with whom he came in contact, were perpetually thinking of *Yuh-hwáng Shángti* when he spoke to them of *Shángti*." "We have proved that there are many other fabulous deities known

under the name of *Shángti*. The term is therefore not a proper name but generic." pp. 3, 4.

Dr. Legge says, "We have from that (the Táuíst use of the term *Shángti*) three different beings all called *Shángti*, that relative term being made proper to an individual being in each case, by the adjunction of the respective terms, *Yuh-hwáng*, *Hüen-tien*, and *Yuen-tien*. These examples completely refute the notion that *Shángti* is merely the name of the chief god of the Chinese, and they show us that the name is used just as the words *Elohim* and *deus*." I agree entirely with Dr. Legge that *Shángti* is not merely the name of the chief god of the Chinese; it is a title; I admit that this title is not restricted to a single individual, and that the individuals mentioned by Dr. L. are severally styled *Shángti*; but what I contend for is, that in the Confucian classics, *when standing alone*, the phrase *Shángti* designates the being named *Tien* or *Háu Tien*, the Expansive Heavens, worshiped at the winter solstice, which being is a false god; and that when speaking to a Rationalist, if we use the phrase *Shángti without any adjunct*, he will likewise understand us as referring to a definite being, namely *Yuh-hwáng*, who is also a false god: so that either party, Confucianist or Táuíst, would understand us as referring to his chief god, which chief god in either case is a false god, and no proper object of worship. Therefore, if we look at the matter practically, we shall see that to exhort either of these to worship *Shángti*, without any explanation, is equivalent to sending them off to worship *Tien* and *Yuh-hwáng* respectively.

The American Missionary says; "Brethren, you all know that *experience* is worth more than *theory*; when the two clash, the former must prevail." It has been the submitting the phrase *Shángti* to the practical test referred to by the "American Missionary," that has convinced the great majority of the missionaries in China that the title *common* to the *chief gods* of the two native sects, (i. e. Confucianism and Rationalism), can not be used as the rendering of *Elohim* and *deus*. There was everything, when the five ports were first opened, to induce the missionaries to make a full and fair trial of *Shángti* in their new fields of labor; our oldest and most distinguished missionaries used this phrase for God in their version of the N. Test, and in their tracts and preaching. Our teachers were all sure to be Confucianists, and to favor *Shángti*. When we told them anything of *Shángti* that did not agree with *their classics*, they listened quietly, and took it for granted we should become more correct in our representations of him, when we became better acquainted with *them*. Thus

everything conspired to induce the missionaries to make trial of *Shángtí*, and this trial has induced the great majority of them to give it up—I am fully persuaded to give it up for good, and all with good reason. Dr. Medhurst, and those who act with him, first gave it up for *T'ien-ti* and *Ti*, and now, rejecting all native terms, for *Aloho*; in taking which last position, they assure their brethren at the five ports that they “*can not go wrong*,” they are “*unmistakably and incontrovertibly right*.”

Soon after the opening of the ports, missionaries proceeded to Ningpo, Shánghái, and Amoy; they commenced preaching *Shángtí* as their seniors were accustomed to do, and the results were such as startled some of them in a manner never to be forgotten. A missionary at Ningpo, after being there only a short time, wrote to inform his brethren at the South, that the use of *Shángtí* must be abandoned; for that one of their number, having exhorted a man to the worship of *Shángtí*, and told him that *Shángtí* had sent his Son to save us, was met by the offer on the part of this man to show him his god, who thereupon led him into a temple, and pointing to the image of *Yuh-hwang Shángtí* (the chief god of the Rationalist sect) said, “There is the father of Jesus; there is the god you worship.”

At other stations, without the slightest concert with each other, many of the missionaries complained of being thus misunderstood; from using this phrase *Shángtí*. A most painful case of misapprehension occurred in our own mission. We were using a catechism on the Creed, and put it into the hands of all who came to inquire of us our doctrines, to give them an idea of Christianity. The first Article was rendered thus: “I believe in *Shángtí*, the Father Almighty,” &c. A man of some intelligence, who read his own language very well, after hearing us preach, applied to the Rev. Mr. Syle for special instruction; he gave him a copy of this Catechism, and requested him to come to his study every morning. The man came regularly for some ten days, and exhibited great interest. He read over with Mr. Syle all the attributes predicated of *Shángtí*, which we are accustomed to predicate of God, and appeared to understand thoroughly what he read. It occurred to Mr. S. to inquire one morning whether he followed the advice he had given him at the commencement of their inquiries, to pray to *Shángtí* every morning and evening. The man replied with great simplicity, that he had not failed to visit his temple twice a day for this purpose. This answer led to inquiry, and Mr. S., to his inexpressible grief, learned that the man had been understanding him for ten days as recommending the worship of this idol.

Thus it will be seen that it will not answer to say, as many in England and America have said, no matter what name is used, if only under this name you take care to describe the true God by his attributes; for the Divine attributes were set forth at some length in this Catechism, much stress being laid on Shángtí's having no form or image, and on his being a pure spirit; and yet the title *Shángtí* was so perfectly identified with this false god *Yuh-hwáng*, in this man's mind, that as soon as he was told to pray to *Shángtí*, he, notwithstanding all he had read in the Catechism, went immediately to this filthy idol. The reader will not be surprised to learn that we immediately, in our mission, ceased to teach and to preach *Shángtí*.

The circumstance led me to make extensive inquiries of the Chinese with whom I have come in contact, whether in town or country, as to what they understood by the phrase *Shángtí*, and the conclusion to which I have been led is this:—the phrase *Shángtí*, when used alone, without any adjunct or qualifying word to limit or explain it, although it is used by different parties to designate several different beings, does yet, like the phrase "the Queen" in the illustration given above, designate a *definite individual*, and is never used as the appellation of these individuals regarded as a *class*, so as to designate any one of them indifferently. If the individual of whom I inquired was a literary man, he understood by the phrase "*the being*" so called in the classics. If he was a Rationalist, or one addicted to the worship of this sect, he understood by it "*the being*" represented by the idol abovementioned, *Yuh-hwáng*. A third party understand by this phrase, Heaven and Earth, the universal father and mother; a very common object of worship at weddings, &c., though not commonly worshiped under the title *Shángtí*, but under the name *T'ienti*. That by the Heaven and Earth thus worshiped, the vulgar understand the material heaven and earth, I think, there can be no doubt. I have had a man in answer to the question, What do you mean by the Heaven and Earth you worship, and which you say is *Shángtí*?—point with his hand to heaven, and stamp with his feet upon the earth.

In looking at this matter practically, it should be remembered that nine-tenths of our congregations are composed of common people, by whom the *Shángtí* of the Táuists is much worshiped; whereas the *Shángtí* of the classics is worshiped only by the Emperor: from this it follows, that if in addressing the common people we exhort *them* to worship *Shángtí*, they will naturally understand us to mean *this being*, as was the case in Ningpo, and with Mr. Syle in Shánghái.

But should our hearers understand by it the being whom Yáu and Shun worshiped, this being, I am persuaded is a false god, as well as *Yuh-hwáng*, and it is not worth while to stop and discuss the difference between them, as it would show great fastidiousness in a Christian teacher to choose between two false gods, which he would commend to his fellow-men as an object of worship. So that could it be made to appear that our hearers would certainly understand by the phrase *Shángti*, the *T'ien* 天 or *Háu-t'ien* 昊天 (Expansive Heaven) whom Shun worshiped under this title, at the same time with the six venerated objects and the hundred *shin*; and that they would in consequence of our exhortation address their prayers to *him* or *it*, such conviction would not in the least mitigate my objection to the use of this phrase, as I should have no doubt that they would be as much guilty of idolatry in worshipping *Háu-t'ien Shángti*, i. e. Expansive Heaven, the Supreme Ruler," as if they were to pray to *Yuh-hwáng Shángti*, "The perfectly Imperial great celestial *Ti*, who at the *extreme beginning* opened out *heaven*; and who has ever *since* regulated the various kulpas, possessing divinity and embodying reason, the *most honorable* in the glorious Heavens, &c." *

Dr. M. in his reply to the Plain Questions of a Brother Missionary, denies the fact he had formerly so positively affirmed, viz., that *Shángti* in "every book of worth and note," when standing alone, *always* and *invariably* meant the Supreme Being, and him only. In this last document he affirms, on the contrary, that *Shángti* is a "generic term." Dr. M. fancies that he has proved this last position when he shows that in addition to the *T'ien*, or *Háu T'ien* 昊天 Expansive Heaven of the classics, there are several other beings styled *Shángti*. But this is not sufficient to prove that the term is used as the name of a class: it may be a name common to many individuals, and yet be always used to designate a definite individual, and not any one indifferently of the individuals so called. There are great numbers of individuals called William, Thomas, &c., yet these are singular terms, not common: in each different family, the "William" designates a different person, yet the speaker uses this word to point out definitely a single individual as the subject of discourse, and the family and other circumstances define who the person spoken of is. So with the title "the Queen,"

* This is the title of *Yuh-hwáng*, the Supreme Ruler of the Táuists, given on p. 33 of Dr. L's argument. We shall search the Classics in vain for such predicates of *Tien*, or *Háu Tien*, the "Supreme Ruler" of said classics. *Tien* is nowhere described therein as he "who at the *beginning* opened out *heaven*" (i. e. *Tien*), or he "who has ever since regulated the various kulpas," &c.

in England, at the present moment, notwithstanding the fact that so many have borne this title, it is in effect a proper name, or, in other words, it designates H. M. Victoria as definitely as a proper name would. This, I am persuaded, is the case with the title *Shángti*, the Supreme Ruler. It designates, when standing alone, the chief god of either the Confucian or Taoist systems, and the family in which it is spoken renders definite which one is meant, as in the case of the common proper names William, Thomas, &c.

I would earnestly beg my missionary brethren who are in the habit of using *Shángti* for God, to inquire quietly of their teachers and other literary men, and then of the common people, what they respectively understand by the phrase *Shángti*, and I am persuaded that the result of such investigation, if conducted carefully and without a resort to *leading questions*, will be the conviction that by this phrase a definite individual being is *always understood*; and that this being will be found to be either the *T'ien* of the classics, the *Yuh-kwáng*, of the Taoists, or the *T'ien-ti*, Heaven and Earth, of the common people. If either one of these be the true God, this fact might justify one in using the phrase, but if they are *all* alike false, and the hearer will be sure to understand us, as exhorting him to worship *a given one of them* (which one, his creed would determine), how can we, if under these circumstances we exhort the Chinese to worship *Shángti*, avoid the charge of exhorting them to the worship of a false god?

But if *Shángti* should be proved by classical and popular usage to be a common term, the fact that it is a relative term, which "can not indicate the *essence*, nor express anything of the *being* of Jehovah," is *sufficient* to decide the question against its use to render *Elohim*, and Θεός. If the word by which we render *Elohim* and Θεός "does not indicate the *essence*, nor express anything of the *being* of Jehovah," but is *merely* the exponent of the relationship he sustains to his creatures, what word are we to use in our Chinese treatises when we speak of the *nature, being, and attributes* of Jehovah? How are we to express the doctrine of the Trinity by the use of this word, if when we say the three Persons are one God, we mean to assert by the word *God* they are of one divine *essence or substance*? This matter has been sufficiently discussed when we were inquiring whether *God* was a relative term or not; but I can not pass on without calling the reader's attention to one remarkable point.

The Romanists used the character *wei* 位 for the Persons, and the character *t'i* 體, substance, to express that in which the *oneness* of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost consisted. In this they have been fol-

lowed by all the Protestants whose statements with respect to the Trinity I have seen. The remarkable fact in connection with this point to which I desire to call the reader's attention is this: that the Chinese writers themselves (without of course having any reference to this subject) explain the phrase *Shángti* as not referring to the *t'i* 體 substance, of the being so styled. Take, for instance, the explanation of the words *t'ien* 天 and *ti* 帝 given by Ching-tsz' when commenting on the 18th Section of the *Chau Li*: *T'ien yü ti yih yá; t'ien yen k'i t'i, ti yen k'i chü* 天與帝一也, 天言其體, 帝言其主, *T'ien* (Heaven) and *Ti* (Ruler) are the same; [the name] heaven refers to its (the ruling power's) (*t'i* 體) substance; *ti*, the Ruler, refers to its ruling." So also the explanation of Ching Shi-ngoh quoted on the 20th page of my Essay: "Because of the immensity of its substance (*k'i* 氣) we call it (the ruling Power) Expansive Heaven; because its ruling seat is on high, we call it (the Power above called Expansive Heaven) *Shángti*, i. e. the Ruler on high."

If we are correct in using the word *t'i* 體 substance, to express that in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one; when we say "the three Persons are one *Shángti*," how can the phrase *Shángti*, which does not refer to the substance of the being indicated, but only to his ruling, teach that the oneness of the three Persons consists in their having only one *t'i* 體 substance, or their being con-substantial? Will the words "Three Persons and Supreme Ruler," express the Athanasian view of the Trinity?

The last objection I shall urge against the use of the phrase *Shángti* to render the words *Elokim* and *Θεός*, is that it is a compound term, consisting of an adjective "supreme" and a noun "ruler;" whereas we want a simple uncompounded word like *God*, אֱלֹהִים *Θεός*.

The unsuitableness of such a compound phrase is easiest tested by showing that we can not thereby teach a strict and proper monotheism. The doctrine of the Sacred Scriptures is that there is but one God; a being must be either absolutely God, or no god at all—only God by way of a figure, or improperly so called. Now then, if in this phrase compounded of an adjective and a noun, the noun *ti* meant God, what would be the effect of using this qualifying term, and saying "there is only one Supreme God;" would this teach monotheism? Does not the addition of the adjective *supreme* on the contrary, imply the existence of inferior gods? The belief in the existence of only one supreme God is not monotheism; but the belief in the existence of only one God is. The Greeks, Romans, and indeed all the polytheistic nations we know anything of, believed in the existence of

only one *Supreme* God; but this belief did not interfere with their belief in the existence of numberless inferior gods. Hence Tertullian objects on this ground to the use of this phrase; he says most admirably, "*Divinitas non habet gradum, utpote unica.*"

If the noun *ti* means merely *ruler* and not *god*, all the adjectives in the world can not make it answer to this word, if God is, as we contend, the *absolute* name of the Supreme Being; and not a mere title. To say there is only one supreme Ruler is not monotheism, for this supreme Ruler might not be a god at all; but only the visible heavens; or a mere lifeless principle, primitive reason, destiny; or fate. This point seems to me so plain that I will not dwell on it, but will only request the reader to endeavor to state the Scripture doctrine of the existence of only *one God*, adding any adjective he can think of except the adjective "*true*," and see if this added adjective does not interfere with his statement of this doctrine. The adjective *supreme* implies inferior; "*good* God" would not exclude the Manichæan idea of a malignant God; "*great*" would not exclude small, &c. To state this doctrine we must have a simple, unqualified word; we can not say there is only one good, or one great, or one supreme, God; but must simply say, There is only one God.

Having shown the reasons which forbid us to regard the Chinese *Tien* 天 as the true God, and also why we can not use the phrase *Shángti* to render the words *Elohim* and Θεός: 1st. because it is a mere title, and we want an absolute name; 2d, because it is the *distinctive* title of a false god; and 3d, because it is a compound term, and we want a simple uncompounded term to express the monotheism of the Bible; I now pass on to the consideration of the last proposition that I proposed to discuss, which reads as follows:—

(e.) "Admitting that under the above-mentioned circumstances the generic name of the Chinese gods should be used, if such name can be found, deny that *shin* is this generic name, and affirm on the contrary that the Chinese have neither a name for any being who is truly and properly God, nor any generic name of their gods; and since the words *Elohim* and Θεός *must* be rendered by a generic term, we have no resource but that of transferring the original word."

After making ample trial of *Shángti*, *T'ien-ti*, and lastly *Ti*, this is the ground taken by Dr. Medhurst and those who act with him, in their letter of 20th Jan. 1850. They admit that *Elohim* and Θεός are generic terms; they maintain that we need a generic term to render these words, and propose to make one for the Chinese, as they have no generic term for *god* in their language.

The ground taken by Dr. Legge is in every point the opposite of that maintained by Dr. Medhurst and his friends, and also of that maintained in my Essay; and I think it will aid the reader in getting a clearer view of the whole case to point out this contrariety at this stage, before entering upon the defense of the argument of the Essay.

Dr. L. maintains that the Chinese *Shāngtí* is truly and properly God. We maintain that the Chinese know no being who is entitled, to be called God proprie. Dr. L. maintains that even if *Shāngtí* is not, the true God, this *title* should be used as the rendering of *Elohim* and *Θεός*; as such a title can properly belong to God alone, and the words *Elohim* and *Θεός* being relative terms—mere titles, which “do not indicate the essence, nor express anything of the *being* of Jehovah”—they must be rendered by a relative term. We maintain, on the contrary, that as the Chinese do not know the true God, we must not use the name of any individual god, but the general name of their gods; that this appellative name must be *absolute*, and not merely a *title*, because *Elohim* and *Θεός* are absolute names that do “indicate the essence, and express something about the *being* of Jehovah.” If it is objected that, according to Chinese usage, this general name has never been employed to designate the Being we design to call by this name; we answer, that the absolute name of a class of invisible beings, who among them govern the world, and are sacrificed to and addressed in prayer by all persons in the empire, in all places and at all times; a class, who divide among them all the attributes and acts of GOD that the Chinese *have known or discoursed about*,—that such absolute term, “ought to belong to Jehovah;” that to predicate—e. g. the hearing of prayer at the same time in every house in China of any invisible Being but Him is false; therefore this name of right belongs to Him, and we must give it to Him, and maintain that He alone can properly be called by this name; and this we must do to reduce the Chinese polytheism to monetheism.

Dr. Legge's view of the character of the word God differs fundamentally from mine and from that taken by Dr. Medhurst and the other signers of the letter of the 30th Jan., and this difference affects our whole systems. If this word is, as Dr. L. contends, only a title of office or dignity, the mere exponent of a relation, and not the absolute appellative name of the Being so designated; it would seem only necessary to decide definitely what the relation indicated by this word is, and to render it accordingly. If God mean Creator, this is easily expressed in Chinese; if Ruler, *Ti* 帝 is ready to our hand; indeed, any relationship can be easily expressed. If this too is the character

of the word *God*, it can be no objection to the use of the term proposed as its rendering to say, "The Chinese have never so called any Being;"—"This term will give them no idea what sort of *Being* the one thus designated is;" the answer would be; the word *God* "does not indicate the essence, nor express anything of the being of Jehovah." The only question to be asked would be, Does this word or phrase clearly express the fact that the being so designated does sustain the definite relationship indicated by the words *Elohim* and *Shen*? If so, then it conveys all the information that the term which renders "those relative words *elohim* and *shen*," should convey. If Dr. Legge's view of the word *God* is correct, these answers to my mind would be amply sufficient.

If however, the words *Elohim* and *Shen* are the absolute appellative names of Jehovah, the reader will agree with me that to render them by any mere relative term whatsoever is wholly out of the question; and that if no absolute appellative name of the Chinese gods can be found, then the ground taken by Dr. Medhurst and his friends in their letter of the 30th of January, viz.; that we must transfer the original term—we must make such an absolute appellative for the Chinese—is the true solution of our difficulties.

I must confess that ever since the question of rendering *elohim* and *shen* by the generic name of the Chinese gods has been agitated, I have had the strongest impression that they must have such a term in their language. That such a people as they should have never conceived of the existence of any gods at all; or that, having the beings, they should have no general name for them—both of these things have seemed incredible to me; and the more I have inquired into the matter from the Chinese around me, and looked into their books, the more firm has my conviction grown that the Chinese people are polytheists, and that *Shin* is the general name of their gods—let us decide by what test we please, who and what the Chinese gods are.

This is the definite point for our consideration at present; and I must be allowed to say that it can only lead to an endless war of words for one party to affirm that "*Shin* is not merely the chief god of the Chinese; but is the true God also," to be denied by the other party; while they affirm that *shin* is the generic name of the Chinese gods; and that these *shin* are not mere spirits but gods; to be denied again; unless both parties will consent to define their terms *God* (proprié) and *god* (improprié) and make proof according to their definitions.

I have urged above the importance of our regarding the word *God*, whether, used proprié or improprié, as the name of a *Being* or *Beings*:

(as the case may be), and not as the mere symbol of an idea. If the views there expressed were correct, they should guide us in the present part of our inquiry. To try the points here at issue, viz., Is *Shàngti* the true God (God *propriè*)? and, Are the Chinese *shin* gods and not mere spirits? we should determine what are the characteristics of a Being, who is truly and properly God; and also of a being, who is a god according to the polytheistic sense of the word; and then use these characteristics as tests to ascertain whether the *T'ien* of the classics and the Chinese *shin* are respectively God (*propriè*) and gods. Unless we consent to this, our discussions will only lead to endless logomachy.

When we contend that the *shin* are the gods of the Chinese, Dr. Medhurst replies, that they are mere spirits, not gods; the Chinese are polypneumatists, not polytheists. To settle the point, we must inquire what is the characteristic difference between a spirit and a god? The word *God*, whether used, *propriè* or *impropriè*, is closely allied to the word *spirit*; *spirit* may be called the genus; God, god, gods, the species. This we soon perceive if we attempt to form a definition of the word *God*, when used *propriè*. No matter what attributes of power, wisdom, &c., we may ascribe to a being, if this being be material or corporeal, he is not God (*propriè*); to be God, he must be a spirit possessed of certain characteristic attributes. Let us then look into the matter minutely, and endeavor to ascertain, 1st, The characteristic difference between a being who is truly and properly God, and a mere spirit; and 2dly, The characteristic difference between a god, gods, as these words are used by polytheists, and mere spirits.

To the question, "What is God?" the Westminster Assembly of Divines in their Larger Catechism, answer, "God is a Spirit, in and of himself infinite in being, glory, blessedness, and perfection; all sufficient, eternal, unchangeable, incomprehensible, everywhere present, almighty, knowing all things, most wise, most holy, most just, most merciful, and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth."

Melancthon defines the word, "*Dens est essentia spiritualis, intelligens, verax, bona, pura, iusta, misericors, liberrima, immensæ potentie et sapientiæ, Pater æternus qui Filium imaginem suam ab æterno genuit, et Filium imago Patris cœterna, et Spiritus sanctus procedens a Patre et Filio.*"

The first article of the Church of England reads as follows: "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts or

passions, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the maker and preserver of all things, both visible and invisible. And in unity of this Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

These definitions all agree; for the words "without body, parts or passions" are a mere periphrasis for the word *spirit*. According to these definitions, God is a spiritual being, or *essence*, possessed of certain *attributes* which distinguish Him from all *other spirits*. Should it therefore be affirmed of any being that he is God (*proprie*), the first question should be, Is he a pure spirit, or a compound, corporeal being? Next, Is he a Spirit, "and of himself infinite in being, all-sufficient, eternal," &c., &c. 4*

The Chinese *Tien* 天, Heaven, the Supreme Ruler, tried by these characteristics as a test, is not God (*proprie*). He is not self-existent from eternity; he is not the first principle of all things, the making of the heavens and the earth being ascribed to another agency than his by Confucius and his disciples; who teach us all that the Chinese have predicated of him. This, I think, has been sufficiently shown in the previous part of this Defense.

The question then arises, If the Chinese have no being who is truly and properly God no word in their language which answers to God (*proprie*); can they have any word that will answer for the rendering of *Elohim* and *Osai* into Chinese? To this question I answer unhesitatingly, Yes; it is quite possible for a people to have had a subject before their minds for centuries, to have discoursed and written much about it, and yet never to have discovered the truth concerning it. It is quite possible for a people, who do not know the true God, to have thought much about the subject of Deity in general, to have a general name for their false gods, and to have sinned greatly against the true God, by the worship of these false ones.

If we look into the arguments for the existence of God from the general consent of mankind, as it is presented by most writers, we shall find that the passages cited to prove this point, most of them refer to this *general view of the subject*; and do not show that heathen nations generally have believed in a simple, self-existent, spiritual being, the creator of the world and the *author* of all other beings.

Calvin, in his Institutes, writing on this point, thus expresses himself; "Certainly, if there is any quarter, where it may be supposed that God is unknown, the most likely for such an instance to exist is among the

* See Appendix A.

most tribes, furthest removed from civilization; but, as a heathen tells us, 'there is no nation so barbarous, no race so brutish, as not to be imbued with the conviction that there is a God.' From the use of the capital G in both instances in which the word God occurs, we might suppose that Calvin used the word here *proprie*, i. e. to designate definitely the true God; but his quotations show that this can not be the case. These are,

"Intelligi necesse est *deos*, quoniam instus eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus. Quas nobis natura informationem *deorum* ipsorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos æternos et beatos haberemus." Cic. de Nat. Deor., lib. i. c. 17. "Itaque inter omnes omnium gentium summa constat; omnibus enim innatum est, et in animo quasi insculptum esse *deos*." lib. iii. c. 4.

Here the word, in both quotations, which are cited to show that there is no quarter in which "God is unknown," is in the plural—"*deos*," "*deorum*," "*deos*."

Witsius, when commenting on the first Article of the Creed, to prove that the heathen derive a knowledge of God from the contemplation of the heavens, quotes the following proofs: "I shall quote another passage from Cicero: 'Who is so stupid and infatuated,' says he, 'as not to perceive, after having looked up to the heavens, that there are *Gods*, or to ascribe to the operation of chance works which discover so great intelligence that scarcely any one is able, by any art, to trace their order and their revolutions.' But why do I insist on the convictions and declarations of individuals? Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Locrians, by a law which he enacted, bound all his citizens to acknowledge a *Divinity*, from the contemplation of the heavens. According to the testimony of Diodorus Siculus, 'Zaleucus having been chosen by the people to frame laws, and attempting to confirm them by new sanctions, began by directing their attention to the *celestial Gods*. At the beginning of the preamble to the whole code he says, that the inhabitants of the city are required, first of all to believe and to be firmly persuaded that there *are Gods*, and having attentively considered the heavens and their astonishing magnificence and order, to conclude that they are neither the production of chance, nor the workmanship of man.'"

Here we see that Witsius, to prove that the heathen derive a knowledge of God from his works, and that they acknowledge "a *Divinity*," quotes sentences in which the existence of *Gods* is asserted. There is very great looseness of expression on this point in almost every book into which I have looked. Barrow expresses himself much more

accurately. His words are, "That in the world there are beings imperceptible to our senses, much superior to us in knowledge and power, that can perform works above, and contrary to the course of nature, and employing themselves sometimes to do so for the interests of mankind; for these qualifications and performances deserving extraordinary respect from us, hath been a constant opinion in all places and times; to which sort of beings *some one general name* hath been in all languages assigned, answering to that of God among us. Of such beings that there is one, supreme and most excellent, incomparably surpassing in all those attributes of wisdom, and power and goodness; from whom *the rest, and all things beside have derived their beings*, do depend upon, are sustained and governed; *the author, I say, of all beings*, and dispenser of all good; to whom consequently supreme love, reverence, and obedience are due; hath been also the general sense of the most ancient, most wise, and most noble nations among men; to whom therefore, in a peculiar and *eminent manner* the title of God (and those which answer thereto) is appropriated; so that when the word is absolutely put, without any adjunct, or limitation, or diminution, he only is meant and understood; to which sometimes for fuller declaration, are the epithets *Optimus, Maximus, Summus, Eternus, Omnipotens, Dominus*, and the like; the Best, the Greatest, the Most High, the Eternal, the Almighty, the Sovereign God."

Of the almost universal consent of heathen nations to the polytheism stated by Dr. Barrow in the first part of this quotation, there can be, I think, no doubt; with respect to the second point, I am persuaded that a careful examination of what these nations have said for themselves, notwithstanding what too indulgent theists have said for them, will greatly diminish the number of those who can fairly be set down as believing in one Supreme, "from whom the rest and all things have derived their beings." Such examination will show that the same nation, at different stages of its existence, is to be placed in a different category with respect to its explicit belief of a self-existent, intelligent, first cause of all things.

In my Essay, on the 54th page, I expressed the opinion that we now must know just where the Greek philosophers found *deos*; designating any one of a class of beings who are all regarded as proper objects of worship. The correctness of this opinion, has been questioned, and it is of such importance that it demands our consideration. Above, (on pp. 57, 58, 59,) we have considered the probability there would be of our finding the posterity of any of the rebels who were scattered abroad on the face of the earth, from Babel, say B.C. 2554,

retaining a knowledge of the true God, when they come up to our notice on the pages of profane history, say in the 8th, 9th, or 10th century before Christ.

We saw above, that the ancestors of the chosen people, and the nations around them, had fallen into idolatry before the time of Abraham. These facts are referred to for the purpose of repelling the presumption which many seem to entertain, that patriarchal tradition will prove so efficacious a means of transmitting this truth, that we shall, yea, must, find a knowledge of God (understanding this word properly) among every people, in the first records we have of their existence as a nation. A calm consideration of the circumstances of the case, it seems to me, removes any such presumption, and produces on the contrary a conviction that we should come to the examination of the early documents of any people, when we desire to learn what their religious creed was, with minds perfectly unbiased, and base our decision *wholly* upon the facts made known to us. If we do this in the case of the Greeks and Romans, we shall, I think, conclude that their knowledge of a monadic *Θεός* was owing, not to *tradition*, but to their philosophy; or, at any rate, if derived from tradition, that this tradition was not handed down from the patriarchs, by their *own ancestors*, and recorded by their *own poets* and other *early writers*; but was gained by their philosophers at a comparatively modern date in their foreign travels.

If we take Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus as the oldest Greek authors whose productions have come down to us, how much do we find in these writers, "of a Spiritual Being in and of himself existing from eternity, the Creator of the world, and the Author of every thing extrinsic to himself?" In the Homeric poems, Oceanus termed the origin of the gods and of all things, though Jupiter is commonly described as the Father of gods and men."*

"Homer represents Father Oceanus as the generator of all things."† In what part of the Iliad or Odyssey shall we find a being called *Γαῖα*, who is superior to *Ζεὺς*, who is self-existent; the Creator of heaven and earth and ocean; of *Ζεὺς*, and of all the gods?

"First in order of time (we are told by Hesiod) came Chaos; next, *Γαῖα*, the broad, firm and flat Earth, with deep and dark Tartarus at her base. *Ερως* (Love), the seducer of gods as well as men, came immediately afterwards. From Chaos sprung *Erebus* and *Nyx*; from

* Thirlwall's History of Greece.

† Brucker, *Historia Critica Philosophiæ*, Tom. II. quoted in Elton's Remains of Hesiod.

these latter Æther and Hæmera. Gæa also gave birth to Uranos, equal in breadth to herself, in order to serve both as an overarching vault to her, and as a residence for the immortal gods; she further produced the mountains, habitations of the divine nymphs, and Póntas, the barren and billowy sea. Then Gæa intermarried with Uranos, and from this union came a numerous offspring—twelve Titans and Titanides, three Cyclopes and three Hekatoncheires, or beings with a hundred hands each. The Titans were Océanus, Koios, Krios, Hypérion, Iapetos, and Kronos: the Titanides, Theia, Rhea, Themis, Mnemosyne, Phoebe, and Tethys.* Kronos and Rhea intermarry; "but Kronos foreboded to himself destruction from one of his own children, and accordingly as soon as any of them were born, he immediately swallowed them; and retained them in his own belly. In this manner had the five first been treated; and Rhea was on the point of being delivered of Zeus. Grieved and indignant at the loss of her children, she applied for counsel to her father and mother, Uranos and Gæa, who aided her to conceal the birth of Zeus. They conveyed her by night to Lyctus in Crete, hid the newborn child in a woody cavern on Mount Ida, and gave to Kronos, in place of it, a stone wrapped in swaddling-clothes, which he greedily swallowed, believing it to be his child. Thus was the safety of Zeus ensured."† And this being is to be henceforth the chief god, the Father of gods and men.

There could surely be no knowledge of a self-existent, understanding Being, who was the first principle of all thing, among those who could write and believe such a cosmogony as that above given. If Homer had believed in the existence of any being who could truly and properly be called God, could he have written *Ὀὐρανὸς ἦ ὅστις πάντας ἀνθρώπων Τέλειος*?—*Iliad*, XIV. 210. The Homeric and Hesiodic gods are to us a mere fable; but the whole story to the men of their own times was not romance, but history—sacred history.

Homer and Hesiod were the grand authorities in the Pagan world respecting theogony; but in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* nothing is found except passing allusions and implications, and even in the Hymns (which were commonly believed in antiquity to be the productions of the same author as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*), there are only isolated, unconnected narratives. Accordingly, men habitually took their information respecting their theogonic antiquities from the Hesiodic poem, where it was ready laid out before them; and the legends consecrated in that work acquired both an extent of circulation and a

* Grote's History of Greece, Vol. I. pages 5, 6—8.

firm hold on the national faith; such as independent legends could seldom or never rival. Moreover, the scrupulous and sceptical Pagans, as well as the open assailants of Paganism in later times, derived their subjects of attack from the same source; so that it has been absolutely necessary to recount in their naked simplicity the Hesiodic stories, in order to know what it was that Plato deprecated and Xenophanes denounced.*

It was philosophical inquiry, a better acquaintance with nature, more correct views of geography, &c., &c., which led the philosophers of the 5th and 6th centuries before the Christian era, to doubt the story of the gods which was so firmly believed by all in the days of Homer and Hesiod. "The honor of having first represented God as the intelligent cause of the universe is ascribed to Anaxagoras by the ancients. . . . That he maintained an infinite mind to be the author of all motion and life, is attested by many ancient authorities. Plato expressly asserts that Anaxagoras taught the existence of a disposing Mind, the cause of all things. Νεὸς ἰδιωτικὸς ἦν καὶ μαθητὴς Ἀλκίβίου." Aristotle gives it as his doctrine that mind is the first principle of all things, pure, simple and unmixed; that it possesses within itself the united powers of thought and motion; and that it gives motion to the universe, and is the cause of whatever is fair and good. Plutarch confirms this account of the doctrine of Anaxagoras, and shows wherein it differed from that of his predecessors. "The Ionic philosophers," says he, "who appeared before Anaxagoras, made fortune, or blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous or necessary motion of the particles of matter, the first principle in nature; but Anaxagoras affirmed that a pure mind, perfectly free from all material concussions, governs the universe. The infinite Mind, or Deity, which his predecessors had confounded with matter, making them one universe, Anaxagoras conceived to have a separate and independent existence, and to be simple, pure, intelligence, capable of forming the eternal mass of matter according to his pleasure. Thus he assigned an adequate cause for the existence of the visible world." Enfield, Vol. I. p. 161. Here we have, if this account may be relied on, this great truth of the existence of an intelligent mind or God, separate from matter, first asserted in Greece in the 5th century B.C. The word *Deus* was much older than this. Homer, and Hesiod, and Orpheus had used it. If, as used by them, this word designated, when standing absolutely, an understanding, spiritual being, who is self-existent and the former of

* Grote's History of Greece, Vol. I.

the universe, how could any respectable ancient authority " ascribe to Anaxagoras the honor of having first represented God (*θεός*) as the intelligent cause of the universe?"

If this honor is denied to Anaxagoras, and it be maintained that Thales and Pythagoras are also theists, it will not alter the force of our argument that *θεός* was not used by Homer, Hesiod, and the earliest Greeks, as the name of a self-existent, spiritual being; for if this had been the general belief in the age of Homer, how can we account for the existence of any controversy with respect to the theism of Thales and others of the Ionic sect, and for the direct assertions above quoted that Anaxagoras was the *first among the Greeks*, who conceived of mind as detached from matter?

If the belief in a monadic *θεός* was the ancient traditional faith of Greece, handed down to them by their ancestors from the patriarchal age, and not either the fruit of philosophic speculation, or a tenet of foreign importation, how can we account for the treatment of this very Anaxagoras and the Greek philosophers generally, by the *common people*, who are sure to adhere most firmly to the tradition of their fathers? Cudworth says, " It is certain the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of theists and atheists; as for example, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, though he was the *first* of all the Ionic philosophers (unless Thales ought to be excepted,) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, *that is, asserted a Deity according to the true notion of it*; yet he was, notwithstanding, cried down for an atheist, merely because he affirmed the sun to be ' a mass of fire,' or ' a fiery globe,' and ' the moon to be an earth;' that is, because he denied them to be animated, and endued with understanding souls; and consequently to be gods. So likewise, Socrates was both accused and condemned for atheistical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was pretended to be proved against him but only this; that he did teach that those were *not true gods* which the city worshiped, and in the room thereof introduced *other new gods*."* What is this, but saying in other words, that he was condemned for rejecting the old traditional gods for the new philosophic ones; among whom the monadic *θεός* is to be included?

If *θεός*, when standing absolutely in Homer and Hesiod designates God (properly); and not some particular god, either Ζεύς or some other, to be inferred from the context, how can we account for the facts mentioned above, and for a thousand others that might readily be mentioned?

* Cudworth's Intellectual System, Vol. I. page 190.

The truth is, we are prone to read old writers with our modern eyes. Polytheism seems infinitely foolish to us; and it is inconceivable, in this age of philosophy, and among Christian men, how any could rest content without clear and definite views of the *first cause of all things*; hence, if the ancients talk only of material, physical causes, and keep silence about a self-existent mind, many are impelled by their kindness to give them credit for knowing all about such an intelligent first cause, and suggest that they only forgot to mention it in their cosmogonies. Others again, if they meet with the word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ standing absolutely (in any old writer, as Homer), and can not readily infer from the context *what* god is meant, immediately jump to the conclusion that it is used *proprie*. They do not stay to inquire whether any such Being, as Him whom we call God (*proprie*), *was known and worshiped in the Homeric age* (without which fact being established it seems over hasty to conclude that the writer had this Being in his mind, when he wrote the word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ in question), but decide at once that this being is designated, because, by $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ standing absolutely, Greek writers of a *later age* unquestionably did mean the intelligent First Cause.

To jump thus to conclusions without examining the premises can serve no purpose but to deceive ourselves. If we wish to ascertain whether the Greek word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ is used in Homer as the name of a being who is truly and properly God, we must inquire whether he and the Greeks of his age knew such a being, and called Him by this name; and not content ourselves with merely finding a few instances in which this word stands absolutely, and thereupon refer it at once to such a Being, without taking the pains to inquire whether Homer knew any such Being or not, before we determine that he wrote about Him. From the Greek theogonies, from all their early writings, and from the gradual manner in which the idea of a monadic $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ grew clearer among the philosophers: from the reception this view met with from the common people, and from the fact that it never was popular among *them* even down to the time that Paul preached at Athens; I am satisfied that it was not a *native traditional* doctrine in Greece, and that the word $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ was in use among them, as the name of a class of invisible beings superior to men, who were regarded as proper objects of worship, long before Anaxagoras, or some other philosopher, first used it as the name by which to designate "a disposing Mind, the cause of all things." This is the reason that induced me to say in my Essay, that we find the Chinese *shin* where the Greek Philosophers found $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$, designating any one (as shown by the context or some qualifying word) of a class of Beings, who are all regarded as proper

objects of worship. Whether I am correct or not in the opinion that θεός in the Homeric age meant a *god*, and if used κατ' ἀρχαίαν, designated the Homeric Ζεύς, and not the Being who is truly and properly God, still I think that the position for which I contend that the general name of the false gods of a people should be used as the appellative name of such a Being, when He is to be *first* made known to them, can be shown to be correct. That the Chinese are in this position has been already sufficiently shown. We have seen that the Tien 天 of the Shū King, worshiped alternately with T' 地 Earth, in the *kiáu* sacrifice can not be accounted God (*propiè*), and I think it is certain that there has no Anaxagoras yet arisen among the philosophers of China, who has clearly taught an intelligent first cause of the heavens and the earth, or who has pointed out any Being, who is the author of all *other* beings extrinsic to himself.

If my idea, however, is correct, that Homer, Hesiod, and the Greeks of their age, used θεός as the general name of their deities, designating any one of them indifferently by this name, to be determined by the context, or occasionally using it when standing absolutely to designate Ζεύς, the highest Being known to them; then, when the philosophers learned from foreign travel, or from their own reflections, that there was an intelligent First Cause, a *Being* wholly different from Ζεύς, and one who had not been spoken of before; the question must have arisen, by what name He should be called? Anaxagoras called his "Disposing Mind, the cause of all things" Νοός, and from this grew up the monadic θεός of the Greek philosophers.

But whether we may consider this course, viz., that of calling God (*propiè*) by the general name of their objects of worship, when He is to be first made known to a heathen people ignorant of Him, to be sustained by the analogous action of the Greek philosophers or not; it can, I think, be clearly shown by independent reasoning to be the correct course to be pursued under such circumstances. Because men fail to discover a "FIRST CAUSE," to which they ascribe spirituality, free-will, intelligence, omnipotence, &c., we must not conclude that they have had no thoughts on the subject of Deity. "No one," says Morrell, "will affirm that the earlier ages of the world were destitute of any searchings after God. So far from that, everything in the mythological period was wondrously gilded with the divine. The only thing to be noticed is that men in those ages conversed mainly with nature; that they formed their conceptions of the *numina divina* without much reflection, and chiefly from nature; and that the argument from this source resulted more frequently than not.

in *polytheism*. Can we say that the process was illogical? I think not. Confine our view to nature only with its endless variations, and what is there unnatural in admitting the whole hierarchy of Olympus? Nay, history and present experience prove, that under such circumstances, the polytheistic hypothesis is by far the most acceptable to the human understanding. Even on this ground, however, the chief share in the argument is derived from the mind or the consciousness. The irresistible belief we have of causation is a primary law of our consciousness, and the first attempt we make to hypostatize the cause of the universe around us, is the transference of our own forms of intelligence, and our own personality, into the conception of that vast architect, or hierarchy of architects, by whom the world was constructed. The theistic argument then, in which the appeal to nature is the prominent feature, ends, at best in the idea of a *Διμουρπος*.*

Men thus working out for themselves polytheistic systems everywhere; we find false gods in possession of the field, and in teaching them monotheism, it is as in teaching men to become good—we meet them in a state the opposite of that to which we desire to lead them; as in the one case we must say, “Cease to do evil, learn to do well,” so in the other, the burden of our preaching must be, “Put away your *false gods*; learn to love, honor, and adore Jehovah, the *true God*.” To enforce this exhortation, it seems plain to me, Jehovah must be called by the same name as the false gods who are to be put away. He is *the truth* of the *very thing* of which they are the *falsehood*; and we shall succeed most easily in conveying to polytheists a general correct idea of Him, by representing Him as taking the place of *all* their gods, rather than that of any particular one, however exalted that one may be. We must teach that He can afford them protection, succor, &c.—yea, and ten thousand times more than all their gods put together were ever supposed to afford; that He is the alone God, there is no place left for any other: hence, we give Him the *common name of all*, and write over our system mono-theism.

While this general name is the best word by which to teach a people who have hitherto been ignorant of Him, a knowledge of the true God, the use of this word is absolutely *necessary* to forbid the false worship in which they have *previously* indulged. The great sin with which a missionary must charge a polytheistic people, the sin which, when God pours out his Spirit, and carries home the preached word to the hearts of his heathen hearers, they will feel more deeply than all others, is that of having worshiped false gods to the dishonoring

* Morrell's History of Modern Philosophy, page 738.

of the true God. With this sin we must, here in China, charge our hearers; but what conviction of sin could be expected to be produced from a sermon or tract charging the Chinese with the worship of false *Alohos* or false *Θεοι*? Would not their answer be, that so far from having sinned in this particular, they had never so much as heard there were any such beings or things in the universe?

If we maintained that the Chinese had never had this *subject* up before their minds so as to have predicated anything either right or wrong about it, then it would be consistent to contend that we must either transfer a foreign word, or invent a new Chinese character to represent this perfectly new *subject*: but if we admit that the Chinese have worshiped false gods, then we admit that they actually *have* had the *subject* up before their minds, though under a false aspect, and we must inquire by what name they themselves have called *this subject*: for we may rest assured we can best teach them the truth with respect to *this subject*, by predicating said truth of the *Chinese name* thereof.

We must teach them what their errors with respect to this *subject* are; so that, being properly instructed, they shall understand that the Being designated is *one*, not many as they have incorrectly supposed; that He is self-existent from eternity, the Creator of all beings and things, &c. Now, to point out *their past errors*, to convict them of *their past sins* with respect to this *subject*, and to warn them against the false gods they have been in the habit of worshipping, of what avail will the use of either of the foreign words, *Aloho* or *Θεοι* be? They have never written or spoken of any *Alohos* or *Θεοι*; they have never worshiped them; it would be a mere waste of breath to preach against false *Alohos* or false *Θεοι*.

I need not however detain the reader any longer to prove that the generic name of *god*, if such exists in the language of a polytheistic people, should be used to render *Elohim*, if such can be found, for Dr. Medhurst and his friends expressly contend for this, and differ from us only in denying that the Chinese have such a word in their language. Dr. Legge insists upon the use of a native appellative in opposition to any transferred term, differing from us only in contending that this appellative must be a relative, and not an absolute term. The points on which we differ from Dr. Legge have been sufficiently discussed: let us now inquire if the Chinese have any generic or absolute appellative name for *god* in their language.

As in the case of the word *God* when used *proprie*, we inquired what is the difference between a being who is truly and properly God and a mere spirit, so here we shall inquire what is the *characteristic*

difference between a spirit and a god. I shall pursue this method as the shortest course leading to the most direct issue. The *shin* worshipped by the Chinese are admitted to be spirits; gods are spirits; so far we are agreed: the point on which we differ is, are they mere spirits, or are they, in addition to being spiritual beings, regarded by the Chinese as something more—as gods? To state the matter logically, we are agreed as to the genus—*spirit*; but differ as to the species—*god*. We must therefore inquire, what is the differentia or characteristic of the species, for the genus, plus the differentia, gives us the species. In my Essay, I contended that the best mark and distinguishing indication of the differentia or characteristic was, “supposed to be a proper object of religious worship.” If this be the true characteristic, as it is admitted that the *shin* are spirits, I have only to show that the Chinese regard them as proper objects of worship, to prove that the Chinese *shin* are gods, and not mere spirits.

I may illustrate the propriety of pursuing this method of proof, viz., Inquiring what is the characteristic difference between a god and a spirit, by taking an analogous case.

If asked the meaning of the word *man*, I should answer, It is the name of a class of beings.—*Qu.* What kind of beings, spiritual or what? *Ans.* A class of animals.—*Qu.* What kind of animal? *Ans.* Rational.—Here then, in the words *animal* and *rational*, we have reached the characteristics of this class of beings.

If we were contending whether a word in a foreign language should be rendered “*man*” or “*animal*,” the point to which inquiry should be directed would be, Are the animals in question rational or not? It would be beside the mark to inquire whether the word, in the foreign language, corresponded etymologically with *Adam* (red),—*anthropos* (to turn the eyes to heaven)—*homo* (*qui ex humo*, earth-derived)—or *man* (etymology not known); for the derivation of this word differs in each language above quoted; nor does that of either afford us the slightest hint that our tests would be for genus *animal*, or for species *rational*. To state our parallel: If asked the meaning of the word *God*, I should answer, That this word is used for purposes so distinct that we must divide its meaning into two classes, viz. propriè and impropiè, and then we shall be prepared to answer in conformity to our case above stated. If asked then, What is the meaning of the word *God* when used propriè, I answer: It is the name of a spiritual being.—*Qu.* What kind of spiritual being? *Ans.* Self-existent, Almighty, &c., &c.—If, in the next place, asked the meaning of the word *god* when used impropiè, *Ans.* The name of a class of spirit-

ual beings.—*Qu.* What kind of spiritual beings? *Ans.* Spiritual beings, other than the true God, who (whether self-existent or dependent) are considered by men proper objects of worship.

Here, as in the case of the word *man*, we fix upon our characteristics from our knowledge of the two classes we are comparing: the etymology of the word for *God*, like that of the word for *man*, in different languages varying so much, and being so uncertain in Hebrew, Greek, and English, that we can derive no help from thence.

The illustration afforded by the word *man* makes plain the propriety of our calling for the characteristic test between gods and spirits, that our controversy may not degenerate into a mere war of words. Unhappily, on the point before us, we are not so agreed as we should be, with respect to the test to be employed to ascertain whether a given animal was a man or not.

In his "Reply to Dr. Boone," page 10, Dr. Medhurst says, "We would suggest a different definition, viz., The name of the being, or class of beings, to whom the Chinese ascribe the highest attributes."

"For the following reasons: A god is a Being possessed of divine attributes. Worship is not necessary to his being or his nature; he may never be worshiped, and yet be God.

"The genus of gods (supposing such a genus to exist) is the class of beings possessed of divine attributes."

"The generic name for *God* is the name of the class of beings supposed to possess divine attributes."

"The attributes possessed by a divine Being are in many respects the same in kind with the attributes possessed by other intelligent beings, only differing in degree. Thus intelligent beings in general possess some power, wisdom, goodness, &c., but a divine Being or beings must be conceived to possess these attributes in the highest perfection."

"There are some attributes, however, which are peculiar to a divine Being or beings, such as the originating and governing of all things."

"Religious worship is the ascribing honor to a being or beings possessed of divine attributes; the qualities or the station of the being or beings must first be allowed, before worship can be paid. Hence the possession of attributes is the primary, and the offering of worship the secondary idea of God."

I am glad to observe that Dr. M. would make attributes—essential attributes, "power, wisdom, goodness, &c.,"—not relationships, the tests of divinity. From his saying, "A divine being or beings must

be conceived to possess these attributes in the highest perfection;" and that "those peculiar to a divine being or beings are the *originating and governing of all things*," he must have had the word: *God* (as understood by us proprie) before his mind when he wrote this; for he surely could not contend that all the Greek *Θεοι*, for instance, had "power, wisdom and goodness in the highest perfection," or that they all had something to do with the "*originating and governing of all things*." Accordingly, on reflection, Dr. M. gave up this view, and adopted that of Cudworth, Mosheim, and others, which was presented by me, and in this he was joined by Messrs. Stronach and Mike, and his other friends, who signed the letter of the 30th January; for they therein maintain (see p. 11) that we must have a generic term, "which, while it is capable of being used for the highest Being of whom they have any conception, includes all worshiped beings, and goes no further." This is also apparent from the definition which they give of the transferred word *Alolo*, in a subsequent part of this letter; viz., "the name of whatever men sacrifice to and worship."

Dr. Legge contends that I make "God" and "worshiped being" interchangeable terms, and styles this "A blunder, of which the best that can be said is that it is a very bad use of the second kind of metonymy which puts the effect for the cause. The Supreme Being is not God because He is worshiped, but He is worshiped because He is God." Dr. Legge's view here is precisely that quoted from Dr. Medhurst's Reply, "the *qualities or the station of the being or beings must be first allowed before worship can be paid*." Dr. L. seems to have fallen into a strange confusion of mind in the part of his argument quoted above.

In my Essay, I made the fact of being worshiped a test to ascertain whether a given being is regarded as a god or a mere spirit; this is very different from saying that "God" and "worshiped being" are interchangeable terms. With respect to our proposing "religious worship" as the characteristic test by which to distinguish a god from a mere spirit, if Drs. Medhurst and Legge are correct in their theory of worship, there can be no doubt of it. Dr. M. says, "Religious worship is the ascribing honor to a being or beings *possessed of divine attributes*." If then we find a man worshipping any being, may we not use the fact of his offering worship to this being; to infer that said being is "*possessed (in his estimation at least) of divine attributes*?" And if, as Dr. M. says, "*the qualities or the station of the being must be first allowed, before worship can be paid*," must we not, where the worship is paid, infer the existence (in the brain of the votary, if no

where else) of the *qualities* or *station* so allowed, in the being worshiped?

Or, let us take Dr. L.'s illustration. "The Supreme Being is not God because he is worshiped, but he is worshiped because he is God." Now then substitute "a being," for "the Supreme Being," and "a god" for "God," and what Dr. L. says, will prove the propriety of using the test I propose. Remember, our object is not to prove that a being who is worshiped *is* a god (for I am firmly persuaded there is only one God in the universe), but that he is a god in the eye of his worshipers; and then, with Dr. L.'s statement changed as above suggested, the matter will stand thus: "A being is not a god because he is worshiped, but he is worshiped because he is (*i. e.* in the mind of his worshiper) a god." May we not then take the fact that a being is worshiped to prove that in the opinion of his votaries he is a god? Instead of putting the effect for the cause, is not this, *according to the theory of worship of both Drs. M. and L.*, from the effect inferring the cause?

To this explanation of my meaning, Dr. L. thus replies in his Letters at p. 34:—"From this, and similar passages, and the general strain of his Essay, I supposed, when I published my Argument, that he understood *God* as meaning *object of worship*. I could not otherwise make out any connection in his reasoning. I have been given to understand, however, that his reasoning is not that *God* means object of worship, or that *Shin* means object of worship, but that the *Shin* being worshiped, are to be regarded AS the Gods of China, and that therefore *Shin* is the generic name for *God*; and God, a God, and Gods, ought to be translated by *Shin*. If it be granted to him that the *Shin* are to be regarded AS the Gods of China, I do not see the bridge from that to the conclusion that *Shin* is to be translated God, or that *Elohim* and *Θεός* are to be rendered by *Shin*. We may regard *rice* AS the oatmeal of China, but if I were to translate a treatise upon oatmeal *into* Chinese, I should write to little purpose if I spoke all through of *fan*. If the first sentence were, "Oatmeal is a farinaceous food, much used in certain countries," the Chinese could not possibly understand me of anything but *rice*. Unless *Shin* and *God* have the same meaning, Dr. Boone's reasoning is too trifling to be examined at length."

To judge whether my reasoning be too trifling or not to deserve an examination, the Reader should observe what the question at issue between Dr. Medhurst, Dr. Legge and myself is. Dr. Legge, says *shin* does not mean what *Elohim* and *Θεός* mean. They are correctly rep-

dered in English by *God*, and *Shin* by *spirit*. We can no more translate *Elohim* and *Θεός* into Chinese by *Shin*, than we could translate them into English by *spirit*." This is Dr. L.'s assertion. Mine is, that, though *Shin* does not answer to *Elohim* and *Θεός* when these words are used *proprie* (having never been used as the name of a self-existent, almighty, spiritual Being), still it does answer to these words when used *improprie*, and should therefore be rendered into English, not a spirit, spirits, but a god, gods. The question is, How the Chinese regard the class of beings they call *Shin*; what are they to them—gods or mere spirits? Dr. Legge says they regard them as a class of mere spirits; I say, as a class of gods. Hereupon I propose as a test the characteristic difference between gods and mere spirits, given by such men as Cudworth, Mosheim, and Waterland. I show that, according to Dr. Medhurst's theory of worship, and that advanced by Dr. Legge himself in the very context in which he charges me with "blundering," and putting "the effect for the cause," &c., that this test is CHARACTERISTIC; that worship does imply the belief on the part of the worshiper of "divine attributes" in the Being worshiped; and Dr. L. instead of pointing out my "blunder," and showing how I had put the effect for the cause, contents himself with saying, "Dr. Boone's reasoning is too trifling to be examined at length."*

* The difference between Dr. Legge and myself here, arises from the different view we take of the word *God*. He argues as if this word were a simple, in-complex term, the symbol of an idea, and demands a word in Chinese that conveys *this idea*. I, on the contrary, regarding the word *God* as a complex term, the absolute name of a Being (when used *proprie*), and of a class of beings (when used *improprie* by polytheists), fancy, that instead of looking for the name of *this idea*, what we want is, *just the name* of said Being or beings as the case may be; so that if a word in any foreign language is proposed as corresponding to this word, I ask, is the *being* of whom this foreign word is the name, the same as the *Being* of whom our English word *God* is the name; if so then, the foreign word answers to, or *means* (if you like) the same thing as our English word *God* means when used *proprie*: If the question be with respect to the word *god*, as used *improprie* by polytheists, when it is the name, not of one Being merely, but a name common to a class of beings; then I ask, does the class of beings of whom this foreign word is the name, answer to the class of beings called by us, a god, gods. It is of no importance *how* any people came to give the name in question to the Supreme Being, or to the class of beings of whom we are speaking, the only question of practical importance is, Is this word in said language the absolute name of the self-existent first cause, the all-wise author of all things on the one hand; or on the other, the absolute name of the class of beings of whom we are speaking?

There is one additional point to which I would advert in this note; the peculiarity of the beings of whom we are speaking; they are mere imaginary beings, and not like Dr. Legge's oatmeal and rice. They have no existence except in the minds of their blinded votaries; hence it is that we must look into the mind of their worshipers, and not to anything in *rerum natura* to find our mark or test of the differentia between them and mere spirits. The differentia between spirits and gods consists no doubt in the one having "divine attributes" as Dr. Medhurst says, while the others have not. But where are we to look for the

In his Letters, at p. 21, Dr. L. says, "We worship because of the *qualities* we apprehend in the *object* of our adoration. These fill us with awe, and of that awe, worship is the fitting expression." That this is the correct theory of worship will perhaps be denied by none. Dr. South, in his Sermon on "Natural Religion," says, "The ground and reason of *all worship* is an opinion of power and will in the person worshiped to answer and supply our desires; which he can not possibly do unless he first apprehend them." And this, I conceive, to be the reason at once why worship is the best test by which to distinguish between a god and a mere spirit; and why it is emphatically that "glory" which God will not give to another. To suppose that an invisible being can "apprehend," attend to, and answer the prayers of all his votaries in all parts of the world, is investing him with attributes of infinity, such as omnipresence, omniscience, &c., &c.; and when you add to this, what the Chinese predicate of their *Shin*, and what seems to be implied in all religious worship, such a knowledge of the thoughts and purposes of the human heart that the object worshiped can not be imposed upon by an insincere worshiper; we perceive that the act of worship implies a belief of the existence of many attributes in the object worshiped, which can belong properly to the true God only, and which it is robbing him of "his glory" to ascribe to any other being.

Let us, for instance, take the case of the *Tsúi Shin*, 財神, god of Wealth, who, though not of high rank, is yet perhaps more worshiped than any other *shin* in China. This *shin*, we may suppose, is often called on at the same moment by many thousands, who are separated

proofs that the *shin* possess these attributes? I answer, To the acts of their worshippers, that we may learn how they regard them, as it is only in their minds that they have any existence at all. The proof to be made of the differentia in this case is similar to that in the case of murder, in remarking on which Dr. Whately observes "that the *differentia* which constitutes the species, and the mark by which the species are known (in some cases) are not the same: *e. g.* Murder the differentia of which is, that it be committed 'with malice of forethought'; this can not be directly ascertained; and therefore we *distinguish* murder from any other homicide by circumstances of preparation, &c., which are not in reality the differentia, but indications of the differentia, *i. e.* the grounds for concluding that the malice did exist." So in this case; while we admit the differentia to be "divine attributes," if Dr. Medhurst pleases, we propose "religious worship" as the "mark," the circumstance which serves as an "indication of the differentia," "the ground for our concluding" that "the divine attributes" are possessed by this imaginary being, as he stands complete in the mind of his worshiper, the only place where he has any existence. We have never proposed religious worship as the only mark of distinction between a Being who is truly and properly God and a mere spirit. To make out a being to be God *proprie*, we propose to Dr. Legge to show that he is a self-existent spirit, the author of all other spirits, and of everything extrinsic to himself.

hundreds of miles apart. The knowledge of human hearts he must be supposed to have to attend to, and appreciate all these prayers, and the control he must have of all sublunary affairs to enable him to cause matters to work together for the wealth of all who worship him, must be most absolute, and imply power little short of infinite. Now it would appear that this dependence upon any beings without the compass of civil intercourse; this calling upon them for help, this belief in their ability to hear and answer our prayers; is that which constitutes the violation of the First Commandment, and which makes the beings so regarded *gods* in the eye of this commandment and throughout the Scriptures; and it is this same point that Cudworth, Mosheim, and Waterland regard as the distinctive characteristic of the gods of pagan Greece and Rome.

If we are not to contend about mere words, we must agree upon some test by which the claim of *Shàngti* to be considered the true God, and of *shin* to be the general name of the Chinese gods may be tried respectively. I have proposed tests for trying the claims of both, not framed by myself to suit my own purposes in this controversy, but quoted from the works of the most learned men that have written on these subjects. If Drs. Medhurst and Legge do not agree to these tests, let them be set aside by argument, and let something *definite* be proposed in their place. Let them furnish a definition of the word *God*, when used proprie, that shall commend itself to the judgment of those who are interested in this controversy, and then show that the Chinese *T'ien* is truly and properly God, according to this definition; or, let them give us a definition of the word *god*, *gods*, that will not cut off the Greek and Roman gods as well as the Elohim of the Old Testament, and I will engage to stand to it. If any other attribute than that of *being supposed a proper object of worship* is necessary to constitute a god in the eyes of polytheists, and they will mention it, I think I may venture to promise that we will prove the *Shin* have this or these attributes also. But to convince us that worship is the *characteristic* mark of a god, we need only look at the 30,000 gods of the Greeks and Romans, and to the Elohim of the Old Testament, and endeavor to find anything else that is common to them all. Therefore we say, that if we wish to distinguish between mere spirits and gods, the test is worship; the worshiped spirit is a god, and this applies even to inanimate things, to wooden images—a worshiped image is a god, *e. g.* Is. xlv. 17, "And the residue thereof he maketh a god, even his graven image; he felleth down unto it and worshipeth it, and saith, *Deliver me, for thou art my god.*"

To prove that the *shin* are the gods of the Chinese, we show that the class of beings so called have been worshiped from the earliest annals of the Empire to the present time; that the highest being known to them, viz., *T'ien* heaven, and *Ti* earth (worshiped at the solstices in the highest sacrifice, called *kiáu*); the beings who preside over the five elements (the immediate producers of all things, styled the Five Rulers); those who preside over the land and grain; the governor of the seas; the dispenser of wealth; the bestower of longevity; the tutelary guardian of their cities; the patrons of every kind of their handicraftsmen; in short, every invisible being, who is invoked by them in times of either joy or sorrow, is included in and worshiped under this general name *Shin*.

We show that in explaining the phrase *Shángti*, the title of their chief deity, they make him neither more nor less than the chief of their *shin*. "*Shángti*, the Supreme Ruler, is the *Shin* of heaven." "*Shángti* is the most honorable of the *shin*." "Expansive Heaven, the Supreme Ruler (*Shángti*) is the most honorable of the hundred *shin*," i. e. of all the *shin*. "They used the Yen-sz' to sacrifice to Expansive Heaven, the Supreme Ruler (*Shángti*); this offering did not belong to any other *shin*." The chief of the *shin* is, thus described:— "*The greatest of the celestial Shin* is called Expansive Heaven, the Supreme Ruler (*Shángti*). He (this chief *shin*) is also called the celestial, august, great Ruler; also the GREAT ONE, or Unity, "*Tai yih* 太一" "The Great ONE 太一 is the most honorable of the Shin of heaven." "The Shin of heaven (*t'ien shin* 天神) is most honorable, and (a Being) with whom none can be compared."

We show that from the time of Shun, there has been an officer appointed to superintend the rites and ceremonies used at the worship of this class of beings; that of the ceremonies thus used in the national worship, we are told, "the principal object of these ceremonies is to serve the *shin*;" and that "in regulating their ceremonies, those which were used in the service of the *shin* were considered most important," thereby excluding all idea of the existence of a class of beings who are above this class called *shin*, and who being worshiped with higher ceremonies, are therefore to be considered the gods of the Chinese. In the *Shú King*, we find the phrase "*shin and men*," just as we meet with the phrase "*gods and men*," in the Greek poets.

These facts appear to me amply sufficient to sustain my position that *Shin* is the general name of the Chinese gods—the absolute appellative name for *god* in the Chinese language, and to show that this word answers to the word *θεός* in the Homeric and Hesiodic poems.

While they deny none of these facts, Drs. Medhurst and Legge maintain that the Chinese *shin* are mere spirits, not gods, and to this point I must devote the remainder of this Defense. Before attempting however, to answer their objections, I would only ask the reader to take away, in his mind, from the Chinese pantheon all the beings mentioned above, who are called *shin*, and *who are worshiped under this name*, and see what place is left for a class of gods after this. And if Drs. M. and L. contend that the beings above mentioned are not gods, but mere spirits, I here call upon them to point out to us who the Chinese gods are; to tell us by whom they are worshiped; what officer is appointed by the state to superintend such worship; by what general name these gods are called, and where—in what classic, their worship is enjoined?

When we insist upon the fact that the *shin* have been worshiped from the earliest times, as proof that they are gods in the eyes of the Chinese; and we contend, that, as Shíngtí, the Wú Tí, and all the objects *worshiped* by the Confucianists, Yuh-hwáng Tái-tí the chief god, and all the objects worshiped by the Taoists, are *worshiped under this name*, therefore the Chinese are polytheists, and *shin* is the general name of their gods: Dr. Medhurst replies, the Chinese are pneumatists not polytheists, because of such worship, as the *Shin* worshiped are spirits, not gods. Here then, unless we can find some characteristic test to decide our dispute, we may wrangle for ever over this point. I propose worship as the test given in the Sacred Scriptures, and by able men who have written on this subject, and have attempted to show the reasonableness of this test, from the theory of worship given by both Drs. Medhurst and Legge.

In answer to this, our opponents point to the Romanists, who worship saints and angels, the Virgin Mary, &c. and say that as they are not polytheists, so the Chinese, though they worship great numbers of *shin*, may not be polytheists either. This objection is worthy of consideration. The worship of any other being than the self-existent God is false worship, is idolatry; but all idolatry is not necessarily polytheism. What makes the distinction? The answer is, the worship of these objects under the same name with God, thus ranking them in the *same class* of beings with him. The Romanists we know, not only never worship any saint or angel, calling them gods, but they make a distinction also (a vain one as I think) between the worship given to God, and to the Virgin and the saints. But the Chinese in the worship of their Shíngtí (who, it is now maintained, is the true God) and their *shin*, make no such distinction. They have no absolute name

of a *higher class of beings* for him; they call him *merely the chief*, the *most honorable of the shin*, and worship, along with him, all their *shin* under this *common name*. When in the *Chau Li*, we read that an officer, "the Tsung Peh," was appointed to worship the national *Shin*, *K'i*, *Kwei*, &c., we find *Shingti* the first enumerated *shin* on the list of those sacrificed to. When, in the same work we read of the Great Chaplain, we find that the duty of this officer was to superintend the offering up of the six forms of prayer to the *shin* (the celestial gods), *k'i* (the terrestrial gods), and the *kwei* (the man-derived—the manes). Of these six forms of prayer generally, thus offered to these beings, the commentators say, they "were used at the *kiau* when they sacrificed to Heaven (*Shangti*) and Earth, and to the gods (*shin*) of the land and grain, and at the sacrifices offered in the ancestral temple." Of the second prayer, the "*nien chuk*," that it "was used to pray to *Shingti* and the gods (*shin*) of the land and grain for the bestowal of grain." So it is everywhere; *Shangti* is *worshipped as a shin*, there is no special officer appointed for his worship; he is *merely honored as the chief of the Shin*. Now suppose that the Romanists were to worship Jehovah and the Virgin Mary, the Apostles and angels, all under *one common name*; would they not be polytheists? When we find Hau-tien *Shangti*, the chief object of worship among the Confucianists, and Yuh-hwang *Shangti*, the chief object of worship among the Taoists (which are the two native indigenous religions of China) both called *shin*, and *worshipped as shin*; and that all the other beings worshipped in the national rites, or by the Taoists, are called *shin*, and *worshipped as shin*; we contend that if Hau-tien *Shangti* is a god, and Yuh-hwang *Shangti* is a god, then, if the Chinese have any gods at all, and any name by which they call them, these gods are their *Shin*; and that this word *Shin* is the appellative name of these gods.

But, says Dr. Medhurst, *Shangti* we admit is a spiritual being, and *shin* in these cases means spirit. Let us test this by a parallel case, and see if the word *spirit* could maintain its meaning if used as *shin* is. "There are six celestial spirits. Jehovah, who is worshipped in the temple on Mount Zion, is the first." "Jehovah is the spirit of heaven." "Jehovah is the most honorable of all the spirits." "The greatest of the spirits of heaven is called Jehovah." "The Spirit of heaven is most honorable, and (a Being) with whom none can be compared." "There is not a spirit we have not honored. But Michael is not able, and Jehovah does not come down to our relief." Would not this way of speaking either bring down Jehovah God—the Supreme Being—

to the rank of spirits, or carry up the spirits so spoken of, to the rank of Jehovah, and if He be God, make them Gods too?

Again, let us suppose that we learned from the Sacred Scriptures, that Jehovah had been worshiped under the name of, and as a spirit; that throughout the whole ritual directing the worship conducted on Mount Zion, He was regarded as a spirit; that we should observe, that, according to this ritual, "the principal object of the ceremonies (there used) was to serve the spirits," and that among all the ceremonies employed, "those that were used in the service of the spirits were considered most important; that the officers appointed were "to sacrifice to, and offer up prayers to the spirits," and that there was not any passage in the whole ritual which spoke of any priest appointed to sacrifice to or worship Him under the name of, or as, God; should we not think that the words *God* and *Spirit* had changed places?

Now this is the case in China. *Shin* is the highest *absolute appellative noun* in the language; there is no class of beings higher than this class; Shángtí, the Supreme Ruler, the highest being spoken of in the Classics, is merely the *chief one* of this class. No officers were ever appointed to worship any class of beings called *tí*, rulers. Shángtí, the Supreme Ruler, was worshiped, but, as we have seen, as a *shin*, the Ruler of the *other shin*, and not as a being of a distinct class, or species from the *shin* over whom he ruled, as he must have been, if the Chinese regarded him as a god, and the other *shin* as mere spirits, beings belonging to a *different species*. More than this, we are expressly told, that "if Shángtí were not a *shin* (observe he might still be a *tí*, a ruler; or a *Shángtí*, a Supreme Ruler), it would be of no use to pray to him; but if he be a *shin*, he can not be deceived." Here Shángtí's being a proper object of *worship* is ascribed to the fact of his being a *shin*, (not to his being *tí*, or *Shángtí*), and it is in consequence of his being a *shin*, that he knows the thoughts and purposes of the human heart, so that he can not be deceived by an insincere worshiper. If *shin* means nothing more than spirit, and Shángtí is the highest being known to the Chinese, deriving as he does his right to *worship* and his *heart-discerning intelligence* from his being a *shin* (the word which denotes his *nature*, and not from his being Shángtí, the Supreme Ruler over the other *shin*,—his *official title*), then it seems clear that the Chinese can not know of any higher being, or class of beings, than spirits, and it is of no use to seek for any word in their language meaning a god, gods, not to mention for an instant, a word answering to our word God.

From these considerations it is quite conclusive to my mind that the Chinese, because of the worship of their *shin* are to be accounted polytheists, and not polypneumatists.

But the Chinese are acquainted not only with the objects worshiped in their two indigenous religions, viz. Confucianism and Táuism; they have encountered men of other religions, and in their books have given us an account of the objects worshiped by these foreigners. By what Chinese name then do the Confucianists and Táuists call the beings whom these foreigners call gods?

The answer to this question will assist us much in determining what is the appellative name for *God* in Chinese. For instance, if it is maintained that Heaven and Earth, and the beings who preside over the land and grain, over wealth, fire, &c., when worshiped under the common name *shin*, are all worshiped as mere spirits and not gods; there can be no doubt of the light in which Budha is regarded; no one would think of calling him a mere spirit. What then do the Confucianists call him?

In the historical work called Káng Kien Í Chí 綱鑑易知, or Mirror of History, when describing the introduction of Buddhism into China, the author says, "The king heard that in the West 有神其名曰佛, there was a god (*shin*) whose name was Budha." The historian quoted in Káng-hí's Dictionary under the character Fuh 佛, tells a story of the Emperor Ming 明 of the Hán dynasty (A.D. 50), seeing in a dream a golden man flying about his palace. The next morning, upon inquiring the meaning of it he was told by one of his courtiers that it related to Budha. His words were 天竺國有佛即神也, "In India there is Budha, that is a god (*shin*)."¹ In the Commentary on the Sacred Edict, he is repeatedly called "*Shin Fuh* 神佛, the god Budha." The word *shin* in all these instances must be rendered *god* and not *spirit*; if then when speaking of a foreign object of worship, who is confessedly not a mere spirit but a god, they call him *shin*, why should not we suppose that when they call their native objects of worship, Heaven, Earth, &c., &c., *shin*, they mean to rank them as *gods* also, and not as mere spirits?

We have also accounts of other foreign religions besides that of the Buddhists. In a work on geography recently published by Sii Sung-lung, the lieutenant-governor of Fuhkien province, the author speaks much of the religions of the people he describes. Speaking of the Persians and Indians, he says, "In the high antiquity, in Persia and India, all served the god of Fire (*Hu Shin* 火神). Those who served the

god of Fire worshiped the rising sun; or lighting faggots, they worshiped towards them: For the people considered that if there was no fire wherewith to cook, they could not live; and that if there was no bright sun, then in the universe there could be nothing seen. Therefore the foreigners of these two countries, from a high antiquity, had this custom. The idea arose from a desire to recompense the root (i.e. to acknowledge itself god, the sun, as a source of blessing): It was not a (shin) depraved god, a being who afflicted them with curses; but a benignant being who sent them blessings. Now the Sun is the one being worshiped by the Parsees. Do they regard this being as a mere spirit? Could this author have supposed they regarded it as a mere spirit? Speaking of the ruin of Ormuz, our author says, "There is an old temple there, where the sun, the god of Fire (Ho Shin) was honored." The Africans, he tells us, "worship trees, birds, and beasts as gods (shin), and whoever kills an enemy offers him in sacrifice to them." The people of Guinea worship birds and beasts as gods (shin). When telling of Hannibal's swearing eternal enmity to the Romans, he says that he swore before 入必德爾 *Jib-pih-tih-ah*, Jupiter, and in a note calls him "so fung shing tsu chi-shia 所奉宗祖之神; the god (shin) whom the ancestors worshiped." Thus we see that the word *shin* is used by this writer just as we would use the word *god* in English. No one would say the Parsees worshiped "the Son, the spirit of fire," that Jupiter was a spirit; that trees, birds, beasts, &c., were worshiped as spirits.

But there are nations with whose worship we are yet more familiar, whose religion is spoken of by the writers. In the 84th Section, 87th page of his work, he speaks of the object worshiped by the Jews and by all the European nations. By what name does he call this Being? His account is as follows: "In Eobshin (Palestine) &c. in Judea and in the countries to the west of it (Europe) all serve the God (Shin) of heaven. His worship of the God (Shin) of heaven commended with Moses in the time of Wuh-tung (B.C. 1720) in the beginning of the Shung dynasty. He (Moses) pretends that the God (Shin) of heaven descended upon Mount Sinai in Arabia, and delivered the Ten Commandments for the instruction of men. The observance of the seventh day as a Sabbath commenced from this time, which is distant from the birth of Jesus one thousand and several hundred years. The (shien-tzu-kiun) religion of the Lord of Heaven (the Romish) sprung from this; it is not the Romish religion." Of the character of the Being worshiped by the Jews and Europeans, we can have no question; and I think there can be no doubt

that this author knew that He who gave the law at Mount Sinai, and who is the alone object of worship of the Jews, the Romanists, and of all Europeans, was no mere spirit; and yet he calls Him all through this section the *Shin* of heaven. In other parts he calls Jesus, when spoken of as an object of worship, by this name *Shin*: e. g. the 6th Section, at the 39th page:—"Those who enter the religion of Jesus, do not sacrifice to any other god (*Shin*) 不祀別神, they do not make offerings to their ancestors, but regard Jesus as the Savior of the world." Also Section 2, p. 7, 不祀先祖, 所奉之神, 惟吐氏而已, "they do not sacrifice to ancestors but *Luh-shi* (Logos!); that is, Jesus is the only god (*Shin*) they serve."

These quotations from the work of the lieutenant-governor of Fuhkien, who is admitted to be a very accomplished writer, are of importance, not only to prove that the word *Shin* is, in some cases at any rate, used in the sense of god and not spirit; they are also very important to rebut some assertions of Dr. Medhurst contained in his recent publications.

In the Letter to the Protestant Missionaries at the Five Ports, signed by himself and five others, he asserts that the use of *shin* to render θεός in the N. T. would render "the whole work unclassical and contemptible," "provoke the ridicule of every well informed Chinese;" that "it would spoil the work for any efficiency to others;" "produce monstrous difficulties for us to struggle against," "involve an absurdity;" and above all, "throw obstacles in the way of the reception of the truth on the part of the Chinese."

That, under all the circumstances of the case, Dr. M. and his friends, to carry a particular point should have had recourse to such rhetoric as that above quoted, is very much to be regretted. Dr. Medhurst has been for thirty years a student of the Chinese language; he is known to be an excellent scholar, and he might justly expect that his opinions on any matter respecting the Chinese would have great weight, not only in Europe and America; but also with his missionary brethren in China, especially those recently arrived. This should have bound him to particular carefulness in the statements of the facts of this great case which he put forth to the public, and to the exercise of much caution in the expression of his opinions. Instead of this, his statements concerning the facts of the case have been so contradictory (no notice being given to the reader of these contradictions), and many of the opinions expressed by him are so manifestly the result of irritation, not of calm judgment, that we must warn him not to be surprised if, in China at least, and among his missionary brethren

whose knowledge of the language of the country enables them to inquire for themselves of "well-informed Chinese," what is their opinion of the use of *Shin*, if his statements and opinions cease to have any weight at all.

On Dr. Medhurst's 'contradictory' statements with respect to the meaning and character of some of the most important words about which controversy exists, I have already commented, and shall have still further occasion to comment; so that I shall say nothing more on that subject at present. But I will here mention some of the circumstances connected with the Letter of the 30th Jan., which tend, in my mind, to deprive the opinions therein expressed in the intemperate language above quoted, of all weight.

On the 17th of January, Dr. Medhurst, Mr. Stronach and Mr. Milne urged Dr. Bridgman and myself to consent to a compromise of our difficulties, in order to procure an immediate edition of parts of the N. T. The compromise proposed by them was that we should consent to their having 5,000 copies with the word Θεός rendered by *Ti*, on which condition they would consent to our having 5,000 copies with Θεός rendered by *Shin*. This compromise we rejected: this was on the 17th of January, 1850.

These facts are important, as the sequel will show, to enable the reader to estimate, at their true worth, the opinions of Dr. M. and of Messrs. S. and M. above quoted. On the 17th of January, they surely could not have supposed that the use of *Shin* to translate Θεός would render God's holy word "contemptible," and "throw obstacles in the way of the reception of the truth on the part of the Chinese," or, they could not have consented to a compromise with such a term; and if they learned, at so late a stage of our controversy, all these sad things about *Shin*, only after they became provoked with us for rejecting their proffered compromise, i.e. between the 17th and 30th of January, the judicious reader will readily understand how much, opinions taken up under such circumstances, and expressed in such language, should weigh with him.

If the opinions concerning *Shin* above quoted are correct, no missionary, as he reverences God's holy word, should have anything to do with it as the rendering of Θεός; and if every "well-informed Chinese" is to be supposed capable of appreciating the "ridicule" its use must cause, all those who have used this term for God are to be esteemed shamefully culpable for not exercising even the commonest care in a matter of such extreme importance. I am far from desiring that the cause of *Shin* should stand upon the shoulders of any men; if it is not

sustained by truth and right reason, let it fall, and the sooner the better; but I am unwilling that all who have used it should be accounted guilty of rendering God's holy word "contemptible." It is well known, that Drs. Morrison, Milne, and Marshman used this word *Shin*, as the rendering of *Elohim* and *Qes* in their versions of the SS.; and one would have supposed that this fact would have restrained all of the six signers from speaking in such language of the use of *Shin* for God in the Scriptures. But in the case of Dr. Medhurst, in addition to his respect for the dead and the living who have used this word, we should have supposed that some regard for his own past course would have prevented his asserting, so broadly and unqualifiedly, that such a use of *Shin* would render God's holy word contemptible.

I have before me a copy of a work of his on the Ten Commandments. The First reads thus:—"Shin spake all these words, saying, I am the Divine Lord (*Shin*, *Chai* 神主), thy *Shin*," &c. The object of the First Commandment is thus stated, 論曰拜一神: "Teaches that we should only worship one *Shin*." Had Dr. Medhurst never met with a well-informed Chinese, when he wrote this work, whose opinion he might have asked, and so prevented himself from rendering that important part of God's holy word, "contemptible," which I am sure the object of his work was to commend to the reverence and obedience of the Chinese? In the *Sin-tsa King*, Dr. M. uses the word *Shin* for God throughout. Such sentences as the following occur: 神爲靈 God (*Shin*) is a Spirit (*Lang*); 萬民乎頌讚神 O, all ye people, praise *Shin*; 神造人 *Shin* (God) made man; 神之子 God's (*Shin*) Son, &c., &c. This work has been distributed by members of the mission who signed this Letter, since the passages quoted from it were published. How can Dr. Medhurst and the other signers of this Letter account for their conduct in thus distributing this book; if they really believe that the use of *Shin* for God renders a work "contemptible," and that the calling God by this name will "provoke the ridicule of every well-informed Chinese?"

And if they were not so fully persuaded of this as to allow it to influence their own conduct, how could they publish such opinions to influence the conduct of others?

When I read this letter, I could not but ask myself, Do these six signers really suppose that Drs. Morrison, Milne and Marshman, never met with any well-informed Chinese; or, meeting with them, never put themselves to the trouble to inquire what they thought of the use of *Shin* to render the word God? Do they really mean to assert that the result of the many years of hard labor of these zealous

men was to make God's holy book "contemptible" in the eyes of the Chinese, and to bring upon themselves and their work the ridicule of this heathen nation? Are Dr. Medhurst and those who signed this paper with him, the only missionaries now in China who are favored with the intercourse of well-informed Chinese? Dr. Medhurst, from his whole course seems determined either to destroy *Shin*, or his own reputation for accuracy. *Shin*, I am persuaded, is beyond his reach. I will not dwell longer on this unpleasant subject; but we surely could not have more direct proof that *Shin* may be used for God, without giving offense to "well-informed Chinese," than that furnished in the quotations above given from the geographical work, unless the intelligence of this high dignitary is to be impeached.

There is another consideration which proves conclusively to my mind that the *shin* are, in the estimation of the Chinese, gods, not spirits. It is that they call their idols by this name. The Chinese are like the Athenians, "wholly given to idolatry." To their idols they have built thousands of temples: every street, every house, even their boats, are full of them; so that Dr. Medhurst, in his work on this country, tells us, "that it was more easy to find a god than a man in China." These idols, whether done in stone or wood, or drawn on paper, are called by the people *shin*. Of this fact anyone, who can speak the language, may satisfy himself by going into their temples and inquiring of the bystanders where the *Shin* thereof, e. g. of Fire,

"My object, in quoting from this writer is not to produce the impression upon the mind of the reader, that according to his opinion the words *Elohim* and *Osos* should, in our translation of the S. S., be rendered by *Shin*; of Tien *Shin* 天神 for I suppose the writer has never thought of the subject; but only to know that he does not hesitate to call the Being who gave the Law on Mount Sinai, the *Shin* of Heaven, and so call our blessed Savior, "the only *Shin* worshiped by Christians." This author calls the Being worshiped by Christians, *Tien* 天, *Shang Tien* 上天, *Shang Ti* 上帝, *Tien* 天, *Chü Ti* 主, *Tien Shin* 天神 and *Shin* 神. Thus his authority may be quoted for rendering this word, when used properly, by any of these phrases; but it should be observed he does not call the Sun worshiped by the Parsees, the trees, beasts, and birds worshiped by the people of Africa, or the Jupiter of the Greeks *Tien* or *Shangti*, but *Shin*. If then we would choose a word that can be employed to render *Elohim* and *Osos*, both when used properly and impropriely, and will be guided by this author, we must use *Shin* for it was a *Shin*, who gave the law at Mount Sinai; it is Jesus who is the alone *Shin* worshiped by Christians; and the objects worshiped by Greeks, Parsees, and Africans are *Shin* and not *Shangti*.—For an interesting account of some old temples that were built in the Xth century to the God of Heaven, see Appendix B.

Wealth, &c., is. Dr. Bettelheim gives us the following letter from an officer of Lewchwé about the gods of a temple in that country :—

"I yesterday received your letter. You went to see the *Hu-kwoh* (Country-protecting) monastery, and found it in all respects commodious and suitable for a residence. You do not speak now of removing to another lodging, but you request us to remove the gods (*shin*) of the temple, and place them outside of it. But the abbot of this monastery has told me, in relation to removing these gods (*shin*), that on his previous humble application you permitted them to remain as heretofore. Now this temple is the *place of prayer for the whole country*, and consequently of the *utmost importance*. In case you should remain long in it, there would be much inconvenience. I beg you to wait till another day, when I will choose a place and let you know that you can move. I send this short note, respectfully hoping you are happy; this is all I have to say. Hiang Yung-páu, treasurer of Chungsháh fú. May 8th, 1846. An important communication." See *Chinese Repository*, Jan. 1850, page 31.

I have before me now a chart of all the *shin*, (*tsung shin* 總神). In the seat of highest eminence I see the representation of a venerable old man with a crown on his head; directly over him are written the two characters *Shangti* 上帝; it is the chief god of the Tâuists; there are *shin* of all ranks and sizes around him; Confucius, too, is there; the *Wu-ti* 五帝 Five Rulers are there also; every one of these *shin* is represented as a corporeal being, has a human figure; and yet Dr. Medhurst now tells us the Chinese *shin* are not gods, but mere spirits. What! you ask: That old man who sits at the head of them all—this stone or wooden thing—do the Chinese really think it a spirit, an incorporeal, immaterial being? To this, Dr. M. replies: "The phrase, 'wooden gods' may occur, but it is evident it is used by metonymy for the wooden *images* of gods; and it would be quite as appropriate to speak of the *wooden images* of spirits, or of saints, as of gods." The propriety of such a figure of speech will depend upon the character of the gods of whom these wooden statues are said to be *images*. A spirit is, if we understand the word aright, *ex vi termini*, an immaterial, incorporeal being. A material image of such a being is very different from that of a god, who may be supposed to be a being compounded of spirit and body. The Apostle says in Romans I., "Their foolish hearts were darkened; they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds," &c., i.e. they lost the sense of God's pure spirituality, and conceived of him as resembling men, birds, beasts, &c. The Greeks we know made images of their *deoi*, and all polytheists we believe have done the same: but these makers of images we fancy

have never regarded their gods as purely spiritual,—incorporeal, immaterial beings. Spiritual beings they were, but not uncompounded; they had bodies as well as spirits, so that there was no absurdity in their making corporeal images of them. If the Greeks esteemed their gods as pure spirits, how could Demetrius have any controversy with Paul for asserting that “They be no gods that are made with hands.” The gods of Homer are certainly corporeal beings—not mere immaterial spirits. They ride in chariots, fight in armor, and are wounded in conflict with mortal men; *A. g.* when Minerva mounted the car as the charioteer of Diomed,

“The groaning axle bent beneath the load,
So great a Hero, and so great a God.”
Diomed and Mars fight: the poet thus describes their encounter:—

“Now, rushing fierce, in equal arms appear,
The daring Greek, the dreadful god of War,
Full at the chief, above his courser’s head,
From Mars’s arm th’ enormous weapon fled:
Pallas opposed her hand, and caused to glance
Far from the car, the strong immortal lance;
Then threw the force of Tides warlike son;
The javelin hissed; the goddess urged it on;
Where the broad cincture girt his armor round,
It pierced the God; his groin received the wound.
Mars bellows with the pain, &c.”

To speak of the images of such gods as these appears natural and appropriate; but I can not see what propriety there would be in persons making “wooden images of spirits,”—of incorporeal, immaterial beings. Until therefore Dr. M. brings us an instance of some people making stone or wooden images, and worshiping them under the name of *spirits*, we must conclude from the fact that the Chinese make images of their *shin* and worship them, that they do regard them as gods; and that, because of this worship, they are to be accounted polytheists, and not poly pneumatists.

In answer to all that we have urged above to show that *shin* is the absolute, appellative name of the Chinese gods, instances are produced in which the word can not be rendered *god*; where, for instance, the human spirit—that of a living man—is called *shin*; and as the word in this case can not be rendered a *god*, the inference is drawn that it can not in any instance have this meaning. Dr. L. says, “If it

* According to the views of the American Missionary, Homer here seems to use the word θεός very unclassically; but if the Iliad is to be put aside, what Greek book shall we consider entitled to rank among the Greek classics?

really mean *god* in any case, then it always means *god*." But words are not so bound down to a single meaning as Dr. L. would here have us to suppose; and in this particular case, the absurdity of supposing that different Chinese writers, or even the same Chinese writer, may have used the same word for both *god* and *spirit*, is not manifest to my mind. I know that Drs. Morrison, Milne, Medhurst, Gutzlaff, and a number of other very intelligent Christian men have used *shin* in the sense of *God*, *a god*, *gods*, and of *spirit* also; and if such men as these have fallen into the error of using the same word for *God* and *spirit*, it is surely too much to suppose it an absurdity to fancy that Chinese writers may have used the word *shin* in the sense of *a god*, *gods*, and in that of *spirit* also. I readily admit that to render *shin god*, in the cases adduced by Dr. L., "I felt my heart and god (*shin*) blown about;" and "As I write, my god (*shin*) gallops away to you &c.;" would be very absurd; for there can be no doubt that by *shin* 心 神 in the first sentence, and *shin* 神 in the last, the writer means his own mind.

But on the contrary, I contend that the absurdity is equally great to suppose the writers quoted above use the word *shin* in this sense, when they call the Being who gave the Law on Mount Sinai a *Shin*; when they call Jesus the only *Shin* worshiped by Christians; or Buddha, the *Shin Fuh*; or say trees, birds, and beasts were worshiped as *shin*. When both classes of facts are considered, the conclusion to my mind is inevitable, that the Chinese use this word *shin* where we would use *god* and also *spirit*. I contend, however, that when used in the place of the latter word, they do not attach the same meaning to the word *shin* that we do to the word *spirit*. With us, the word *spirit* means a created, incorporeal, intelligent being: the human spirit we regard as such a being. The Chinese, I fancy, do not call the human spirit *shin* from conceiving of it in this way; but on the contrary, from regarding it as a part of the eternally existing *Shin* that belonged to the primordial substance of which heaven, earth, man, and all things were made. The human *shin*, therefore, is only a portion of the universally diffused divinity. But I shall endeavor to set forth the Chinese views of this matter more fully after I have noticed Dr. Medhurst's answer to the conclusion drawn from the premises stated in my Essay, viz., "That the class of beings called *shin*, being the highest class worshiped by the Chinese, must be regarded as the gods of China, and *shin* as the generic name for *god* in the Chinese language." "In reply to this," Dr. M. says (Reply to Dr. Boone, p. 40.), "we may observe that we have abundantly proved *shin* to be the general

name for spirits in the Chinese language, including a larger range of beings than what are usually termed *gods* in any country, while it is never used, for, *God*, par excellence, by any Chinese writer." This reply only brings out the necessity, above insisted on, of some *characteristic test* by which to distinguish between gods and spirits. To say the *shin* include "a larger range of beings than what are usually termed gods," is so vague that we can determine nothing from it, as the Chinese may have used the appellative name for *god* in their language to include a larger range of beings than any other people have ever done.

With respect to the next point, on which Dr. M. evidently lays the greatest stress, that as *shin* is never used for *God* par excellence, therefore it can not be the generic name for *god* in Chinese, it appears to me a complete *non sequitur*. It is in effect contending that, because an appellative noun has never been used to designate by way of eminence a certain one of the class of which it is the general name, *ergo*, it can not be the generic name of that class. The questions, I contend, are perfectly distinct. Is *shin* the generic or absolute appellative name of the Chinese gods? And, has this word ever been used to designate by way of eminence the chief one of the class: the highest being they have ever conceived of? It can serve no purpose but to entangle the argument to merge these questions into one.

We say the class called *gods* is the highest class of beings acknowledged by polytheists, therefore the word *god* is the highest absolute appellative noun in the language of said polytheists: in accordance with this we show that *shin* is the highest absolute appellative noun in the Chinese language; in other words, it is the absolute name of the highest class of beings known to the Chinese, and we conclude that this word must either be the name of their gods, or that they have no gods. We show that *Shàngtǐ* is merely the chief one of this class; that he is worshiped as one of this class, and that it is said it would be no use to worship him if he did not belong to this class; but, because it has not pleased the Chinese to use the general name of this class when standing absolutely to designate the highest being they know, but choose to call him either by his proper name 天 *T'ien*, Heaven, or by his title *Shàngtǐ* 上帝 the Supreme Ruler, or the Ruler on high, Dr. M. contends that *shin* can not be the generic name for *god* in Chinese. As well might he contend that the word *jün* 人 is not the name of the genus *homo* in Chinese, because the chief one of this genus, he who has most power, to whom the most honor and reverence is shown, and whom all the other individuals of

this genus in China obey, is never called "the man" par excellence, but is distinguished either by his proper name, or by some title.*

To upset the conclusion that *shin* is the absolute appellative name for *god* in Chinese, it should be shown who the Chinese gods are; that they are a higher class of beings than the *shin*, and what their absolute appellative name is; this last word being found, the claim of *shin* would be set aside at once. Dr. Medhurst wrote his Inquiry to prove that *tí* 帝 was this word, the "generic for God in Chinese." This ground, however, he abandoned in his letter of the 30th January, 1850, and it has since been most peremptorily overruled by Dr. Legge, who says, "The question 'what is the generic term for god in Chinese' is futile, as there is no such word in any language. It (*tí*) means Ruler." According to Dr. Legge, *god* is a relative term; he goes therefore in quest of an appellative relative, and finds all he wants in *Shángtí*; this, however, can not content Dr. M., who must have a generic term, and who all through his writings has regarded the word *god* as an absolute appellative. Having fallen out with *shin*, and being obliged to abandon *tí* as this absolute appellative, there was no resource left him but to fly to a foreign language for aid. According to his principles, and that of those who signed with him the letter of the 30th January, that we must have a generic term, he should I think, have returned to *shin*, and adhered to this term, until some higher absolute appellative noun in the language was produced, or he became convinced that the Chinese have no gods at all; for the fact that *shin* is never used when standing absolutely to designate the chief Chinese god, can not prove that it is not the general name of all their gods. If the fact could be *proved*, which it is the object of this argument to *imply*, that because *Shángtí*, the chief god, is never designated by *shin* when this word stands absolutely, he therefore belongs to a higher class of beings than the class called *shin*; i. e. that he is something more as to his *nature* than the chief *one* of this class, then indeed there would be great weight in the argument. Dr. M.'s Inquiry was written to make out this point, as I said, not only for *Sháng-*

* The argument of Dr. M., that, because *shin* is never used for God par excellence, it can not therefore be the generic name for *god* in Chinese, is based upon the assumption that the word for *god* in every language must first be used *proprie*, and then afterwards *improprie*, but I think I have sufficiently shown that this is bare assumption. The first use of the appellative name for *god*, when standing absolutely, to designate a disposing mind, the author of all things, may be long subsequent to the use of this word as the general name of the gods of a people, as we have shown above in the instance of Anaxagoras, who is said first to have used the Greek word Θεός in this way.

ti, but for the other shin who are styled ti, rulers; but it is now admitted that ti is a relative term "that does not indicate nature," and the whole argument of the Inquiry of course goes for nothing. Dr. Legge asserts it as his opinion that "there are to the minds of the Chinese people three orders of intelligent existences—men, shin or spirits, and Shángtí." If Dr. Legge had proved this instead of merely asserting it; if he had shown that the authors quoted by me in my Essay, who assert "That Shángtí is the Shin of Heaven;" "the greatest of the celestial Shin;" "the most honorable of the hundred Shin," &c., &c., were mistaken, and had degraded him by such a classification; and, above all, that he was never *worshiped among this class*, and under the *name of shin*; it would have had more weight than such a naked assertion, without any attempt at proof; for I can not consider the assertion that "Shángtí is the Lord and Governor of the other two," as affording the slightest *proof* that the *nature* of Shángtí is higher than that of the shin he governs. If this be admitted as proof of superiority of *nature*, then I am sure, quite as good an argument can be constructed to prove that the Emperor, who is styled *Huángtí* 皇帝 August Ruler, is of a higher nature than the men over whom he rules.

That *shin* has never been used, when standing absolutely, to designate the highest being known to the Chinese, has been, I believe, the greatest hindrance to its universal adoption as the rendering of *Elohim* and *Θεός* by the Protestant missionaries now in China. Under all the circumstances of the case however, I fancy, that this word is better adapted to our purpose, which is, to teach this people the knowledge of the true God, not having been thus applied, than it would have been, if by previous Chinese usage, it had designated, when standing absolutely, their highest being, their chief god *T'ien*. This *T'ien* not being like the monadic *Θεός* of the Greeks *αγνός*; not being the maker of the heavens and the earth; not a self-existent, independent being, who can be regarded as truly and properly God; had the word *Shin*, when standing absolutely, designated this being, we should have had to unteach them this meaning of the word, and to have taught them to understand by it when so used, not their *T'ien*, but Jehovah, the self-existent, the living and true God. Instead of an assistance, such a use of the word *καὶ ἔξοχον* would have been a hindrance to us. Being the absolute appellative name of *god* in Chinese, we should have been obliged to use this word; and its having already been employed, when standing absolutely to designate a false god, we should have had the double work, first to unteach, and next

to teach. If therefore seems to me that, as among all the Chinese gods there is not one who is self-existent, not one who is truly and properly God, we may rejoice that the general name of their gods was never used to designate any one of them as *Shin* 神 *shin*; this use of the term, when put absolutely to designate a definite individual being, being reserved by God's providence, for his own servants to introduce, as the absolute appellative name of Himself, who alone can claim to be the God by way of eminence, the alone God.

Shin never having been used to designate any definite individual, the indefiniteness of this term has been felt by many as a great difficulty in the way of its use to render *Elohim*. That the word is thus indefinite there can be no doubt, and that our being obliged to use so indefinite a word to render *Elohim* is a matter much to be regretted, is clear; but this is not so much an objection against *shin*, as against the whole Chinese language, and is, if the Chinese really know no being who is truly and properly God, just what we might have expected; for without a clear apprehension, that among the beings called by the one general name, answering to that of God among us, (to use the words of Dr. Barrow quoted above p. 98) there was one, who himself uncreated and self-existent, was the author of all the rest, and of all things beside, we could not expect that this general name would have been used to designate any one 神 *shin*, for such a use has a monotheistic force about it, and gives an absolute eminence to this one, which nothing but his being the cause of all the others would, we may suppose, suggest, or seem to justify.

In the Confucian classics their chief god *T'ien* is never so conceived of; he is never supposed to have made 地 *chi* earth, or any of the *t'ien* 天神 *shin* celestial gods. He is, as we have so often said above, merely the chief of his class, and is therefore more appropriately distinguished from the other *shin* by a title of office or dignity, than he would be by a 神 *shin* use of the general name of the class (*shin*), just as in the case of the chief among the men in China, who is in like manner distinguished from his fellowmen by a title of office or dignity, and not by the 神 *shin* use of the word *jin* 人 *man*: the only difference being, that whereas Yau or Shun is simply *Ti Yau*, the Emperor Yau, or *Ti Shun*, the Emperor Shun, and their remarks are introduced by the phrase *Ti yueh* 帝曰 the Emperor said; *T'ien* is called *Shangti*, the Ruler or Emperor on high, and he is so impersonal a being in their conceptions, that I do not remember a single sentence in which the phrase "*Shangti yueh* 上帝曰, the Ruler on high says," occurs.

If we compare the Chinese views on the subject of deity with the views which Dr. Barrow has given as first, those which have "been a constant opinion in all places and times;" and secondly, those which have been "the general sense of the most ancient, most wise, and most noble nations among men," we shall find that the Chinese agree in every particular with the first class, but have never attained to the second. *E. g.* they have believed, to use Dr. Barrow's words, "that in the world, there are beings imperceptible to our senses; much superior to us in knowledge and power, that can perform works above and contrary to the course of nature, and who concern themselves sometimes to do so for the interest of mankind; for these qualifications and performances deserve extraordinary respect from us;" and they have to this sort of beings given one general name (*shin*) "as hath been in all languages assigned, answering to that of *god* among us." But they have never gone on to the second class described by Barrow; they never believed that "of such beings there is *one*, supreme and most excellent, incomparably surpassing in all those attributes of wisdom, and power, and goodness, from whom *the rest* and *all things beside*, have derived their beings; do depend upon, are sustained and governed by; the author of *all being*, and dispenser of *all good*, to whom consequently supreme love, reverence, and obedience, is due;" and in consequence of this they have not, as "the wisest and noblest nations among men have done," appropriated "this general name" (*God* or *Shin*) "in a peculiar and eminent manner to *this one*, so that when the word is absolutely put, without any adjunct of limitation or diminution, he only is meant and understood." This is the plain fact of the case, the Chinese have not used the absolute appellative name of their gods, as Barrow says the noblest nations of men have done; the reason I have supposed is, that their highest being wanted the essential characteristics (self-existence and omni-causality, as Oudworth calls them) of the highest being of these noblest nations.

But however it may be accounted for, the fact is undoubtedly so, and the question is, What are we, under the actual circumstances of the case, to do? How are we to teach the Chinese the knowledge of such a being; and to lead them on even beyond this, to monotheism. I answer, follow the example of these noblest nations; use "the general name of this sort of beings, without any adjunct of limitation or diminution; when absolutely put," to designate, not their highest being, but ours—to designate *Jehovah*, the true *Shin*. By this course we shall teach an unmistakable monotheism; the general name of their gods is challenged as proper to *Jehovah* alone; the other *shin* are all

pushed out of existence, they are made to be no *shin*—nonentities. A new distinction is introduced as existing between the members of the class comprehended under this common name, in place of the old polytheistic one of higher and lower, ruler and ruled—a distinction of true and false—a distinction founded on nature, according to the words of the Apostle in Gal. iv. 8., “Then when ye knew not God, ye did service unto them which by *nature* are no gods.”

Dr. Legge proposes to effect this object by the use of a title of dignity or office, by the use of the phrase *Shángti*, the Supreme Ruler. But with this phrase, I am persuaded, he will never teach the Chinese a real monotheism. He may teach a Divine Monarchy, but this, so far from being monotheism, implies, in all the polytheistic systems with which we are acquainted, a plurality—a large class of gods, as the subjects of this Divine Monarch.

The affirmation that “there is only one *Shángti*,” will never teach monotheism. The assertion “that there is only one Supreme Ruler,” does not push the gods now worshiped by the Chinese out of existence; it does not introduce the scriptural distinction of true God, or no God at all, but only continues the old polytheistic distinction of supreme and inferior, recognized here in China from the days of Yáu and Shun to the present time, and which *ex vi termini*, instead of negating, implies the existence of the inferior equally with that of the superior. No title of office or dignity will answer, no word limited “by adjunct” or adjective can be used to declare that there is in reality only one of the species spoken of; and therefore it is, that we must use the absolute appellative name of the gods of a polytheistic people to render *Elohim* and *Θεός* into their language. The fact that *shin* has never been used *shên* 神 to designate their *T’ien*, should not induce us to lay this word aside for the name of a dignity or office, but only be remembered by us as indicating how much we have to teach this poor, benighted nation.

That people have fallen into errors on any given subject is no reason why we should not call this subject by the same name they do, when our object is to correct these errors.

There are two uses of the word *Shin* that have weighed very much against its employment as the rendering of *Elohim* and *Θεός*: I refer to the fact that the manes of the dead, and the human soul have been called by this name. When the circumstances that led to these uses are duly considered, it does not appear to me that either use is a valid objection to the employment of this word to render *Θεός*. I shall consider them separately.

And first that the calling the manes of ancestors in common with all the other objects worshiped, *shin*, is no argument to prove that the word when so used does not mean *god*, we think will appear from the following considerations:—1st. That the *distinctive* name of the manes of ancestors is *kwei*, not *shin*. 2d. That *shin* is the distinctive name of the objects of worship who reside in heaven (the Olympian deities). 3d. That, when not restricted to this, its appropriate meaning, it is then used as the general name of all the objects worshiped in the state religion. This appears from the explanation of the uses of this word quoted in my Essay, p. 17:—"If we speak of them (i. e. the objects worshiped in the national rites) separately, the *t'ien shin*, celestial gods, are alone called *shin*; but if we speak of them collectively, then the *kwei*, human manes, and the *k'i*, terrestrial gods, are both called *Shin*." That is, *Shin*, when thus used, is the general name of all the objects worshiped in the national rites. 4th. That the manes of a deceased ancestor, when regarded as an object of religious worship, should be ranked in the same class with the Chinese Olympian deities, so far as this is done, by their all being called by the same appellative name, *shin*, should not surprise us, when we remember the hero-gods of Greece and the "*Dii lares et penates*" of the Romans. That heroism was the idol of ancient Greece accounts to us for the fact that Hercules, after death, was ranked among the *deoi*. If we remember that the whole ethical system of the Chinese turns, not on the duty of obedience to *T'ien* 天, to *Ti* 地, or to any other god, but on filial piety; with this fact on our minds, we shall have as little cause to wonder at the Chinese deification of a deceased ancestor, as at the Greek deification of a hero; find as little cause of surprise in the fact that *Hau-tshih* (the ancestor) is classed with *Shángti*, among the *Shin* sacrificed to on the occasion of the great drought referred to on p. 30 of my Essay, as that the Greeks called *Zeus*, the father of gods and men, and Hercules (the hero), each a *θεος*. 5th. *Elohim* being a name common alike to the true and to false gods, one of the most important uses of this word in the Sacred Scriptures is to forbid polytheism. It is indeed by its appellative character, and the consequent use that can be made of this word to forbid polytheism, that it is chiefly distinguished from the word "*Jehovah*;" and this is a point of the utmost importance for us to keep in mind, while discussing the rendering of this word into the language of a polytheistic people. Now it is an unquestionable fact that the false worship to which the Chinese are most addicted, and to which they are much the most attached, is that of their deceased ancestors. Should we not then rejoice, rather than

otherwise, that the word by which we must render *Elohim* (our great weapon against all false objects of worship), although it specially designates the Olympian gods, yet, by Chinese usage ready to our hand, has had its meaning so extended as to make the blow aimed at objects of false worship equally fatal to deceased ancestors and the terrestrial *K'i*, as to the celestial gods themselves? As the Chinese are so inveterately addicted to the worship of their deceased ancestors, should we not be obliged to extend, by our explanations, the meaning of whatever word we was to render *Elohim* in the First Commandment, so as to include these manes? If this is so, surely it can not be an insuperable objection to the use of *Shin*, that the Chinese have preceded us in so attending its meaning.

The error of extending this name, the distinctive name of the celestial beings worshiped, to the terrestrial and man-derived, was a polytheistic error, one into which the Chinese polytheists naturally fell, for it is of the very nature of polytheism to go on from age to age increasing the number of its gods. The other error, referred to above, that of calling the soul of a living man *Shin*, is of much more recent date I judge, from all I can learn; and has, I think, grown out of the pantheistic system of cosmogony taught in the *Yü King*.

As in the previous instance, so here it is important to remember that the original name of the human soul in Chinese is *huan* 魂, not *shin* 神. I have taken great pains to ascertain if the word *shin* occurs anywhere in the Five Classics, or in the Four Books, as the name of the soul of a living man, and have not been able to find an instance of such a use of the word. The calling the *huan*, the human soul or mind of man *shin*, is said to have been introduced by the medical men. It appears to me to be a mere reversal of the process by which pantheism was conceived.

The Chinese philosophers, in endeavoring to form a scheme of the universe, regarded man as a microcosm, his constitution and nature formed their model. This model they conceived to consist of a body which had *ling* 形 form, and of a *huan* 魂 animus, and a *pek* 魄 anima, which were invisible, and were regarded as the depositaries of human life, intelligence, powers of locomotion, &c., &c. As we have seen above p. 26, when discoursing of their cosmogony, the Confucian system of philosophy assumes the existence of two eternally-existing principles, *li* and *ki*. Of these, the philosophers of this sect affirm that, *li* neither "wills, nor wishes, plans nor makes;" but that " *ki* can collect together, make and do," "can ferment and settle, and generate things." The *ki*, primordial substance, is viewed under the two

aspects of *yin* and *yáng*; i. e. as passive or active. Of the *yin* *k'i*, or primordial substance which has vis. inertile, they say *kwei* 鬼 is the *ling* 靈 spirit; and of the *yáng* *k'i*, or primordial substance which moves, or is active, *shin* 神 is the *ling* 靈 spirit. They also say that the *shin* is the *huan* 魂 soul of the *yáng* active principle; and that the *kwei* is the *peh* 魄 anima of the *yin*, the passive principle. These last explanations of the *shin* and *kwei* throw much light upon the subject, and seem to point very clearly to the source from whence these philosophers borrowed the ideas on which their scheme of cosmogony was founded, viz., the *zoo-psychic being man*. Having thus conceived of a primordial substance possessed of a spirit or soul, and of an anima, like unto the microcosmic man, they fancied they had now an agent suited to the work to be performed; and accordingly, to this compound primordial substance, so informed by *shin* and *kwei*,—this *yin yáng shi k'i* 陰陽之氣, is ascribed the making of the heavens and the earth and all things. E. g., "Heaven and earth are only a thing or creature of the *Yin* and *Yang*; they are what the *yin*-ed and *yang*-ed *k'i* 陰陽之氣 (i. e. the primordial substance of which they predicate *Yin* and *Yang*, passivity and activity) generated of old." (See above, p. 36; also pp. 26—28.) Man's distinction above all other things arises, not from his having an intelligent, moral, accountable, immortal spirit, unlike to that of the beasts which perish, and wholly different from anything possessed by the inanimate beings around him, but from his having been made from the finest parts or particles of this primordial substance. 惟人也得其秀而最靈, "but man, having obtained its most subtle or finest part, is most noble." All things being made from this one compound, primordial substance *k'i*, according to this system, it follows that Heaven, earth and man, and all things, are composed of the finer or grosser parts of this *k'i*, as to the material part of them; and that they also share one common *shin* and one common *kwei*, viz. the *kwei* and *shin* which are inherent parts of the eternally-existing, compound, primordial principle *k'i*. Hence we read, "The spirit of the great one above 太上 is the informing divinity or spirit (*Shin*) of the wide expanse; the spirit of Heaven and Earth is the informing divinity or spirit (*Shin*) of the *Yin* and *Yang*, the active and passive principles of the primordial substance; the spirit of men and beasts is the informing divinity or spirit (*Shin*) of flesh and blood; that in which they are the same is the possession of the same *Shin* divinity or spirit, (共同者神) but, that in which they differ is, (observ-

not *k'i* 氣 substance, but merely) *ling* 形 form." Quoted in the *Pei Wan Yun-fu* under the character *Shin*.

Chú fú-tsz' affirms that "the human heart is the same as the heart of birds and beasts, grass and trees." A commentator on the 16th Sect. of the *Chung Yung* says, "The *kwei* and *shin* of my own person (*wú shin chí kwei shin* 吾身之鬼神) are the *kwei* and *shin* who are the objects of sacrifice (*tai sz' chí kwei shin* 祭祀之鬼神); and the *kwei* and *shin* who are the objects of sacrifice, are the *kwei* and *shin* of the mechanism of nature;" i. e. the *kwei* and *shin* who preside over the mechanism of nature.

Of this *Kwei* and *Shin*, Confucius, in the 16th Sect. of the *Chung Yung* affirms that, though invisible and inaudible, yet "they pervade, or are consubstantiated with (體物) all things, without a single exception. The critical commentator explains the phrase "pervade all things" as follows:—" *tí wuh* 體物 means *tí-hú wuh* 體乎物 consubstantiated with things; but not that the things first existed and afterwards the *kwei* and *shin*; but that the *kwei* and *shin* first existed, and afterwards the things; and after the things had their existence, none of them could be divested of the *kwei* and *shin*. The *kwei* and *shin* are in the midst of things, and constitute (as it were) the bones of things. The *kwei* and *shin* are the hosts, and things are the guests. Between heaven and earth (i. e. in the universe) there only is this one *k'i* (compound, primordial substance); that which enters into every atom and fibre (in the universe) is this *yin*-ed and *yáng*-ed *k'i*; and which envelops heaven and earth as in a net, is this same *yin*-ed and *yáng*-ed *k'i*."

In the Commentary called the *Wáng Tá-chuen*, we have the following explanation:—"The *kwei* and *shin* are without form; therefore if you look at them, you can not see them: they are without sound; therefore, if you listen you can not hear them; but the production of things is never without [the presence of] the *k'i* 氣, the primordial substance; and this *k'i* (the *yáng*-ed *k'i*, or active principle is here meant) is the 盛 fulness of the *shin*, or is pervaded all through with *shin* (i. e. an inherent *ling* 靈 spirit or *huan* 魂 soul). There is nothing [produced] without *peh* 魄; and this *peh* (the *yin*-ed *k'i*, or passive principle is here meant) is the fulness of the *kwei*, or is pervaded all through with *kwei* (i. e. an inherent *ling*, or *peh*), hence man is said to be a congregation of *kwei* and *shin* 鬼神之會."

These *kwei* and *shin* are made the authors of physical and moral effects; and also of the intellectual phenomena of the human mind.

Physical:—"all the *production and changes* of heaven and earth (*i. e.* that take place in the world), such as the flourishing and decaying of the blood and spirits of human life, the blooming and withering of plants and trees, with the *living and dying of all kinds of things*, are never without the *kwei* and *shin*, *i. e.* are invariably to be ascribed to the *kwei* and *shin*." Critical Commentary on 10th Sect. of Chung Yung. Moral:—"They (the *kwei* and *shin*) cause all the men in the Empire with evenly adjusted [minds] and pure clean [hearts], and arrayed in suitable apparel, to offer to them sacrifices." Confucius, Chung Yung, Sect. 16. The "all men," who are the subjects of this moral influence, and whose minds are here said to be influenced by this *kwei* and *shin* to bring their sacrifices, are explained to mean "all men, from the son of Heaven to the common people."

The intellectual phenomena of the human mind are ascribed to *k'i*, the primordial substance, and not to *li* 理, the other eternally-existing first principle. *E. g.* "所謂精神魂魄有知有覺者皆氣之所爲也," that which we call the discerning faculty and the power of consciousness of the animal spirits and of the human mind, are both derived from (*k'i*) the compound primordial substance."

What account do the men who teach this scheme of cosmogony give of the *hwa* 魂 or human soul? Chü fútsz' says, "*hwa* 魂, *k'i chi shin* 魂者氣之神, the human soul is the *shin* of the primordial substance." We have seen above that men, birds, beasts, &c., have the same *shin* with heaven and earth, the *yin* and *yáng*, &c., &c., and that the only difference among them is in form; and that the *kwei* and *shin* of the human body are the same as the *kwei* and *shin* who preside over the mechanism of nature. In their letter of the 30th of January, Dr. Medhurst and his friends urge it as their second objection to *shin* that, "It is applicable as well to the spirit of man, and the *living principle in irrational animals and plants* as it is to the highest being of whom the Chinese have any conception." According to the view of the Chinese pantheists, every pulse that throbs through universal nature is owing to the influence or energy of the *shin*; and this *shin* being inherent in every particle of matter, is expressly declared to be omnipresent, 無往不住. To contend whether this eternally-existing, universal agent, that lies at the foundation of all life, vegetable and animal, and that set the primordial mass in motion, is to be called Spirit or Divinity, would be a mere logomachy, if we could not show that *shin* is used by the Chinese

polytheists, as the name of their gods. By the phrase "a spirit," as I have said above, we understand a created, immaterial intelligent being. The human soul is such a spirit; but the *shin* of Chinese cosmogony is no such being as this: it exists before things, and it is an inherent part of the eternally-existing primordial substance, of which heaven and earth, man and all things, are made, and which therefore, all things share by their very constitution. To show therefore that the Chinese call the human mind *shin*, as well as *huan*, by no means proves this word means merely spirit, and never god or divinity. How the Chinese came to give the names *kwei* and *shin* to these innate vital energies of the primordial substance, we have no account; but we may suppose that they regarded the words *huan*, soul, and *peh* anima, as not sufficiently dignified to serve as the names of this universal soul and anima, and so they borrowed the names of the objects of worship of their polytheistic countrymen, and called them *kwei* and *shin*.*

This opinion is confirmed by the fact that pantheists have always strongly objected to being classed with atheists, and that to prevent this, they have everywhere used the appellative name of the objects of worship of their theistic countrymen, as the name of the spirit, soul, divinity, or whatever you may choose to call it, which pervades their *to wau*. The Greek pantheists all did this: all the German and French idealistic pantheists of the present day do the same, and Spinoza calls his universal substance God. It is only on this principle, I think, that we can account for the assertion quoted above, that the *kwei* and *shin* of the human body are the very same as the *kwei* and *shin* who are worshipped; and that these again are the same as the *kwei* and *shin* who preside over the mechanism of nature; i. e. the *kwei* and *shin* of the pantheistic cosmogonists, had no need to be so, but it is so.

If we compare the views of Deity held by these Chinese cosmogonists with the views of the Greek philosophers, we shall find them very similar to those of the predecessors of Anaxagoras, who believed that the world was *en-hygon*, encased, or animated with a living soul; and who all "confounded the Infinite Mind or Deity with matter, making them one universe." (Anaxagoras, p. 10.)

I will not pursue this subject any farther, but will only say, I am fully persuaded, that all the instances that have been quoted, in which the word *shin* is used for the human mind, or in a sense analogous to

* I am strongly under the impression that I saw this very reason assigned for calling the universal *huan* and *peh*, *shin* and *kwei*, in *Chü fütze's* *Yü Lui* or his *Hsueh-kuan*; but I made no note of it at the time, and can not now lay my hand on the passage.

our worth *spirits*, have grown up out of this partiality of the *yin* and *yáng*; and I can not think, when all the circumstances of the case are considered, that the use of *shin* by these writers as the name of the universal informing spirit, or divinity, wherever found—in heaven, earth, man, birds or beasts, is a good argument against the use of this word to render *Elohim* and *Qesm*. It is a circumstance which rather serves to show that *shin* is the name of the subject on which we wish to set the Chinese right, for all these uses of the word that have grown out of pantheism, are, to my mind, only so many evidences of the groping of the human mind in China after the truth on the great subject of Divinity. The polytheistic uses of the word afford evidences of the same thing; and the fact that both pantheists and polytheists have called the name of their highest agent or deity *shin*, is, I conceive, the highest kind of evidence that *shin* is, in the Chinese language, the general name of the *subject* on which we want to enlighten the Chinese, and is therefore the very word we are in quest of.

Having now considered the principal arguments which have been adduced by the several parties who have discussed this question, still though very inadequately, at a length which I fear has been tedious to the Reader, I shall conclude by taking the fitness of each of the three terms that have been proposed to effect the great object we have in view, which is to remove from the minds of the Chinese all the errors and superstitions on the subject of Deity into which they have fallen, and to build them up in the knowledge and love of the true God. It is very important for us to remember that the subject is not a new one to the Chinese, it has been before their minds and occupied their thoughts for generations; the thousands of temples that have been erected to their objects of worship are monuments of the errors into which they have fallen, and it is upon the ruins of these that the temple of Christian truth must be built.

The first proposition we shall bring to this test is that of rendering the word *Qesm* by the Hebrew word *Eloah*, transferred by the three Chinese characters *A-lo-hé* 阿羅何, and will remain as it stood.

This proposition first claims our attention as embodying the deliberate conclusion to which three of the Commissioners of Delegates have been led after a three years' careful examination of this controverted subject. It challenges our attention, too, from the circumstances under which they adopted this foreign term. According to their published Letter it was after full consultation with "the most intelligent Chinese to whom they had access," that this step was taken. The parties had had a long experience of *Shángtú*, that of many *niángi*

years, and both *Tien-ti* and *ti* had been tried for many months; and that too at a time when all the powers of their minds were given to the consideration of this subject. These circumstances invest the opinion of such men (one of them the oldest Protestant missionary in China), given at such a period of the controversy, with great weight. The terms in which they speak of this transferred word, and the arguments with which they urge its adoption on their fellow-missionaries laboring at the Five Ports, show that all doubts, with respect to the course to be pursued, have been removed from their minds, and that they have attained a situation, which they think warrants them to resort to both intimidation and encouragement in addressing their brethren. Their proposed term is one, "against which no believer in Divine Revelation dare raise his voice." // Speaking of their plan of transferring the Hebrew word, they say, "We cannot go wrong in so doing. It is sanctioned by the Scriptures: we are therefore right in employing it, unmistakably and incontrovertibly right. We free ourselves hereby from all mixing with Chinese superstition." //

"The missionaries who 'have but recently come to the country' are dissuaded from forming an opinion of their own upon the subject, until 'a thorough knowledge of the Chinese classics, and extensive intercourse with the people,' put them in a fit position to do so; *ad interim*, these three Delegates, together with the three friends who join them in their Letter of 30th January, offer the persuasive influence of their own example. // Those who have enjoyed (say they) the most of these advantages (i. e. who have the most thorough knowledge of the Classics, and who have had the most extensive intercourse with the Chinese) are the first to abandon native terms." // I do not think these expressions at all in good taste from any of the parties who signed this letter, and most especially not from those who had but recently come to China, and I have not quoted them for the purpose of exciting the reader's admiration; but to show how determinately the minds of the signers of this Letter are made up to adhere to the course they have adopted. Being "*unmistakably right*" they are resolved to adhere to *Aloho* through evil report and good report, and stand pledged to this term, as firmly as solemn convictions published in strong unhesitating language, can pledge men to any course. // It is however, I believe, now well ascertained that notwithstanding this proposition came before them so highly recommended, and that too in such confident language, there has been no single missionary in China induced to follow the lead of the six signers of this Letter.

The transfer of a word having been suggested both in London and New York, the unanimity with which all the missionaries in China, the six abovementioned excepted, have joined in protesting against this course, will no doubt excite much surprise in Europe and America. The missionaries who propose this transfer are clever men; they have made abundant trial, as I said before, of *Sháng-ti*, *Tien-ti* and *ti*; why then do all the missionaries refuse to follow them? These missionaries are practical men, who are guided by sound common sense in conducting their work, and these six signers, disgusted with the "Chinese superstition" mixed up with the native terms they had been using, forgot to take counsel of a friend so plain and unpretending, when they sat down to write their Letter. The case seems to be a plain one to those who are familiar with the facts as we see them here in China; and who are willing to be guided by common sense. Demetrius complained of St. Paul, "That not alone at Ephesus, but almost throughout all Asia, he had persuaded and turned away much people, saying that they be no Gods, which are made with hands," &c. &c. Can we suppose that such an effect would have followed from the Apostle's preaching, if St. Paul had contented himself with telling the Ephesians that the Alohos made with hands were false Alohos? If in preaching against the false gods worshiped by the Ephesians, St. Paul had used the word *Aloha* instead of *God*, and Demetrius and his friends had seen the people standing aloof from their *God*, on this account, they would, as a matter of course, have denied that the *God* they made were Alohos, or that the Apostle was preaching against them; if St. Paul in answer to this denial asserted that *they were* Alohos, then it would have been surely pertinent to ask, Why in speaking to Greeks, he did not call them by their Greek name *Goi*? Now here in China it is notorious that there are a multitude of beings who are worshiped by the whole nation, from the Emperor down to the meanest peasant. To these beings they have built thousands of temples, and like the Greeks have made images of them that are met with at every corner of their streets. No one will deny that in the Chinese language there is a name common to all these objects. We ask then, Why, in the name of common sense, should the Christian teacher, when preaching in Chinese against these objects, lay aside their common Chinese name, and call them Alohos? Will this word effect more in his mouth in China, than Aloho would have done from the lips of St. Paul at Ephesus?

be. If however the adoption of this proposition is urged on the ground that the Chinese have no word answering to the word *God*, which used properly answers, the transfer of the appellative name of *God* does not do away with; but only removes the difficulty one step. Who is this *Shin*? the Chinese must immediately ask: Is he a man, or a shin, or a *Fu* (Buddha); or to what class of beings does he belong? If you answer, He is the only true and living *Shin*; or that he is the *Shangti* who has been for thousands of years worshiped in the national rites; of what use is the clumsy intervention of this foreign word? These two considerations seem to settle the claims of *Aloho*: it offers us no advantages for teaching the Chinese the knowledge of the true *God*; and it is wholly useless in attacking their polytheism. Nevertheless, when this word was proposed by Dr. Medhurst and Messrs. Stronach and Milne, Dr. Bridgman and I immediately withdrew all opposition to their obtaining funds from the Bible Societies to make the experiment; which they are now so confident is the true solution of all our difficulties. We did this that we might put an end, if possible, to our sad controversy, and leave the case to a fair experiment of this new expedient. We felt constrained, however, at the time, we communicated to the Bible Society the fact of our withdrawal of all opposition to Dr. M. and his friends having funds to print our common version with the transferred term; to suggest our firm conviction that it would never do any good, and that it would be ultimately abandoned. Our opinions remain unchanged. The determination of the great majority of the Missionaries not to accept of a transferred term is already put beyond all doubt; and Dr. Medhurst and Messrs. Stronach and Milne, and the three other signers of the Letter of January, to judge from their letter, are just as determined that they will use their "unpardonably, incontrovertibly right" term *Aloho*. Their language leaves us no room to hope they will ever abandon this term; and it is nothing more than due to these three Delegates to say that theirs has been the chief labor of making this version of the N. T. and it would seem therefore right that they should have funds to print it in a form in which they can use it; unless principle forbid; or it can be shown that the allowing them to do so would injure the *Shin* or *gauts*. I am far from pleading their cause against the great majority of their brother Missionaries who are opposed to a transferred term; but I am satisfied principle does not forbid the patronizing of two non-antagonistic terms; and under all the circumstances of the case, I should hope that less evil would result from following this course than any other.

The second term we shall bring to our proposed test is *Shángtí*. This term comes forward under the disadvantage of having been abandoned, not only by the three members of the Committee of Delegates abovementioned, but also by the majority of the missionaries who were in the habit of using it previous to the commencement of this controversy. To compensate for this disadvantage, it has gained the able advocacy of Dr. Legge.

Dr. L. is as resolute in favor of *Shángtí* as Dr. M. and his friends are in favor of *Aloho*. Before he reached his present position, he tells us he was led to see "that God was not a generic, but a relative term." That which induced others to abandon *Shángtí*, viz., its not being the generic term for God in the Chinese language, has attracted him. *Shángtí*, he confesses is not the absolute appellative name for God in Chinese, and he urges its claims on the ground that it is a mere relative term, and therefore answers to the word *God*, which is also a mere relative term. Let us then inquire how the use of this compound, relative term will answer in teaching the monotheism of the Bible, and in combating the Chinese polytheism. Dr. Legge asserts "There is only one *Sháng Tí*, Supreme Ruler;" but we may safely say, There is no monotheism taught in this assertion. It is an assertion that might have been made in Greece and Rome, without endangering the existence of a single one of their thirty thousand gods, as it would have only asserted the supremacy of *Zeus* and *Jupiter* respectively.

This phrase is compounded of an adjective and an appellative noun, and therefore will not convey the idea that the being so called is wholly *qui generis*; but will, on the contrary, only affirm that he is the supreme one, or greatest of the species called by this common appellative, and thus it will not exclude the existence of the others of the species implied by the use of the appellative noun, but only the existence of two "supreme ones" of said species. Now the monotheism taught in the Bible is, that there is but one God; i. e. there is absolutely (if I may so speak) but one of this species: the assertion, therefore, that "There is but one supreme Ruler" will never answer to convey this meaning. It will not prevent the Chinese from recognizing the existence of any number of other *tí*; for it only declares that there is but one "supreme *tí*," and on the subject of their gods, it says not a word.

This phrase *shángtí* labors under the double disadvantage of not answering to the word *god*, whether understood propriè or impropriè; for the being called by the Chinese *Shángtí*, differs in essential characteristics, from the being we Christians call God; on the other

hand, it is not the appellative name of the Chinese gods, and can not, therefore, be used as the word *Elohim* in the O. T. is, to forbid the reigning polytheism.

But apart from the objections to the phrase *Shángtí*, on the score of its past uses, it is a most unsuitable phrase to be chosen as the basis for making, by our *usus loquendi*, a word in all respects like to our word *God*. Being a compound phrase, the qualifying force of its adjective will resist its conversion into a simple word like the word *God*; being a relative term, it is unfit for many of the uses to which Christians apply the word *God*—e. g. to speak of His eternal, necessary existence, &c. Implying office merely, and not nature, it is wholly unsuitable to express the doctrine of the Trinity, or that of the *divine nature* of our blessed Savior. And lastly, we insist upon the fact that *Sháng-tí* is the distinctive title of a definite Chinese god; and this god is a false god. Dr. Legge may affirm that "the *Sháng-tí* of the Chinese people is God over all, blessed for ever;" but unless he proves that this *Shángtí* existed from eternity, and that he made the heavens and the earth, we must on the contrary declare with the prophet that "the gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens:" also with the Psalmist, that "All the *Elohim* of the nations are *elem* (vanities, nothings), but Jehovah made the heavens:" and, as it is clear that *Shángtí* is one of the *Elohim* of the Chinese, we must insist he is here called by the Psalmist an *elem*, unless Dr. Legge proves he is the very Being who made the heavens. We can not, we dare not, use *Shángtí*. We can not exhort men to worship him, and we shall only encounter the ridicule of the people, if we call their (*shin*) gods, *kiá shángtí*, i. e. false supreme rulers.

The third term to be brought to our proposed test is *Shin*. This word being the absolute appellative name of all the Chinese gods, and also the name by which the Chinese pantheists call the life-giving principle that pervades their *lo xav*, brings up the whole subject on which we desire to enlighten the Chinese; all we want therefore is to teach them the true and proper ideas they should connect with this word *Shin*.

To prove that this term will be efficient in condemning the Chinese polytheism, we need only say that all the missionaries, who have attacked this many-headed hydra in China, have used this term for that purpose. On this point, therefore, we need not dwell, but will proceed at once to test the suitableness of the word *Shin* for teaching the Chinese the monotheism of the Bible, and we shall endeavor to do this

by showing how we can, using *Shin*, remove from the minds of the various errorists we here meet with, the errors into which they have fallen on the subject of Divinity.

Let us first take the Polytheist (or polypneumatist, as it now pleases Dr. Medhurst to call him), and see what the effect would be of setting his views right with respect to the word *shin*. Suppose him a common plebeian or a merchant, and that we were to meet him making offerings to the *Tsái shin*, the god of Wealth; and that upon asking him why he worshiped this being, he were to answer, "That I may prevail upon him to assist me in getting wealth." should we not do well to say to him, What you are doing is entirely right, viewed in one respect. You can not, by any exertions of your own, insure the success of your trading; you do well to rely upon the protection and blessing of a superior being to help you to get wealth; but you Chinese make a mistake, when you go to seek help from the *shin*. You suppose that there is a *shin* who presides merely over money getting; and you call upon this *Tsái shin*, god of Wealth, that he may help you to grow rich; for protection from fire, you make offerings to the *Ho shin*, the god of Fire; for protection at sea, you call on the *Hái shin*; and so too, you put every town, every district, under some tutelary *shin*, and to every occupation you give a patron *shin*: the idea running through all this (we might say to him) is right; man is a weak, dependent being; he must look up to, and depend upon a superior; but you are in great error as to the proper *object* to whom you should apply for aid. There is but one Being who can really aid you; in our holy book, He is called Jehovah. He it is who presides over all human affairs: the administration of them is not divided out as you suppose among a number of *shin*; He himself is the alone SHIN. He is the *Shin* of wealth; pray to him to aid you in your business: He is the *Shin* of the sea; call upon him in time of danger: He is the *Shin* of fire; pray to him, &c., &c. In this way we shall avail ourselves of whatever knowledge of divinity in general exists in the mind of this individual, at the same time that we turn to good account whatever *devotional feeling* he may have connected with the word *shin*; which is a matter of great importance. The *feeling*, we tell him, is correct; the *object* he calls *shin*: we have no right to complain of his calling it by this or any other name; but his conception of the *object*—of this *shin*—is wrong; it must therefore be changed—elevated. Now to do this, to keep the *subject* on which we would enlighten him before his mind, it is surely wise to adhere to his word *shin*, and to predicate of

this word the truths we would teach him. We should instruct him to put all his *shin* of wealth, fire, sea, &c., together, as the first process to help him to rise; and then tell him that Jehovah, the true *Shin*, can afford him ten thousand times more protection and blessing than all he ever fancied all his imaginary *shin* put together could afford; that He is in truth the ONLY SHIN, the Self-existent, the Almighty, the Holy Shin, &c., &c.

Let us next take the other great errorist, the Pantheist, and set him right with respect to the meaning of this word *shin*. He too, as we have seen, predicates his errors on the subject of divinity of this word. With him, *shin* is the informing divinity, spirit, or soul, of the primordial substance whose revolutions made the heavens and the earth. Heaven, earth, man, animals, and plants, all share this universal *shin*: it is the living principle of all things. This *shin* is evidently no created spirit, as we regard the human spirit, and all spirits (save God) to be; but a divine power that co-existed with the eternally-existing primary matter. How are we to set this pantheist right? Tell him that in some respects he is right, and has the advantage of his polytheistic countrymen in his views of the great subject, they in common call *Shin*. He has a great advantage of them in the unity with which he invests his *Shin*. We therefore tell him he is right in conceiving there is but one *Shin*, in making *Shin* the principle of life, and in ascribing to the influence of this *Shin* every pulse that throbs through universal nature; but that he greatly errs in his conception of *Shin*. It is not the name of a mere principle of life—of the soul of the world; but of the Lord of life,—of the Creator of the world, of Jehovah—the only true and living SHIN.

If we teach the Chinese correct views of this single word *shin*, we seal the fate of polytheism, pantheism and atheism. One *shin* (call him Spirit or God) hearing prayer in every house in China, knowing all hearts and ruling over all things, causing the grass to grow and the clouds to rain, &c., &c., is one God, is monotheism—the fourth and only other theory on the subject of theism we can think of. *Shin* is the word the Chinese use when speaking of the first: it is the word by which we must teach them the last.

This term is a strong contrast to *Shángti*, the other native term proposed. It is simple; whereas *Shángti* is a compound phrase. It is the general name of the Chinese gods; whereas *Shángti* is the definite title of the chief of said gods. These characteristics—its being the Chinese name of the general subject—an absolute appella-

tive—a simple, uncompounded term—render *shin* exactly the term from which to make, by our *usus loquendi*, a word exactly answering to the word God.

It has no qualifying adjective to restrict its meaning, and to withstand the formation of the *usus loquendi* we desire to establish. It is not like *Ti*, the name of a relationship, which is common to God and men; but is the absolute name of a being, or class of beings (according to its context), who are possessed of a nature superior to that of men. Being an *absolute appellative noun*, we shall in using it as the name of God, have no difficulties made by the term by which we designate Him, when we speak of his self-existence from eternity; meaning *nature* and not *office*, it will well express that wherein the Oneness of the Three Persons consists, and the Divine nature of the blessed Savior. It is the general name of the false gods here worshiped, and is therefore the term to be used for negating the existence of all these false gods—the first thing that is necessary to be done to clear the way for the truth.

Shin, we admit, is not by its previous *usus loquendi*, the name of the Being whom we adore: unhappily the Chinese have no knowledge of this Being; but they have some knowledge of the general subject of Divinity; they have thought and written much on this subject, and with the gods (though not with God) they have had most extensive dealings; and there can be no doubt, we think, that they call this subject *Shin*, and that they have worshiped these gods under this name. If therefore we succeed in teaching the Chinese around us correct views of Divinity in connection with this word *Shin*, we may rest assured that monotheism will spread. This word is in every one's mouth. Thousands are constantly making clay *shin*, wooden *shin*, paper *shin*: tens of thousands of others are manufacturing incense, candles, imitation *sycee*, &c., &c., for the worship of these *shin*. Let it then go forth that we solemnly assert, what it now so shocks Dr. Medhurst that we “should stand up before God and man,” and assert,* what he himself has asserted thousands of times, that “there is in truth only one *Shin*,” and let a few thousand Chinese, in any given city, sincerely believe this, and then what a stir we shall have!

The word *Shin*—the native name of this subject—brings the doctrine taught by us home to every man's daily thoughts, practice, and occu-

* See Proper mode of translating Ruach, page 20.

pation: The native Christian, as taught by us, asserts that "there is only one *Shin*;" his polytheistic fellow-countryman laughs him to scorn; he can show him thousands of *Shin* in the very city in which they both live. "Aye; but the holy apostle Paul says, they be no *Shin* that are made with hands: I can show you the very place in the holy Book." How, if when he turns to Acts xix. 23, instead of *Shin*, he finds *Aloho* or *Skángti*? And if with a view to bring the matter home to some Chinese Demetrius, our native Christian would be justified in telling him, "the *Alohos* St. Paul was there speaking of were just such *skin* as you are now making;" if, I say, he would be justified in making such an assertion, why can not *we* now so write it down in the Acts, that the Apostle may speak out plainly for himself to all who read the sacred Book?

May the great Author of all truth lead us all to see the truth of the matter that is now controverted among us, and enable us so to use the proper Chinese appellation of Himself, that his "NAME may speedily be known" to this great nation, and all their false gods and idols be put far away from them! And to Him, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, we will ascribe all the glory, both now and for ever. Amen.

APPENDIX.

(Note A. referred to on page 96.)

SINCE the part of my Defense in which I discuss the question whether God is a relative or absolute term was sent to press, Dr. Legge has published a series of letters, in which he has written at much length on this point. I trust the reader will therefore pardon my calling his attention to this subject again in a note. I shall only comment on three points in the Doctor's letters.

1st. "Some people seem to apprehend a lurking heresy in the opinion that *Elohim*, with the words by which it is rendered in Greek and English, is a relative term; whereas the difficulty is to find critics and scholars of any note, who have not in substance at least maintained the same thing." And on a lower part of the same page, "I do not believe that a single writer of eminence can be brought forward to controvert my position that *Elohim* is a relative term," &c.

2d. The Doctor's attempt to *express* the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, regarding the word *God* all the while as a mere relative term which does not express anything about essence or nature.

3d. "The view of *Elohim* as a relative term exhibits the doctrine of the Trinity in its *scriptural simplicity*, and establishes the Divinity of Christ on its *proper evidence*."

On the first of these points, we beg the reader to notice that the Westminster Divines and Melancthon (no mean names I should suppose in Dr. Legge's eyes), are so far from regarding the word with Dr. L. as a mere relative term that "does not indicate the essence," but expresses only the *relationship* that Jehovah sustains to his creatures, that neither of them take any notice of this relationship at all in their definitions of the word (quoted at p. 49 above); but on the contrary say, "God is a Spiritual Being, or essence, possessed of various essential and eternal attributes." Howe also, one of the most eminent of the Nonconformist divines, in his "Living Temple," in like manner gives a definition of the word *God*, to preface an elaborate argument to prove the existence of the Deity, without making any mention of the relationships which He sustains to his creatures. His words are so much to the point that I shall give them at some length:—

"And first for the existence of God: that we may regularly and with evidence make it out to ourselves, *that he is, or doth exist*,.....it is requisite that we first settle a true *notion* of him in our minds; or be at agreement with ourselves, what it is that we mean, or would have to be signified by the *name* of God, otherwise we know not what we seek, nor when we have found him. And though we must beforehand professedly avow, that we take him to be such a one as we can never comprehend in our thoughts, that this knowledge is too

excellent for us, or he is more excellent than that we can perfectly know him; yet it will be sufficient to guide us in our search after his existence, if we can give such a description, or assign such certain *characters* of his being, as will severally or together distinguish him from all things else. For then we shall be able to call him by his own *name*, and say, this is God: whatever his being may contain more, or whatsoever other properties may belong to it, beyond what we can yet compass in our present thoughts of him. And such an account we shall have of what we are inquiring after, if we have the conception in our minds of an *eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being*, that hath active power, life, wisdom, goodness, and whatsoever other supposable excellency in highest perfection originally *in and of itself*. Such a being we would with common consent express by the *name God*."

Here we see Howe too, in this definition, takes no notice of the *various relationships* which Jehovah sustains to his creatures, and which the word *God*, being the absolute appellative name of Him is used in the sacred Scriptures to designate sometimes the one, and sometimes another. He makes no mention of these relations, because he justly regards them as not necessary to a proper definition of this word, it being the name of the eternal, uncaused, independent, necessary Being, who was God, before any of these relations subsisted. These relations may or may not be mentioned in a definition of the word *God*, but I have never seen a definition of the word, in which the *nature* of the Being designated was not mentioned; and doubt if such a one can be quoted from any good writer.

Voltaire, in giving Newton's view as quoted by Dr. L. in his *Letters*, p. 27, is careful to state these essential attributes, and that before he makes mention of any of these relations; his words are, "Newton was deeply persuaded of the existence of a God, and he understood by that word not only a *Being, Infinite, Almighty, Eternal*, and the *Creator*, but a *Master*, who has established relations between Himself and his creatures;" (observe, not was constituted God by this relationship, but being God, himself established this relation;) "for," adds Newton, "without this relation, the knowledge of a God is nothing but a barren idea." Here I would again observe that Newton does not say that this Infinite, Eternal Being, without this relation would not be God, but rather clearly implies the contrary, stating only that a knowledge of this relation is necessary to our welfare.

According to the common consent of mankind, the word *God*, whether understood *proprie* or *improprie*, is an absolute term, and not the mere exponent of a relationship as Dr. Legge contends it is. St. Paul speaks of those who were "by nature no gods." Cicero wrote "*De NATURA DEORUM*;" would he have used the word "*natura*," if writing *De Imperatorum*? In every Christian work on theology we take up, we shall find something said "of the *nature* and attributes of God." Hesiod has given us a Theogony, or generation of the gods; and it is just as plain that he regards the gods throughout this poem, as a genus—a race of beings, as that he regards men in this light. He constantly couples the names of the two races together. Love is "Sire of gods and men." "They (the Fates) of men and gods the *crimes* pursue,"

They are expressly spoken of as a race.

"The Muses (he says) bade me praise
The blessed race of ever living gods."

"They send forth
Their undecaying voice, and in their songs,
Proclaim before all themes the race of gods,
From the beginning."

"And the Earth
And the huge Ocean, and the sable Night,
And all the sacred race of deities
Existing ever."

"The lovely race
Of goddess Nereides, rose to light;" &c.

Elton's Remains of Hesiod.

Dr. Legge's doctrine is that the words "*E'lohim* and θεός of themselves tell us *nothing* of the nature of the Being, or Beings which they represent," and that Shàngtí, "Supreme Ruler," tallies exactly with these words.

How would it accord with the picture drawn of the Olympian deities by Homer and the other Greek poets, to regard them as a mere assembly of rulers? All rulers, or rather *all* Shàngtí, *Supreme Rulers*!!! If such was "the assembly of the gods," what becomes of the sovereignty of Ζεύς? The Goddesses, what are we to make of them? Are they "*Supreme Ruleresses*?"

Dr. Legge lays much stress on the etymology of the word *E'lohim*; but etymology is a very uncertain guide to the character and meaning of words. Every work on logic is full of warnings against our being misled by sophistries derived from this source. It is wholly conjectural, and there is no other field perhaps in which learned men have so indulged their fancies. If a serious doubt once arises, there is no means of setting it at rest; the most that can be contended for is that my *conjecture* is more *probable* than you's. And even where the etymology is manifest, it is of comparatively little service, as it is the subsequent *use* which determines the character and meaning of a word much more than its root. In this case, from Dr. L.'s own showing, there is so much diversity of opinion among the learned, the only safe inference to be derived from their conflicting opinions is, that no satisfactory conclusion on this point can ever be arrived at, none certainly which one can afford to make the basis of an argument.

But suppose Dr. L.'s view to be conceded—that the radical idea is power, I can not see how this will show that the word is a mere relative term; *power* being one of the *essential, eternal* attributes of God, as this word denotes an intrinsic perfection, not an *outward relation* like that expressed by the words *dominion, ruler, &c.* Fuerst's view of the word *EL*, given by Dr. L. (Letters, p. 20), shows how compatible such a derivation is with our regarding the word *God* as an absolute term. He says, "*Robustus, powerful, brave.* It is used (b) for *God, on account of his very powerful and excelling nature*" (not because of his sustaining any *relationship*), "and with the article *ha-El*, the

Omnipotent, who is over all things, as in the phrase *el-Elohim* (God of gods), that is, superior to all false and feigned gods in his *strength* and *power*," (not a being sustaining a superior relationship, or having a more exalted office, but of a more excelling nature, of "*strength* irresistible, and *power* infinite.")

The Omnipotent, the powerful One, the Almighty, the Omniscient, &c., are very different to the words *Ruler*, *King*, &c.; and if Dr. L. can succeed in establishing the etymologies for which he contends, it will afford him no aid in proving that we must render *Elohim* by a term that is the mere exponent of a relationship. Power is an *essential* attribute of the Deity, possessed from eternity before the worlds were made; Shángti, "Supreme Ruler," can derive no aid from their etymology.

Dr. L. quotes Calvin as agreeing with him in the character of this word, and seems to have persuaded himself that even Athanasius uses the term *God* just as a relative term; and his conclusion is, that there are not three beings, *who sustain the relation of God*, but only one; not three spirits who are each a God, but one Spirit (observe not one God), Jehovah namely, in whose essence there yet exist, "by a natural and eternal necessity, three intelligent and active subjects, who are made known to us as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." I have not the works of Athanasius, and never read them; I can not therefore say whether Dr. Legge represents him correctly, when he thus speaks of him as regarding the word *God* as a relative term, and the Persons of the Blessed Trinity as sustaining "the *relation* of God." I content myself therefore with merely calling the attention of the learned in Europe and America, who are taking an interest in this controversy, to his statement, who no doubt can vindicate this noble defender of the orthodox faith from the views here erroneously ascribed to him by Dr. Legge.

Some of Calvin's works I have at hand, from which it is very plain that Dr. Legge is mistaken if he supposes that Calvin agrees with him in regarding the word *God* as a mere relative term. The proof of this I will present below.

I shall next offer a few remarks on Dr. Legge's attempt to *express* the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, using the Athanasian formula, and regarding the word *God* as a mere relative term, which does not express anything about essence or nature. According to Dr. L., that which constitutes the Supreme Being God, is not the possession of a Divine nature, but the sustaining of a given relationship.

I am most happy to find that Dr. Legge, however, makes the unity of the Godhead to consist in oneness of substance, and not in unity of office or dignity; as from his words, "the view of *Elohim* as a relative term exhibits the doctrine of the Trinity in its *scriptural simplicity*," his defining a relative term as the name "of a *dignity* or *office* common to many individuals," and his views generally on the character of the word *God*, I had feared he did, and as I believe, all have done, who have regarded this word as Dr. L. does, as a *mere relative* term. On this subject Dr. Legge is happily very explicit. He says, "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; does it not seem then that there are three Gods? It seems so, yet the Father, Son, and Spirit are 'one in substance;' so that there are not three Gods, but one

God." Dr. Legge then gives a statement of his views which shows that one can *regard* the word God as a mere relative term that does not indicate essence, and yet *believe* that the three Persons of the sacred Trinity are of the same divine nature or substance; but he has not *shown us* how this orthodox doctrine is *expressed in the formula* he has quoted, if the word God tells us nothing of the nature of the Being represented.

When we say in the Athanasian Creed, "the Father is God," we mean by it, as Waterland says, that He is possessed of "all perfection," that He is possessed of the "Divine nature;" by which phrase we understand "the sum of the Divine perfections;" we mean that all the essential attributes, necessary existence, eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, &c., &c., are predicable of the Father. Next, when we say "the Son is God," we mean that he is possessed of "all perfection," possesses the same Divine nature, has the same essential attributes, &c.; and so of the Holy Spirit. And lastly, when we say, "they are not three Gods but one God," we affirm that there is only one Being possessed of this divine nature, having these essential attributes; that, to use the words of the Athanasian Creed, "the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one."*

There can be no doubt the same thing is meant when we affirm in the words of this Creed, "they are not three Gods, but one God," as when it is said just above "the Godhead is all one." Godhead (from *God* and *hade*, state) means simply the state or condition of being God: hence, this word is defined by Johnson and Webster as, "Godship; deity, divinity, divine nature or essence." If *God* meant *ruler*, the noun formed from it would mean the state or condition of being ruler; if no nature is indicated by the word *God*, but only a relationship, the words *Godhead*, *divinity*, &c., would only mean the state or condition of being or standing in that relationship to others: they would not "indicate essence or nature."

I can not here refrain from adverting to Dr. L.'s very remarkable views of the Divine nature, i. e. that in which it consists.

He says, Letters, p. 56, "Dr. Boone believes that the idea of a Divine nature lies in the word *God*. Now the nature of God is spiritual; 'God is a Spirit,' was the account given by God himself manifest in the flesh. *The*

* To show that this method of viewing the word *God* as expressing "the Divine nature" is not peculiar to the Athanasian Creed, and to the writers of the Church of England, I will here append Knapp's statement of the doctrine of the Trinity: See Art. 4. § 33, 2. "The doctrine of a Trinity in the Godhead includes the three following particulars (*vide Morus*, p. 69, § 13): viz., (a) There is only *one God*—one divine nature; § 16, (b) but in this divine nature, there is the distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as three (called *subjects*, *persons*, and other names of similar import in the language of the schools); and (c) these three have equally and in common with one another, the nature and perfections of supreme Divinity.—This is the simple doctrine of the Trinity, when stripped of refined and learned distinctions. According to this doctrine, there are in the Divine nature ~~THREE~~ inseparably connected with one another, possessing equal glory, but making unitedly only *ONE* God."

peculiarly by which God, as he is revealed to us in the Scriptures, is distinguished from all other spiritual Beings as to nature, is, that in his infinite and incomprehensible spiritual essence there exists a Trinity of hypostases, or, as we term them in English, Persons. *This is the only divine nature.* And the idea does not lie in the word *God.*" Following up this very peculiar notion of what is meant by "the divine nature," his *reductio ad absurdum* is, that, if the word *God* indicates nature, then none but Trinitarians have any idea of God. When enumerating the peculiarities that distinguish God from all other spiritual beings, Dr. L. might have mentioned that He is necessarily existent; whereas the existence of all other spiritual beings is contingent and dependent upon Him: that He is almighty, while they are of a weak and feeble nature; that He is omniscient, omnipresent, &c., &c. Knapp explains this matter very clearly in his 3d Article "On the NATURE and Attributes of God." His words are, "The nature of God is the sum of all the Divine perfections; the attributes of God are the particular distinct perfections or realities, which are predicable of the Divine nature (*predicata Dei necessaria ob essentiam ei tribuenda*, *Morus*, p. 58, not. 1). The Divine attributes do not therefore differ *materialiter* from the Divine nature, but only *formaliter* (i. e. the difference between nature and attribute is not *objective*, or does not appertain to God himself; but is *subjective*, *formal*, or as the older theologians say, *secundum nostrum concipiendi modum*). The attributes of God are merely our notions of the particular distinctions, which taken together compose the Divine nature. We are unable to take in the whole object at a single glance, and are compelled, in order to accommodate the weakness of our understanding, to consider it in separate portions." Art. 3d, § 18.

We must here carefully distinguish between the sense of the word "attribute," as applied to the essential attributes of God, and the logical use of this word, as the opposite of "substance," i. e. "a predicate which may be present or absent, the essence of the species remaining the same." See this point illustrated by St. Augustin, *De Civ. Dei*, XI. 10. "Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere, vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet," &c. This reasoning Hagenbach declares identical with the proposition of Schleiermacher, "that in that which is absolute, the subject and the predicate are one and the same thing." Which agree exactly with the views of the Divine nature and attributes presented in the quotation from Knapp. But to return to our argument.

There is another point which clearly manifests the sense in which the word *God* is used in the Athanasian Creed and other Christian formulæ, in connection with the Trinity: I refer to the two natures of Christ. To express the *divine nature*, the words *God* and *Godhead* are used indifferently, just as the words *man* and *manhood* are used to express the *human nature*: thus in the Second Art. of the Church of England, "the Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal *God*, of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance: so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the *Godhead* and *manhood*, were joined together in one Person, never

to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very *God* and very *man*." The words are too clearly defined here to allow of mistake; "very *God* and very *man*," express the two natures called above the *Godhead* and *manhood*.

The Westminster Divines use language almost identical; they say, "so that two whole perfect, and distinct natures, the *Godhead* and the *manhood*, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very *God* and very *man*, yet one Christ."

Confession of Helvetia. "And John saith, 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word.' Therefore the Son is co-equal and consubstantial with the Father, as touching his *divinity*; true *God*, not by name only, or by adoption, or by special favor, but in *substance* and *nature*." It would be tedious to quote the other Confessions drawn up by the Reformers in the 16th century. It will be sufficient to say they all agree in stating that Christ was possessed of two perfect natures, the Divine and the human, and that ~~therefore~~ he is *very God* and very *man*.

The words of all the Confessions on this subject are remarkably similar, being all derived from the decision of the Council of Chalcedon. The exposition of faith put forth by this Council was designed to guard against both Eutychian and Nestorian errors. After recognizing the Nicene and Constantinopolitan creeds, they say, "Following, therefore, these holy Fathers, we unitedly declare, that one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, is to be acknowledged as being perfect in his *Godhead* (*θεοτης*); and perfect in his *humanity* (*ανθρωποτης*); truly *God* (*θεου αληθεως*) and truly *man* (*ανθρωπον αληθεως*)." The Athanasian Creed uses the word *God* in like manner to express the divine nature of the Person Christ; "the Son of God is *God* and *man*, *God* of the *substance* of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and *man* of the *substance* of his mother, born in the world; perfect *God* and perfect *man*; equal to the Father as touching his *Godhead*; and inferior to the Father as touching his *manhood*. Who although he be *God* and *man*; yet he is not two, but one Christ." Whatever Dr. Legge may persuade himself as to the agreement of his views with those of Athanasius, it seems to me that if he will give this Creed, that bears his name, only a cursory glance, he can not contend that "the term *God*" is used therein "just as a relative term, and that its conclusion is that there are not three beings who sustain the relation of *God*, but only one." On the contrary, he must acknowledge that it teaches that the three Persons sustain not a common relationship to their creatures, but are of the same nature—of one substance.

It is a favorite idea of Dr. L. that they who contend that *God* is an absolute term, "confound the being of Jehovah with the name *God*." His own view is, "He whom we call *God*, existed from everlasting, but not as *God*. It was in consequence of the act of creation, that He began to sustain the relation which is signified by that term?" And he thinks that no scholars or critics can be found who disagree with this view. In the Athanasian Creed above cited, we read that "the Son of *God* is *God* and *man*; *God* of the *substance* of his Father, begotten before the worlds." According to this, Christ is declared to be *God*, not because of his having a common dominion or office with

the Father, but to be "God of the *substance* of the Father;" not to have begun to sustain "the relationship called God" when he created all things, but to have been God before the worlds were made. Dr. Legge may declare that the word *God* is used incorrectly in this Creed, and in all the other Creeds and Confessions from which I have quoted, but if he will carefully examine these documents, I am persuaded he will not contend that the word *God* is used in them as a mere relative term; or that he can *express* the doctrine which they teach, with respect to *that wherein the oneness* of the three Persons consist; or the doctrine of the two natures of Christ, by the use of the word *God*, as they teach it, using this word, if the word *God* "of itself tells us nothing of the nature of the Being represented." This was my objection to the use of the word *Τῷ*, Ruler (and the objection holds good, no matter by what adjective it may be qualified), not that those, who use this term as the rendering of the word *God*, can not *hold* the orthodox doctrine on the subject of the Trinity; but that they can not *express* it by the use of the *relative term* *Τῷ*, Ruler. God and man, very God and very man, Godhead and manhood, can not be expressed by the words Ruler and man, very Ruler and very man, Rulership and manhood; and the addition of the *adjective* "supreme" will make no difference in the character of the *noun*. I will here mention that my Chinese teacher, when I was making a version of the Communion Service, and the sentence "our Savior Christ, both God and man," was under consideration; upon being asked How it would answer to render "both *Τῷ* and man?" without my ever having said one word to him on the subject, objected to it on the ground that the word *Τῷ* did not refer to nature; and there was no antithesis between the words *τι* ruler, and *ἄνθρωπος*, man, for many men had been *τι*.

The character of the word *God* in the documents I have quoted is too clear to admit of any controversy, but Dr. Legge, seeing that their views can not be made to agree with his, may contend that this *word* was alike misunderstood by the early Councils and the Protestant Reformers; let us therefore turn to the inspired writers from whom the early Fathers and the Protestant Reformers derived their views. The first verse of the Gospel of John is a locus classicus for determining the character of the word *Θεός*. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God." The word *God* being here the predicate of the sentence "the Word was God," this sentence affords us an admirable opportunity of testing the point at issue between Dr. Legge and myself.

If Dr. Legge is correct in his position, that the word *Θεός* is a mere relative term, then the Evangelist here asserts that the Word "in the beginning" sustained a certain office, dignity, or relationship *because of which* he is called *God*; on the contrary, if I am correct, by the word *God* he here affirms that the Word, "in the beginning" was possessed of "the Divine nature," "of the sum of the Divine perfections."

The apostle asserts two facts: 1st, that "in the beginning" the Word "was with God;" 2d, that at that same time "the Word was God." If then, by the phrase "in the beginning," we understand from eternity, before the world was

made, the whole question as between Dr. L. and myself is settled: for *first*, we have a Being called God, with whom the Word was "in the beginning," that is before there were any creatures: this Being therefore could not have been "constituted God by the act of creation;" *second*, we are told "the Word was God," existed "as God," "in the beginning," i. e. from eternity. Unless then Dr. L. denies that the phrase "in the beginning" has the meaning we have attached to it, he must admit the incorrectness of his theory that "it was in consequence of the act of creation that He whom we call God, began to sustain the relation which is signified by that term."

With respect to the meaning of *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, Knapp says, "Ὁ λόγος existed *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, viz. *κόσμου* (*Bereshith*, Gen. i. 1. i. e. *ab eterno*). Did he exist before the creation of the world he must be God; for before the creation nothing but God himself existed." Art. 4. § 37.

Pearson. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' Where 'in the beginning' must not be denied unto the third proposition, because it can not be denied unto the second. Therefore 'in the beginning, or ever the earth was, the Word was God,' (Prov. viii. 23.) the same God with whom he was. For we can not conceive that the Apostle should speak of one kind of God in the second, and of another in the third proposition; in the second of a God eternal and independent; in the third of a made and depending God."

Waterland. "The Word is here (John i. 1.) said to have been God in the beginning, that is *before the creation*; from whence it is further probable that he is God in the strict and proper sense. This circumstance may at least be sufficient to convince you that the relative sense which you contend for is not applicable. He could have no relation to the creatures before they were made; no *dominion* over them when they were not; and therefore could not be God in the sense of *dominion* or office." Vol. I. p. 316.

Kuinoel. "Initio rerum, ante mundum conditum extitit Logos. *Ἐν ἀρχῇ* *act. τοῦ κόσμου*. respondit Heb. *Bereshith*, Gen. i. 1. quem locum Johannes respexit;" &c.

Tholuck. *Ἐν ἀρχῇ*, the same as *bereshith*, *in the beginning*, and means when the world commenced, and time with it—then, *already* the Word was."

I will pause longer on this point, as there will probably be no difference of opinion among those who take an interest in this controversy with respect to the meaning of *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, but will proceed to cite some authorities to show that the word God, in the sentence "the Word was God," predicates that the Word was possessed of the Divine nature; and this because Dr. L. expresses the belief "that not a *single* writer of eminence can be brought forward to controvert his position that God is a relative term." I will commence my quotations with Calvin, as Dr. L. has quoted him to sustain his views. Commenting on this sentence in the 1st verse of John's Gospel, he says, "That there may be no remaining doubt as to Christ's *Divine essence*, the Evangelist distinctly asserts that he *is God*. Arius showed prodigious wickedness when, to avoid being compelled to acknowledge the eternal Divinity of Christ, he prattled about I know not what imaginary Deity; but for our part, when we

are informed that the Speech was God, what right have we any longer to call in question his *eternal essence*?"—*Calvin in loc.*

"For as the *names* of God, which have respect to external work began to be ascribed to him from the existence of the work (as when he is called the Creator of heaven and earth), so piety does not recognize or admit any name which might indicate that a change had taken place in God himself. Nothing therefore is more intolerable than to fancy a beginning to that Word, which was *always* God, and afterwards was the Creator of the world." *Christian Institutes*, Book I. Ch. 13. § 8.

"Theodoret disputeth with great earnestness that God can not be said to suffer. But he thereby meaneth Christ's *Divine nature* against Apollonarius, which held even Deity itself passible. Cyril on the other side against Nestorius as much contendeth, that whosoever will deny *very* God to have suffered death, doth forsake the faith. Which notwithstanding to hold were heresy, if the name of God in this assertion did not import as it doth the person of Christ, who being verily God suffered death, but in the flesh, and not in that substance for which the name of God is given him." *Hooker*, Book V. Ch. liii. § 4.

"In N. T. clarius adhuc Deus vocatur (Io. i. 1.) *Sermo erat Deus*, quod de Deo secundario et factitio, ratione muneris intelligi nequit: ut vellent *Adversarii*, sed de vero Deo ratione nature; quia non dicit *ἐγενήσθαι*, ut v. 14. quando loquitur de incarnatione, quod prius notasset; sed *ἦν* erat ad ejus *existentiam æternam* designandam. Deinde eo modo debet esse Deus, quo potuit esse in principio ante rerum omnium creationem, v. 1. tanquam ejus author, v. 3, hic autem nemini nisi Deo summo competit." *Turretin*, Vol. I. p. 842.

"The Father is called God, so is the Son, John i. 1. *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.* With God as to his person, God himself as to his essence." *Bishop Beveridge's Works*, Vol. VII. p. 83.

"No epithet or attribute is more proper to God, than that *αἰώνιος Θεός*, *God eternal*. Hence is our Lord said by St. Paul, before he did assume the form of a servant, and became like unto men, to have *subsisted in the form of God, not deeming it robbery to be equal to God* (or: to have a subsistence in duration and perfection equal to God); so that as he was after his incarnation truly man, partaker of human nature, affections, and properties; so before it he was truly God, partaking the *Divine essence and attributes*. Thence he is often in the Scriptures absolutely and directly named God; God in the most proper and most high sense: *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God*, saith St. John in the beginning of his Gospel (the place where he is most likely to speak with the least ambiguity or darkness); the same Word, which was in time made flesh and dwelt among us, did before all time exist with God, and was God." *Barrow's Works*, Vol. II. p. 281.

"Præterea vero et illud est in promptu, eandem notionem subesse vocabulo Θεός in hac enunciatione, quam in proxima antecedente et sequente, atque adeo Servatorem eodem sensu, et dici et esse Θεόν; ac Θεός is dicitur, apud quem fuit, eique DIVINITATEM et tribui hoc loco et tribuendam esse, non aliam et

diversam ab ea, quæ summi Dei est, sed plane eandem." *Tittman, Comment. in loc.*

Doddridge paraphrases the sentence as follows: "The Word was God himself, i. e. possessed a *nature* truly and properly Divine."

Whitby, "And the Word was God. He was, so say the Socinians, by *office*, not by *nature*, as being the Legate and Ambassador of God;" and then contests this point at much length.

Scott. "And what can we understand by this testimony, 'the Word was God,' but that he was possessed of the same *Divine nature* and *perfections* with the Father?"

Henry. "The Word was with God. (1) In respect of essence and substance; for the Word was God, a distinct Person or substance (subsistence?), for he was with God; and yet the same in substance, for he *was* God."

Poole. "The Word was God; this speaks of the oneness and sameness of his *essence* with that of the Father. The term *God*, which in the foregoing words is to be taken Personally for God the Father, is here to be taken *essentially*, as it signifieth the Divine Being."

Burkitt. "Learn hence, 3d, his *Divine essence*. The Word was God. Here St. John declares the *Divinity*, as he did before the eternity of our blessed Savior. The Word was God, say the Socinians, that is a god by *office*, not by *nature*, as being God's ambassador."

Tholuck. "By *Θς*; the Evangelist wished to designate that *Divine essence* in which the Son was equal to the Father."

Erasmus, "— dicere vult; Verbum particeps erat *Divinæ essentia*."

In the former part of this pamphlet, I have shown that the ancient Councils and the Protestant Reformers of the 16th century agree in regarding the word *God* as the absolute name of Jehovah, indicating his essence. In addition to this I show that Tertullian, Pearson, Waterland, Usher, Stillingfleet, Bloomfield, Stuart, Hodge, and Tholuck, agree in this view; to these I have now added the name of almost every Commentator whose works are within my reach. I can not fancy in what quarter Dr. L. has pushed his inquiries to assert, as he has done, his firm conviction, that not "a single writer of eminence can be brought forward to controvert his position that *Elohim* is a relative term."

But to all this, Dr. Legge replies, "I have carefully counted the number of times in which *Elohim* is used in the O. T. The word is used in all 2,555 times. . . . With relative force apparent, 1,476 times; with the definite article, 357 times; and simply (i. e. standing absolutely), as in the first verse of Genesis, 722 times."

Before Dr. Legge expects us to lay any stress upon these numbers, he should have shown that the absolute name of a Being, or the absolute appellative name of a class of beings, can not be used "with relative force apparent," as the word *Elohim* is in the O. T.; or else his numbers all go for nothing. In some languages, the phrases "*my man*" and "*my woman*" are used to designate the relationship of husband and wife (or, as it is commonly said in English, man and wife), and yet no one would question the fact that the word *man*

in these languages was an absolute, appellative noun. If the question was raised, to what class of beings does this individual belong, it would bring out an answer that would at once settle the point. *Ans.* "He is a man." Here the word *man*, being the predicate of the sentence, tells us of what nature the being in question is; as we saw above, the word *God* declares in the 1st verse of St. John's Gospel, and in the sentences, "Very God and very man," &c.,

Take another instance: Suppose a lady called her husband, or her son, "my Charles;" and that upon reading a memoir of her, we should find that the phrase, "*my Charles*," occurred 1476 times, whereas the word, *Charles* stood absolutely only 722 times: what would be thought of the inference that this word "Charles" was a mere relative term, which signified husband or son, the reader being left in doubt which was the definite relation indicated, as Dr. L. is with respect to the relation designated by the word *God*. Those who consider the word *God* as an absolute appellative noun, find no difficulty at all in accounting for the use of the word *God* in these 1476 cases, where Dr. L. says it "is used with relative force apparent;" for the Being whose absolute name it is, stands in many relationships to us, several of which relationships (it is worthy of remark) and not *one* only, this word is used to designate.

In a preceding part of this paper, I endeavored to show from this fact that the word *God* can not be a mere relative term:—e. g. we can say "God is the Creator; God is the Supreme Ruler; God is our Preserver; &c., predicating every relationship which the Supreme Being sustains to us, of the word *God*, without any sense of tautology or impropriety. Could we do this if the word *God* were not the absolute name of the Being designated; but a mere title expressing any *one* of these relationships. If this was the character of the word, should we not have tautology when we predicated that relationship of the word: e. g. of the relationship designated by that of Creator to creatures, as Dr. L. says it is on p. 5 of his Argument, to say that God is our Creator is equivalent to saying "the Creator is our Creator:" the same if the relationship designated is that of "Supreme Ruler," or any other whatsoever, there would be a tautology if we predicated *this* relationship of the word *God*. Now as we have no such difficulty in predicating each and every of the relationships, in which we stand to the Supreme Being, of the word *God*, this word can not be a mere relative term—the mere exponent of any given one of these relationships.

But that which Dr. L. fancies will reduce the advocates of the absolute character of the word *God* to a complete dilemma, is the 245 instances in which the word "is applied away from him," e. i. Jehovah. He says, if "E^l and Eloh^{im} express ANYTHING of the Divine nature, how is it that they are applied, away from Jehovah, to angels, judges, and to Moses? When Jehovah says to Moses, 'I will make thee a God to Pharaoh,' he promised what he actually did. But did he make Moses from being a man to become actually of the nature of God? Did he convert the unity of his human existence into a trinity of Divine existences? I dare not pursue the subject farther to its impious consequences."

It is to be hoped that Dr. L. succeeded in filling his own mind with due horror at the impious consequences that must follow from regarding the word *God* as an absolute term, but I very much doubt if a single reader has shared these feelings with him. If, when Dr. L. declares, that, "when Jehovah says to Moses, 'I will make thee a God to Pharaoh,' he promised what he did," he means to assert that the word *God* is used *proprie*, and not metaphorically, and that we are to understand from the sentence above quoted, that God promised to make Moses really and truly a God, the consequences are quite as serious on Dr. L.'s theory as on my own. He says the correlatives are "God and creatures;" the Supreme Being is "constituted God by the act of creation;" "God is a relative term expressing a relation of which the *one party* could only be the Supreme Being." Now then, did Jehovah make Moses and Pharaoh to stand to each other in the relation of Creator and creature? By what act of creation was Moses constituted God? If the *party* sustaining the relationship called God "could only be the Supreme Being," was Moses changed into this Being? These absurdities are inevitable if the word *God* is here to be understood *proprie*; but if we admit that it is used metaphorically, then the fact that Moses is called a God presents no difficulty to our regarding this word as an absolute term; for I have above given instances of the absolute nouns "*man*" and "*woman*," to express the relation of husband and wife; and these words are also used by way of metaphor to express the qualities which distinguish men and women: e. g. when we exhort a boy to "be a man," or call a man "an old woman;" and yet no one would contend that because of this usage the words "*man*" and "*woman*" have ceased to be absolute appellative nouns.

If Dr. L. had paused a moment to reflect upon the character of the absurdity, with which he wished to press his adversaries, he must, it seems to me, have seen that, if the word was to be understood *proprie*, the difficulty was equally great on either supposition; and that, if used metaphorically, the difficulty was at an end for both.

This point, viz. that the name *God* is a mere relative term, on which Dr. L. relies, and which he admits is essential to the success of Shángti, was much relied on, to sustain their views, by Dr. Clarke and his fellow Arians, who, in the early part of the 18th century disturbed the peace of the English Church, and brought on the most able discussion with respect to our Lord's Divinity that has been held in the English language. To show the similarity of Dr. Legge's views to those of these writers, and at the same time to give a conclusive answer to them from one of our most sound and learned Divines, I will quote a few paragraphs from Waterland's Works:—

"Dr. Clarke would indeed persuade us, that the proper Scripture notion of *God* is *dominion*; and that therefore any person having dominion, is, according to the Scripture notion, truly and properly God. This shall be examined; but it will be convenient here to set down the Doctor's own words. 'The word *God*, has in Scripture, and in all books of morality and religion, a relative signification; and not, as in metaphysical books, an absolute one: as is evident from the relative terms, which in moral writings may always be joined with it.

For instance, in the same manner as we say, *my Father*; *my King*, and the like; so it is proper also to say *my God*, the *God of Israel*, the *God of the universe*, and the like: which words are expressive of dominion and government. But in the metaphysical way, it can not be said, 'my infinite substance,' the 'infinite substance of *Israel*,' or the like. He repeats the observations (p. 291); and is very positive that the word *God* in Scripture is always a relative word of office, giving the same pretty reason for it as before. This shall be carefully considered, and the manner of speaking accounted for in the sequel.

"I shall only observe here, by the way, that the word *star* is a relative word, for the same reason with that which the Doctor gives for the other. For, the 'star of your God Remphan' (Acts vii, 43) is a proper expression: but in the metaphysical way, it can not be said, the 'luminous substance of your God Remphan.' So again, *water* is a relative word; for it is proper to say, the *water of Israel*: but, in the metaphysical way, it can not be said, the fluid substance of *Israel*; the expression is improper.* By parity of reason, we may make relative words almost as many as we please. But to proceed: I maintain that *dominion* is not the full import of the word *God* in Scripture; that it is but a part of the idea, and a small part too; and that if any person be called *God*, merely on account of *dominion*, he is called so by way of figure and resemblance only; and is not properly *God*, according to the Scripture notion of it. We may call any one a *king*, who lives free and independent, subject to no man's will. He is a king so far, or in some respects: though in many other respects, nothing like one; and therefore not properly a king. If by the same figure of speech, by way of allusion or resemblance, anything be called *God*, because resembling *God* in one or more particulars, we are not to conclude that it is properly and truly *God*.

"To enlarge somewhat further upon this head, and to illustrate the case by a few instances. Part of the idea that goes along with the word *God* is, that his habitation is sublime, and 'his dwelling not with flesh.' Dan. ii. 11. This part of the idea is applicable to angels or to saints, and therefore they may thus far be reputed *God*: and are sometimes so styled in Scripture, or ecclesiastical writings. Another part of the *complete idea* of *God* is giving orders from above, and publishing commands from Heaven. This was in some sense applicable to Moses; who is therefore called 'a *God* unto Pharaoh:' not as being properly *God*, but instead of *God* in that instance, or that resembling circumstance. In the same respect, every prophet or apostle, or even minister of a parish, might be figuratively called *God*. *Dominion* goes along with the idea of *God*, or is part of it; and therefore kings, princes and magistrates, resembling *God* in that respect, may, by a like figure of speech, be styled *Gods*: not properly; for then we might as properly say, *God David*, *God Solomon*, or *God Jeroboam*, as *King David*, &c.; but by way of allusion, and in regard to some imperfect resemblance which they bear to *God* in some particular respects; and that is all. It belongs to *God* to receive worship, and sacrifice, and homage. Now, be-

* It is very obvious to perceive where the impropriety of such expressions lies. The word *substance*, according to the common use of language, when used in the singular number, is supposed to be intrinsic to the thing spoken of, whose substance it is; and indeed to be the thing itself. *My substance is myself*: and the *substance of Israel is Israel*. And hence it comes to be improper to join substance with the relative terms, understanding of it something extrinsic.

cause the heathen idols so far resembled God, as to be made objects of worship, &c., therefore they also, by the same figure of speech, are by the Scripture denominated *Gods*, though at the same time they are declared, in a proper sense, to be no Gods. The belly is called the *God* of the luxurious (Phil. iii. 19.), because some are as much devoted to the service of their bellies, as others are to the service of God; and because their lusts have got the *dominion* over them. This way of speaking is in like manner grounded on some imperfect resemblance, and is easily understood. The prince of the devils is supposed, by most interpreters, to be called the 'God of this world,' 2 Cor. iv. 4. If so, the reason may be, either because the men of this world are entirely devoted to his service, or that he has got power and dominion over them.

"Thus we see how the word *God*, according to the popular way of speaking, has been applied to angels, or to men, or to things inanimate and insensible; because some *part* of the idea belonging to God has been conceived to belong to them also. To argue from hence that any of them is properly God, is making the whole of a part; reasoning fallaciously, a *dicto secundum quid*, as the schools speak, *ad dictum simpliciter*. If we inquire carefully into the Scripture notion of the word, we shall find, that neither dominion singly, nor all the other instances of resemblance, make up the idea, or are sufficient to denominate any thing properly God. When the prince of Tyre pretended to be God (Ezek. xxviii. 2), he thought of something more than mere *dominion* to make him so; he thought of strength invincible, and power irresistible: and God was pleased to convince him of his folly and vanity, not by telling him how scanty his *dominion* was, or how low his *office*; but how weak, frail, and perishing his *nature* was; that he was man only, and 'not God,' ver 2, 9, and should surely find so by the event. When the Lycaonians, upon the sight of a miracle wrought by St. Paul (Acts xiv. 11), took him and Barnabas for gods, they did not think so much of *dominion*, as of power and ability beyond human: and when the apostles answered them, they did not tell them that their dominion was only human, or that their office was not Divine, but that they had not a Divine nature; they were weak, frail, and feeble men, of like infirmities with the rest of their species, and therefore no *Gods*.

If we trace the Scripture notion of one who is truly and properly God, we shall find it made up of these several ideas; infinite wisdom, power invincible, all-sufficiency, and the like. These are the *ground* and *foundation* of *dominion*, which is but a secondary notion, a consequence of the power: and it must be supreme dominion, and none else, which will suit with the Scripture notion of God. It is not that of a governor, a ruler, a protector, a lord, or the like; but a sovereign Ruler, an almighty Protector, an omniscient and omnipresent Governor, an eternal, immutable, all sufficient Creator, Preserver, and Protector. Whatever falls short of this is not properly, in the Scripture notion, *God*; but is only called so by way of figure; as has before been explained. Now, if you ask me why the relative terms may properly be applied to the word *God*, the reason is plain; because there is something relative in the whole idea of God; namely, the notion of Governor, Protector, &c. If you ask why they can not be so properly applied to the word *God* in the metaphysical sense, beside the reason before given, there is another as plain; because metaphysics take in only part of the idea, consider the *nature* abstracted from the *relation*, leaving the relative part out." Waterland's Works, Vol. I. p. 33—35.

The word *God*, as I intimated in the first part of this Essay, does not stand for a single idea, but for an assemblage of ideas, some of which relate to the nature of the Being so called, and some to the relations he sustains. When used metaphorically, any one of these may form the basis of the metaphor; if, however, we desire to give a full definition of the word when used properly, we should mention both classes; those which refer to nature (such as necessary existence, wisdom, power, &c., &c.), being however "the ground or foundation" of the relative, the mention of them is indispensable in all definitions of the word, as I have observed above; the mention of the relative is not indispensable as we have seen, because we may contemplate God as existing from eternity, before there were any beings to stand in any relation to him.

Dr. Legge, when he insists that *God* is a mere relative term, which tells us nothing of the nature of the Being indicated, discards the whole class of fundamental ideas, and gives us a word which can not be used to express the doctrine of the Trinity, as the word *God* is used in the Creeds of the Catholic Church; which can not be used as the word *God* is in the documents I have quoted, to teach the Divine nature of Christ; in short, a word which differs from the *Geog* used in St. John's Gospel, and by orthodox Christian writers from the beginning. He must therefore be wrong in his view of the word.

This note has already extended to great length, but I must say a word to Dr. L.'s statement that we can not with the word *Shin* express the doctrine of the Trinity. He asks, "Does the word *God* standing absolutely, without definitive of any kind, denote a Being who is possessed of a Divine nature; or the Being who sustains the relation of supreme dominion? If the former be taken, the Athanasian formula is equivalent to 'The Father is A Being who possesses a Divine nature, the Son is A Being who possesses a Divine nature, &c.'"

It is difficult to persuade oneself that Dr. L. is serious in all this. To his question, however, I will answer that the word *God* denotes the Being who is possessed of the only true Divine nature that exists, which Being sustains to his creatures the relationship of Supreme Ruler, and many others also.

If the word *God*, as used in this formula, is an absolute term denoting nature; then, as Dr. L. admits that *shin* denotes nature and "it does not, the inference is that the word *shin* is a suitable one to express the Trinity; and that it and its compounds are not. But Dr. L. insists that if we attempt to state the doctrine of the Trinity in Chinese, by the use of this word, it will be "the Father is a *Shin*," &c., &c. In answer to this, we have only to inform the English reader that the Chinese has no article, and that the phrase 父乃神, may without any violation of Chinese grammar be explained to mean the Father is the one only true and living *Shin*, to remove all apprehension from his mind on this score; and as we, who advocate the use of *Shin*, are monotheists, the reader may rest assured that we will tell the Chinese that, although they have heretofore supposed "that there were *shin* (gods) many, and *chii* (lords) many, that to us there is but one *Shin*;"—"that the Father is this *Shin*, the Son is this *Shin*, and the Holy Ghost is this *Shin*," and that there is yet, as we said above, "to us, but one *Shin*."

Dr. Legge must know that there is nothing easier than for us to say this in Chinese, and if he believes that the unity of the Godhead consists in a oneness of nature, I should be glad to know why the fact that the word *Shin* is an *absolute appellative* noun, unfits it to express the "Scriptural doctrine" of the Trinity. If he regards the Divinity of the Savior as "a mere relative divinity," and is prepared to stand to his position that "the view of Elohim, as a *relative term*, exhibits the doctrine of the Trinity in its *Scriptural simplicity*, and establishes the Divinity of Christ upon its *proper evidence*," then I can easily understand why he should maintain that we can not with *Shin* (an absolute term) express the doctrine of the Trinity in its *Scriptural simplicity*," but if he regards the Divinity of the Savior as absolute, if he regards him as "the very and eternal God," as "very God and very man;" if he believes, as he tells us on p. 57 of his Letters, "that the Father, Son, and Spirit are 'one in substance,' SO that there are not three Gods but *one God*;" then I can not understand what difficulty he can possibly see in the way of his expressing the doctrine of the Trinity in its *Scriptural simplicity* by the use of an *absolute appellative noun*.

I should be glad to see Dr. L. reconcile his views above quoted, viz., that "the Father, Son and Spirit are 'one in substance,' SO that there are not three Gods, but *one God*," with the opinion that we must use a mere, relative term which does not indicate *essence* or *nature* to express the doctrine of the Trinity in its *Scriptural simplicity*. I should like him also to point out what difficulty there can be in expressing that wherein the oneness of the Trinity consists by the use of a term signifying *nature*, if that oneness consists in *nature*. If his answer is that the difficulty consists not in the absolute character of the word *shin*, but in the fact of its being an *appellative* noun, this militates directly against his position that a relative term alone can express this doctrine in its *Scriptural simplicity*; besides he has told us that relative nouns, as well as absolute, are appellative; which being the case, we should be glad to know why an *absolute appellative* must give place to a *relative appellative* in our teaching the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity?

If to this Dr. L. replies, "Some relative terms are similarly construed," i. e. either with or without the article; that is the reason why we must have a relative appellative: our answer is, In Chinese there is no article; in this respect there is no difference between *Shángli* and *Shin*; and in English, his favorite phrase and the word *God*, tried by this test, can not be reconciled: he can not with "grammatical propriety" say, "Supreme Ruler made the world." *Argument*, p. 4.

(Note B., referred to on page 123.)

While we are engaged with this author, I will call attention to some very remarkable temples mentioned by him. He says, "In China, at the time of the former Five dynasties (A.D. 907—959), there was a temple to '*Hien Shin*,' or '*Yáu Shin*,' and another to 'the Fire, *Hien* or *Yáu Shin*.' During the *Táng* dynasty (A.D. 620—904), there were religious books from Persia. The fourth year of *T'ien-pau* (A.D. 745), the Emperor commanded the two Persian monasteries to be changed into *Ta-tsin* (Romish) monasteries (Nestorian?). We have also a Tablet giving an account of the spread of the *King kiau* (Illustrious religion) in China, written by *King Tsing* in the second year of *Kien-chung* (A.D. 781). Now to explain the character *Hien*, or *Yáu* 祆, it is from *shí* 示 and from *t'ien* 天, and is the god (*Shin*) of Heaven, whose religion arose in Palestine;* which originally was on the eastern borders of the Roman empire (*Ta-tsin*).† That which is called the "Foreign *Yáu*," is the "*Yáu Shin*," which is the same as the *Shin* of heaven,‡ and belongs to the Roman empire as I suppose,§ and is the origin of the religion of Jesus. With respect to the religion of the God of Fire (*Ho Shin* 火神) it came from Persia, and has no connection with the Roman Empire (*Ta-tsin*); should we say that it (the religion of the god of Fire) was the same with the '*Ho Yáu*,' this would be to confound the god of Fire with the God of Heaven: to say that the religion of the Persians comes from the Roman Empire (*Ta-tsin*) is like the erroneous derivation of my family from one of another surname. The Tablet about "the (*King kiau*) Illustrious Religion" (i. e. that described on the Syrian Monument) is still more erroneous. The *King kiau* is the religion of the fire worshipers: in the Tablet it is said, 'a bright star proclaimed the happy event; 'he suspended the bright sun in order to break open the abodes of darkness; at mid-day he ascended to heaven: 'all which refers to the sun's fire. It being also said in the Tablet, 'he determined in the form of the cross to establish the four quarters; and, 'once in seven days they have service,' implicates it with the *T'ien-chú kiau* (Romish religion). When it speaks

* *Fuh-lin*, i. e. Judea. Moses first established this country: Jesus was a descendant of his.

† *Ta-tsin* is the country of Rome in Italy or Roman empire. The Chinese observing that the men thereof in height and size were very like themselves, called it *Ta-tsin*, but the natives themselves did not call it by this name.

‡ "The character *Yáu* 祆 (or *Hien*, as others read) was originally made by the Chinese men; the people of the west have not a common mode of writing with Chinese men; how then came they by this character?" His astonishment seems to arise from this Chinese character's being given on the Temple as the name of the foreign God.

§ Palestine, from the time of the *Hán* dynasty, began to serve Rome; but from the time of the *Táng* dynasty it was captured by the Arabians.

of the three-one, mysterious bodied, uncreated, true Lord *Moho*, I do not know what man (胡人) is referred to. And the composition of the whole piece is in the exaggerated style of the dregs of the Buddhists: it (*the King kián*) is not the religion of Fire; it is not that of Heaven (i. e. the Nestorian); it is not that of Budha: we are entirely at a loss to know by what name to call this religion; for the Persians sacrificing to the god of Fire was an ancient custom that originated among themselves, and the religion of Budha prevailed in India, its (Persia's) eastern neighbor. The religion of the God of Heaven prevailed in the Roman empire (*Tu-tsin*) its western neighbor. From the time of the Tang dynasty, the *Tien-chú kián* of the Roman empire (*Ta-tsin*) flourished more extensively, and a clever foreign priest (*King Tsing*, the writer of the Tablet it is to be supposed) united the three religions, and made out of them one, to which he gave the name of *King kián*, "Illustrious religion" (or he may mean to insinuate that the priest meant it should be understood as the religion of *King* 景, this being his own name), in order to exalt himself. In China the origin was not known, the people therefore followed his story and honored and believed in it, exactly according to what Chung Li says, "You only like to hear what is strange."

It is also said in the Tablet, that in the twelfth year of Ching-kwán (A.D. 630), Olopun, a man of great virtue, of the Roman Empire (*Tu-tsin*), has brought sacred books and images from afar, and presented them at our capital. This *Olotuk* (misprint, I presume for *Olopun*) coming from the Roman empire (*Tu-tsin*) was no doubt of the *Tien-chú kián* (Romanish religion); and his sacred books were the Holy Books and Gospels that have been transmitted to us from Europe: the images were those of Jesus on the cross; but we do not hear that, at that time, they had those images. With respect to that which is called *King kián*, its depending upon (being derived from?) the religion of the Persian god of Fire, and having its images, dresses, decorations, &c., from the Buddhists—this is what I can not explain.

"From the time of the *Tang* dynasty, the Buddhist religion has flourished: the temples of the Foreign *Yü* and of the Fire *Yü*, and the religion of Persia and of *Tu-tsin*, have all not been again seen. According to western writers, in the northern country of Africa, called Abyssinia, the *Ta-tsin* "Roman," (perhaps Nestorian) religion still exists; it still is also the name of the religion of the Persian fire-god."

The three temples above-mentioned are objects of great interest to us, and I trust we shall be able to learn from what source His Excellency obtained his information, and thus get access to a fuller account of them.

The character 祇 is explained as the name of a foreign god, 胡神 in the following Dictionaries:—

說文通釋 篆字彙 正字通 韻府 萃音 韻府約編。

It is read by all *Hien*: the 正字通 alone reading it also *Yü*. If our author is correct in saying that this *Shin* was the same as the *Shin* who gave the law at Mount Sinai, then I think there can be but little doubt the charac-

ter should be read *Yáu*, as the Being designated by the builders must in that case have been $\text{IA}\Omega$, i. e. Jehovah; for the Nestorians could not have built a temple to any false god.

I have translated *Tú-tsin* throughout "Roman empire," as the author so explains it himself. It may mean (though I doubt it) Judea, in the Syrian Monument, but this author does not so understand it. He can make nothing of the Monument at all, as the reader will perceive. Because in the Tablet it is said, "a bright star proclaimed the happy event," and that, "Persians, seeing its brightness, came with presents," he concludes the people mentioned were Parsees, or worshippers of fire.

ERRATA.

- Page 46 line 4 from bottom, for *ονων* read *ονων*.
- " 48 " 13 " " after *καρπός*, add *Θεόν ex Θεού*.
- " 52 " 14 " top, for "possessing a being," read "possessing, or being," &c.
- " 53 " 18 from top, insert "not" before "properly."
- " 54 " 9 " " for "sound" read "sounds."
- " 61 " 17 " " for "*mentis*" read "*mentis*."
- " 61 " 12 from bottom, for *Το θεων* read *Το θεϊόν*.
- " 62 " 6 " " insert "of" after "conceive."
- " 64 " 10 " top, for "simple" read "single."
- " 65 " 8 " " "Supreme god" should be printed "Supreme God." Same change in word "god" on last line of this page, in the 6th line of the 63th page, and the 3d and 6th lines of the 77th page.
- " 71 " 8 from top, insert "to" after "that." Two lines below, for "what" read "which."
- " 72 " 20 from top, for "other political," read "atheo-political."
- " 73 " 2 from bottom, in note, for "discune" read "discurrere."
- " 76 " 13 from top, for "of the being" read "of being."—Also line 24, for "term" read "terms."
- " 76 " 3 from top, insert a comma after "*substans*."
- " 78 " 4 from bottom, for "is guilty" read "if guilty."
- " 96 " 11 from top, insert "in" before "and."
- " 96 " 5 from bottom, for "simple" read "single."
- " 101 " 6 from top, for "Xenophanos" read "Xenophanēs."
- " 101 " 17 " " for *ηαντων* read *παντων*.
- " 114 " 3 " " for "being" read "beings."
- " 119 " 20 " " for "the god (*shin*) whom their ancestors worshiped," read "the ancestral god (*shin*) whom they (each country) worshiped."
- " 127 " 7 from bottom, insert "they" before "choose."
- " 130 top line, for "If" read "It."
- " 131 line 16 from top, insert "have" before "believed."
- " 136 " 16 from bottom, insert "that" before "which."
- " 139 " 19 from top, transpose "still" after the word "inadequately."
- " 149 " 15 " " for "page 43" read "page 95."

